Naval War College Review

Volume 37
Number 6 *November-December*

Article 1

1984

November-December 1984 Full Issue

The U.S. Naval War College

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

November - December 1984

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

The *Naval War College Review* was established in 1948 by the Chief of Naval Personnel in order that officers of the Navy and Marine Corps might receive some of the educational benefits available to the resident students at the Naval War College. The forthright and candid views of the authors are presented for the professional education of the readers. Articles published are related to the academic and professional activities of the Naval War College. They are drawn from a wide variety of sources in order to inform, to stimulate, and to challenge the readers, and to serve as a catalyst for new ideas. Articles are selected primarily on the basis of their intellectual and literary merits, usefulness and interest to servicewide readership, and timeliness. Reproduction of an article published in the *Review* requires the approval of the Editor, *Naval War College Review*, and the author. Reproduction of articles published in the *Review* is subject to the Copyright Act of 1976 and treaties of the United States, to the extent that they are applicable. Caution should be exercised in the case of those articles protected by copyright, as may be indicated by a copyright notice at the beginning of such articles. *Review* content is open to citation and other reference, in accordance with accepted academic research methods. The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department or the Naval War College.

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The editorial offices of the *Naval War College Review* are located at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I., 02841. Published bimonthly, distribution is generally limited to: U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard commands and activities; Regular and Reserve officers of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard; military officers of other services, foreign officers, and civilians having a present or previous affiliation with the Naval War College; and selected U.S. Government officials. Correspondence concerning *Review* matters should be directed to its editorial offices. (Telephone: Area Code 401-841-2236/4552, Autovon - 948-2236/4552.) All other departments of the college may be reached by calling 401-841-3089, autovon 948-3089.

Second Class postage paid at Newport, RI, and pending at additional mailing offices. POSTMASTERS, send address changes to: Naval Publications and Forms Center, 5801 Tabor Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19120. ISSN 0028-1484

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Cover: The destroyer *David R. Ray* (DD 971) closes another ship during a mass conflagration exercise off San Diego in March 1983. Photo courtesy Captain Larry Seaquist, US Navy.

President's Notes

As we complete our Centennial year celebrations, I want to call attention to a part of our campus that has been quietly emerging as a major contributor to the Naval War College mission—the Center for Continuing Education, or, as we call it, "CCE." This is the extension department of the college, responsible for all nonresident instruction.

Originally known as the Correspondence School, CCE has an interesting past. It was formally established in 1914; however, its antecedents provided seminar instruction to the staff of the US Naval Academy as early as 1906. Among the past directors of the Center were Lieutenant Commander William S. Pye (1914-1915) and Commander Raymond A. Spruance (1932-1933), both of whom became distinguished flag officers and later returned to Newport as Presidents of the college.

From its inception, the mission of CCE has been to provide Naval War College courses to nonresident students who seek to expand their professional horizons. Today, the Center is truly an extension of the Newport campus, offering courses which not only permit an officer to study the entire College of Naval Command and Staff core curriculum; but also to receive a Naval War College nonresident diploma. This diploma is recognized by the Chief of Naval Personnel as representing completion of the Naval War College at the intermediate i.e. Command and Staff level, a major career achievement.

The best known of CCE programs is the correspondence course program which has been described periodically in the *Review*. In more recent years, CCE has been offering an off-campus seminar program in Washington, DC, and now in other locations. Completion of either track or a combination thereof qualifies the student for the nonresident diploma.

One of Admiral Watkins' key initiatives has been an increased emphasis on Naval War College education. In past "President's Notes," I have described how the college is receiving more naval officers in the resident courses with more operational and command experience than ever before. There still remain, however, large numbers of highly qualified officers who would benefit from a Naval War College education, but who may not be able to attend in residence because of competing demands for their time and talents.

To meet the educational needs of the Navy and to assist talented and ambitious naval officers to reach their professional education goals, the Naval War College has expanded its programs for nonresident study. This

expansion has taken two forms: first, increased opportunities for naval officers to participate through the correspondence course program, and second, expansion of the number of locations where officers may participate in the Off-Campus Seminar Program. In this latter program, officers 0-3 and above, can complete the core curriculum through weekly seminars held in the evening. In cooperation with the Chief of Naval Air Training and the Superintendent of the US Naval Academy, I have recently opened three new Centers for Off-Campus study, in Corpus Christi, Texas; Pensacola, Florida; and Annapolis, Maryland. The new Centers are modeled on the highly successful Off-Campus Seminar Program now in its tenth year in the Washington, DC area. Currently over 340 students are enrolled in Off-Campus Seminar courses! I anticipate that approximately 30 percent of those graduating from the Naval War College next June, at the Command and Staff level, will come from the nonresident programs! Plans are being made to further increase the number of Naval War College Off-Campus Centers in other areas around the country where there are large numbers of naval officers. Demand and sponsoring command support will help determine how rapidly this program is expanded.

Naval War College nonresident programs are of high quality and tough. They are not for everyone. As with the resident program, they require discipline and intellectual vigor. The nonresident courses are substantive, graduate-level courses to which the same high standards are applied as in resident courses. Though the demands are high, these courses are professionally and personally rewarding.

Although CCE nonresident students spend most of their time away from the Newport campus, I get a good look at many when they come to Newport to participate in special resident activities and when they come to graduate with their resident classmates. Two of last June's graduates, with whom I spoke, are on their way to command; one to a nuclear submarine and the other to an F/A-18 squadron. Both are convinced that their War College studies have significantly influenced their opportunities for further professional growth.

For those of you who would like to know more about the programs and courses offered by the Naval War College's Center for Continuing Education, I suggest that you send in the card located at the back of this issue of the *Review*. You will be sent more information about the courses and how to apply. I urge you to give this opportunity your serious consideration.



JAMES E. SERVICE
Rear Admiral, US Navy
President, Naval War College

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A Central Role for Naval Forces? . . . to Support the Land Battle

Captain Andrew Jampoler, US Navy

Western political and military leaders had some reason for satisfaction as they viewed the globe on the morning of D+30.

First, the war was still a conventional one. The past 30 days had seen tragic loss of life and terrible destruction, but nothing like that which would have attended exchanges of tactical nuclear weapons on the continent of Europe.

Next, in the face of the Warsaw Pact's huge offensive, Nato defenses still held. Although the forward edge of the battle area was now some tens of miles west of the initial defense lines on the inter-German border, Western defenses remained intact from the Channel to the Alps. There was, however, as yet no possibility of a counterattack to regain forward defense positions. And there was no way to replace the thousands of aircraft and tanks that had been lost in what was already clearly the world's most lethal war. One month into the war, fully 70 percent of the West's tanks and tactical aircraft had been destroyed; corresponding Warsaw Pact losses, thanks to Nato's quick response to strategic warning and the wholesale use of "smart weapons" of extraordinary accuracy, were substantially higher.

At sea, Nato had been successful everywhere—in the minds of some, incredibly so. Shipping on the Atlantic, Pacific and oil SLOCs was not significantly impaired, although this appeared to be more the result of a diffident Soviet submarine warfare campaign than in consequence of Allied ASW successes. The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron was on the bottom. While some Soviet diesel submarines remained in the Mediterranean, Nato ASW operations promised the near-term elimination of this threat.

Naval operations in the northern Atlantic and northwestern Pacific had been equally successful.

The Soviet offensive against northern Norway had been turned back, leaving key littoral airfields in Allied hands—thns making sustained Western naval operations in the Greenland, Barents and Norwegian seas possible. These same operations had pressed Soviet surface units back against the Mnrman Coast and into the White Sea, sinking many. The US Navy's ASW campaign in these waters had eliminated an important fraction of Soviet SSNs and SSBNs attached to the Northern Fleet.

Soviet Pacific Fleet units at sea southeast of the Kurils had been sunk, excepting a small number of submarines now being harried by ASW ships and aircraft. Here, too, Soviet submarines had been sunk in substantial numbers.

Soviet naval bases in both fleets had deliberately not yet been attacked. The Alliance's political leadership had judged that such a direct attack on the

Soviet homeland would be construed by the VGK as a deliberate escalatory step and would almost certainly provoke a nuclear response. Moreover, Nato's admirals had concluded that—irrespective of the Soviet response—such attacks could occasion heavy attrition on the attacking force and, considering that much of the Soviet Navy's assets was already on the bottom, were not worth the cost.

In sum, the naval bastions of the Soviet Union's two deployable fleets had been breached, and the USSR's maritime flanks were open to strikes from the sea.

After 30 days of war, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet was largely intact. It had suffered some minor losses to Turkish submarines and to Western air strikes against units near the Bosporus. To date, significant Western action had been limited to strikes against Rumanian and Bulgarian airfields that could bed-down Soviet aviation regiments targeted against Nato ships in the eastern Mediterranean.

The situation in the Baltic was similar to that in the Black Sea; Soviet combatant ship losses to German submarines were modest. It was clear, however, that a major push into the Jutland Peninsula was in the offing and that the offensive would include a substantial Warsaw Pact amphibious effort, through mined waters, against the Danish east coast. Should Jutland fall, the implications to southern Norway and possibly to Sweden's neutrality would be ominous. Equally ominous was evidence that Warsaw Pact second echelon forces—comprising some 60 divisions—would soon be committed in strength at key points along the line. The advance of these divisions appeared to have been unimpaired by intense US air strikes behind the front, in implementation of the doctrine which prescribed destruction of the Pact's second echelon, as a way of taking pressure off outnumbered Western forces in close combat.

For its part, the Pact had been largely unsuccessful in disrupting Allied ground defenses through the introduction of high-speed, well-armed "operational maneuver groups" deep into Western rear areas, where the VGK hoped they would eviscerate the relatively vulnerable logistics infrastructure of the West.

In short, Nato had survived the first month of the war substantially intact, although it had been thrown back in places from its forward defense lines by the weight of the Pact offensive. Remarkably, it now appeared possible that the war in Europe might develop into a conflict of maneuver and attrition like World War II, rather than the quick rush to Armageddon which had been forecast. (Unlike that earlier war, however, the industrial strength of the United States was no longer the largest factor in the attrition equation. Indeed, in the still-unscathed Russian homeland, Soviet industry was doing very well in the *only* thing it did well: military production. Soviet tank, aircraft, artillery, combatant ship, and munitions production vastly exceeded that of the United States, whose own economy—for a variety of reasons—would be for months incapable of high-speed, high-volume production of the means of war.) But it was not at all clear whether Nato's conventional strength was sufficient to sustain a conventional defense.

The question now was: could the Alliance hold fast on the ground, in the face of the impending offensive, once the Pact's second-echelon fronts

arrived on the line? The question for the Alliance's *naval* leadership and its political figures as well, was: could Nato's decisive advantage at sea be brought to bear on the Central Front? Could control of the sea be used to project power into western Europe, or was Nato condemned to be on the wrong side of a war of attrition which at some point could make a resort to tactical nuclear weapons inevitable? If the Allies could not translate victory at sea to power ashore, what were the implications for Nato if the Alliance no longer could sustain its Continental partners? What were the implications for the United States if it faced a world in which it had lost most of its air force and army in Europe, and the Warsaw Pact stood on the Channel ports across from Dover?

Children familiar with Aesop's fables recall the story of the fox and the crane, who invited each other to dinner. The fox served the meal on flat plates; the crane served from tall-necked jars. Neither guest got anything to eat but instead had to watch his host consume the meal. Their problem was one of configuration. Neither guest was configured to eat from his host's tableware, which condition the host used to best advantage. Does the world's premier power projection navy suffer from the same configuration problem, such that we are not able to project power into the one theater where in conventional, extended warfare it might matter most: the Central Front? Or is our problem less one of physical capacity than it is of mental agility? Are we simply unable to think of ways in which to use naval forces in Europe's heartland?

Setting aside special-purpose applications, such as the use of SEALs, there are three general ways to project naval power ashore.

Through the aircraft of a carrier air wing. While a host of factors combine to define precisely how much force can be exerted, in general the weight of the strikes is a function of the number of ships, air wing composition and distance to the target. To increase a wing's attack aircraft complement, sacrifices necessarily would have to be made elsewhere. Whether or not such trade-offs (e.g., a reduction in embarked ASW aircraft) could safely be made would be a function of the threat environment and other defensive resources (i.e., land-based patrol aircraft) that could be brought to bear.

By bombardment of the shore. Until the return of the *New Jersey* and *Iowa* to active service, the Navy's shore bombardment resources were almost vestigial. Even now the *New Jersey* and *Iowa* are as much symbols of this capacity as its reality. The introduction of land attack cruise missiles into the inventory raises the possibility of long-range, high-accuracy bombardment, but its practical application will have to await the further development of improved warheads and of a sound conventional, land attack cruise missile employment doctrine and supporting mapping.

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In amphibious assault. Today's amphibious shipping can put ashore a balanced fighting force of 50,000 men, the assault echelon of one Marine Amphibious Force. While available amphibious lift is adequate to move only a portion of the Corps' wartime strength ashore, it is unlikely that we will need to land more than a MAF-sized force again. To ensure optimal capability, however, the Navy has begun a major improvement in amphibious lift capability toward achieving a goal of lifting a MAF and a MAB.

With these forces—taken together and combined with those of friendly armies and air forces—and in the light of other naval missions, can Nato's navies change the likely course of the land battle?

It is a general, and generally defensible, principle of naval warfare that *more* is better than *less*. This unremarkable insight has stimulated a remarkable amount of criticism, most recently cast in terms that a larger navy merely creates "a target-rich environment," directed at proving the counterintuitive notion that *less* is somehow superior to *more*. The real expert on this subject was General Custer, who is today famous for having died in a target-rich environment. (The price of confusing an opportunity to excel with imminent disaster has always been high!) Accepting, without complicated proof, the basketball coach's observation that a good big team will always beat a good little team, it is easy to see that naval contingency planning will always be a matter of allocating insufficient assets against competing theater claims. This allocation process compels some rank order of priorities, for we cannot do everything everywhere at once.

Whether or not we believe that war at sea will be global, and irrespective of what one thinks of swing strategies (or "The Swing Strategy"), for the foreseeable future we will have to fight sequentially at sea, in a sequence designed to commit our limited naval forces first in support of the most urgent and important campaigns, so that in each instance we have decisive strength available at the decisive point.

Our national military priorities would appear to be something like the following:

The defense of the United States. This is always first on everybody's short list of military missions, even though it is increasingly less clear how we can do this without success in western Europe and the western Pacific.

The defense of our Nato allies. Parenthetically, it may not be possible to defend our eastern Mediterranean allies and friends without some measnre of Israeli Air Force assistance. For this reason—to be able to operate in the eastern Mediterranean—and others, the defense of Israel becomes an implicit part of our general obligations on the Southern Flank, notwithstanding Allied fears that the United States is confusing its national and Nato objectives.

The defense of Japan and our other interests in the Far East.

The defense of Western (and Japanese) access to Middle East oil, an objective fundamentally different in character from the first two. In practical terms, this translates into defense of Saudi Arabia and the oil SLOCs.

Everything else.

Putting aside the first objective, arguably undoable by itself, it is possible to hear cogent arguments altering the order of the next three objectives, although many would agree that Europe's defense is second only in importance to our own. (Sometimes, strangely, it appears that we believe the defense of Europe to be more important than some Europeans do. It is regrettably easy to adopt this cynical view while scanning the defense budgets and public statements of some of our more prosperous allies.)

The case of oil access vs. Japan is an especially complex one, but the answer appears to hinge on the answers to two questions. First, is enough oil stockpiled in the West and Japan to support an enduring conventional defense, such that oil access can be a lower priority consideration? (If not, then we risk driving ourselves into an early resort to nuclear weapons—a strategic decision of overarching importance compelled by a failure of logistics.) Second, if the Soviets gained a military position controlling Middle East/southwest Asia POL reserves, would we later be able to eject them by force?

An inspection of US Navy deployments today seems to suggest that our naval forces have a wartime employment priority partially congruent with this listing of national military priorities. In America's closest (and most neglected, until recently) maritime theater, the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea—from which, and through the Florida Straits, virtually all of the initial reinforcement and early logistic support for a war in Europe must flow—we have almost no naval forces permanently deployed. We are well postured on the southern of Nato's two maritime flanks but have given scant consideration to a naval role on the principal European front. We have great plans for Nato's northern maritime flank but only very modest forces there—partly a reflection of allied sensitivities and partly of force structure. We are reasonably well deployed in the western Pacific, and have a lesser presence in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, supported from tiny Diego Garcia, which is—sadly—in the wrong place to be especially useful in the important Persian Gulf/North Arabian Sea area. It is difficult to escape the thought that our deployments (and exercises) are equally the product of balancing the requirements of national and naval missions against the force structure (and what we know of our adversaries' intentions and capabilities) and the products of habit and recent history.

In the face of these shortages and this reality, to win—not just at sea but ashore too—we must be able to: (1) Rationalize our peacetime deployment modus operandi. (2) Move quickly from a peacetime deployment posture to

one of crisis containment and de-escalation. Should that fail, (3) act on strategic warning to reposition naval forces. Accomplish urgent wartime naval missions. And then, (4) contribute effectively to the land battles.

If we are nimble and nimble-witted, there is no reason why the Soviet surface navy cannot be destroyed at sea during the early weeks of a conventional war. If we then eschew the temptation to get distracted, it should be possible to swing our naval forces from where they were to engage the Soviet Navy to where they have to be to support more directly the land battle. (Coincidentally, considering the size of the tactical air forces facing one another across Europe, 3,000 Nato and 7,200 Warsaw Pact aircraft on D-day, and perhaps one-third that many 30 days later, the introduction of sea-based tactical aviation too soon in the conflict could result in the premature loss of these relatively scarce aircraft. By "premature" I mean that the loss would not be balanced by an offsetting military benefit. Putting naval aircraft into the Central Front battle some time after D+30—which is probably as soon as possible, if uniquely naval missions were to be accomplished first—could be done to greater advantage.)

Accepting that naval intervention in the land battle is desirable and I would argue that, without it, we cannot win a conventional war, can it be done? How?

One way is not to intervene at all but rather to substitute US naval power for some other kind, which can in turn then be sent forward. If, for example, American aircraft carriers operating from within the Irish Sea could participate in the air defense of the United Kingdom, then land-based RAF squadrons, which would otherwise be performing the home-defense mission, could become available to support the land battle on the Continent.

Another way would be to fly strikes from US and French carriers steaming in the North Sea and the Ligurian Sea against targets on accessible portions of the FEBA or to blunt a Pact ground offensive into northern Italy via the Po Valley. Naturally, this would be more effective if the air wing were attack-heavy.

Any decision to use naval aircraft as substitutes for those based ashore must be made after careful consideration, because each tailhook-equipped aircraft is more than a number of potential sorties; it represents roughly one percent of the military capability of the carrier itself, an investment of people and dollars that dwarfs the cost of corresponding shore-based aircraft and facilities.

The aircraft carrier with her embarked air wing and afloat escorts, is the best general-purpose response our nation has to overseas crises which have a military dimension. Seen in this light, our requirement for *carrier battle groups* is driven substantially by our peacetime crisis control needs. The present objective force level is 15; obviously, more would permit either a faster

response, a more substantial one, or a response in more places at the same time at today's tempo of operations.

In the event of general conventional war, the number of available CVBGs is obviously important. Less obviously important is the number of aircraft embarked and the availability of attrition replacements; but I would argue that, in general war, aircraft are in some ways more important than the parent ships. High aircraft attrition can quickly reduce our carriers to relative impotence. To avoid a situation whereby a loss of an important fraction of the air wing would permanently degrade the combat potential of the CVBG, we need to ensure that we are prepared for substantial aircraft attrition.

The thesis being argued here is that we need significant numbers of aircraft carriers for crisis management in peacetime and that our enduring and substantial peacetime needs for presence and power projection are inadequately reflected in our CV inventory. In wartime, we need more than one air wing per aircraft carrier to ensure continued capability in the face of a high threat to the air wing, such as would obtain on the Central Front.

A third naval contribution to the land battle is through amphibious assault at some decisive point. Geography, naturally, limits where amphibious forces can be brought to bear. Happily, putting Marines ashore on Jutland is not only possible but also strategically wise. Ensuring Nato control of Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland—something the Danes and West Germans must view as vital—would:

Protect southern Norway and Sweden. Certainly populous southern Norway deserves as much attention as the strategically important, but largely vacant, north if for no other reason than that we cannot hold the North Cape area should southern Norway fall. With respect to Sweden: as armed neutrals defending their national territory, the Swedes perform an important, albeit coincidental, service for the Alliance. There is no contradiction in Nato's taking of measures which have as one effect preserving the ability of the Swedes to defend themselves.

Control access to the Baltic Sea. Our traditional objective in the Baltic has been to ensure that the Soviet Baltic Fleet, supported by Pact allies, could not sortie through the Kattegat and the Skagerrak and join its northern counterpart in depredations in Atlantic shipping lanes. The Soviets may not be interested in this at all; if not, we should not deny ourselves the possibility—and benefits—of Nato offensive operations on the Baltic southern littoral, impossible without firm control of the Danish peninsula. These operations raise interesting questions about Pact, especially Polish and East German, solidarity.

Anchor the immediate seaward flank of the Alliance's forward defense, the bedrock of Nato's agreed strategy. Ideally, US Marines should get to Jutland in some force before D-day, when administrative delivery—instead of the much more challenging amphibious assault—would be possible. Such a timely arrival

depends heavily on adequate strategic warning of a Soviet move west (which we probably can expect to receive) and quick political decision-making to permit the movement of forces designed to deter that same invasion. This latter event is much less certain than the former, when one considers the elephantine decision-making process to which the Alliance has bound itself.

As to the feasibility of an amphibious landing on western Jutland: if a preemptive administrative landing were not made, most judgments are probably too pessimistic.

An alternative for Marine Corps employment, this one in the Southern Region, would be as a strategic reserve held afloat and on the island of Sicily. There the Marines could be committed to either the eastern Mediterranean (Thrace) or the central Med (perhaps the Po Valley), when it became clear which choice represented wise employment. Until such a decision had been reached, Marines ashore on Sicily could defend that island—a vital part of our logistics infrastructure in that theater—and Marine air could fly throughout the central Mediterranean, and over much of coastal north Africa, to ensure open SLOCs to our Nato and Middle East friends and allies.

Distilled to its essence, what emerges from the foregoing is:

- Nato's conventional defenses, at sea and ashore, might well be fully sufficient to result in a long war of maneuver and attrition. Such a war is made more possible because both sides understand well the costs of nuclear war and have developed political and military instruments and procedures of restraint to a high level.
- Parodoxically, while Nato can thus "force" a long conventional war, its land and air forces probably cannot win one, and the Alliance (and its individual partners) have not well considered—in any sort of rigorous way—how its substantial naval advantage can be brought to bear on the land battle.
- There are European battlefields where naval forces can be brought to bear with significant effect, if the time of commitment and type of forces are selected wisely. Norway, Denmark, Italy, Greece and parts of Germany and Turkey are examples of European partners where naval forces could be decisive in supporting land battles under certain scenarios.
- Our naval power projection force needs to be examined in light of a possible substantial role in support of the land battle for Nato Europe. Such an examination may reveal additional procurement requirements; it may simply show the need for more carefully considered and articulated tactical employment doctrine.

A Concept of Service

General John W. Vessey, Jr., US Army

For those of you in the Armed Forces of the United States, you leave here at an exciting time from the perspective of your profession. There is more going on in the development of tactical concepts, in equipment modernization, in innovative training, and in genuine cooperation among our Armed Forces than I have seen in the 45 years I have been in uniform. You have read of the recent Army-Air Force announcements about battlefield collaboration, and the work between the Navy and the Air Force on collateral maritime missions. For you, what makes it even more exciting is the fact that we, as a nation and as Armed Forces, are absolutely uninhibited by lack of room in dealing with improvement.

Now, I realize that I am talking to officers from other nations and I think you will see that what I have to say perhaps fits the concepts of your nation. I realize I am talking to some civilian graduates of the college and I think that you will see that perhaps these same general concepts apply to you—if not exactly, then at least generally. You military people have chosen to serve the nation through service in the Armed Forces. The key word is "service." You serve *in* the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard. You do not work for them.

The reason for your service is because "We the People" agreed to provide for our common defense. You serve the people, and you do it best by helping preserve the peace by preparing for war. The people of this nation need to have confidence that you do not promote war. You do not advocate war, but war is in fact your *business* and *you are ready for it.*

In April I was in Greece. When in Athens I went to the Acropolis; and while there I could not help but think of that marvelous dialogue that Plato relates in the "Second Book" of the *Republic.* He has Glaucon and Socrates talking about the attributes of the armed forces of the day, which Plato called the "Guardians"—the Guardians of the city. At one point in the dialogue Plato has Socrates saying, "Nothing can be more important than that the work of the Guardians should be well done." He said, "If shoemakers become

Graduation address for the 1984 Naval War College Class.

General Vessey is Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

inferior and claim to be what they are not, the state is not in peril; but if the Guardians of our city only appear to be Guardians and are *not* Guardians, you surely see that they utterly destroy the city."

Socrates and Glaucon go on to describe desirable attributes for the Guardians. They said they should be "quick to see, swift to overtake the enemy, and strong." Socrates adds that they should be brave and that their strength is spiritual as well as physical. Then they went on to decide that " . . . one man cannot practice many arts," and that war is an art and must be studied and practiced. And Socrates adds that "The higher the duties of the Guardian, the more time and skill and art and application will be needed by him."

Socrates and Glaucon conclude their description of the Guardians by recognizing, "They ought to be dangerous to their enemies but gentle to their friends," and by their friends, they mean the citizens of the Republic. Then, they go on to wonder if it is possible to find these conflicting natures in a single person.

Through the years, most civilized countries have wrestled with the same questions about their armed forces: how to have warriors with the necessary skill and ferocity in times of war and not have them be a menace to the society in times of peace. Our Forefathers were very concerned about those issues. The product of their concern is the relationship that exists today between our society aud its warriors. That relationship was founded in the *Declaration of Independence* and in the *Constitution.*

The nation has always been skeptical of military power—witness Ben Franklin's brilliant but unsuccessful pamphlet, "Plain Talk," asking his fellow colonists in 1747 to do more in their own self defense, and Thomas Jefferson's initial opposition to a navy. And, in 1784, the Continental Congress declared that standing armies in peace were inconsistent with the principles of the Republic. The Congress reduced the Continental Army to about a hundred officers and men aud then stationed them as far away from civilization as they possibly could. As some of you know, we still do that today.

Later, at the Constitutional Convention, one delegate proposed that the *Constitution* prohibit the Army from ever being larger than five thousand men. Now, George Washington was also a delegate to the Convention and it is reported that he said, "That's fine—as long as we have another provision in the *Constitution* that no enemy will be permitted to attack the Nation with more than three thousand men."

That skepticism was later developed in the *Federalist Papers*, and it all relates to why our military, springing from the society it serves and is sworn to defend, embodies the principles that govern the society. We, the military, are a part of "We the *people.*" That is why our military forces have never produced a man on horseback; why the military forces have not been involved in the political affairs of the nation; and why they have not strayed from the

narrow path of defending the *Constitution* as it was originally intended—that is, protecting the society and not policing the society.

You, the officers, the men and women of the Armed Forces of today, are the nation's Guardians, Guardians of today. You are the warrior class of the United States in the 1980s and 1990s. You have chosen to give up some of the benefits of your own personal liberty so that the citizens of the nation may enjoy those benefits in full. You have chosen to serve the nation; but, it is also important that you recognize that the nation has chosen you to serve. That is a unique relationship. As with Socrates' Guardians, your higher duties will require more of your time, skill, art and application. And that is the reason for your attendance here at the Naval War College. As with the Guardians of Plato's *Republic*, *nothing* is more important than that your work be well done.

As you go on to your assignments, your skill and your concept of service and your values and your loyalties to the nation and to your service will carry you through the years ahead. The skills you learned here, the issues that were exposed, are all important; and you need to develop them and hone them through the years ahead. But you also need to continue to hone the concept of service. The concept of selfless service is essential for the Armed Forces as an institution; it is essential for you as members of the Guardian class; and it is essential for the security of the nation.

You do not choose the wars you fight or the places you serve, whether it is fighting a war or preserving the peace. You do not go home until the job is done. And, in doing the job you may well have to put life and limb at risk. Sir John Hackett called it the military's "unlimited liability contract." That is a good name for it. Many years ago a great sailor, Lord Nelson, said, "Duty is the great business of a sea-officer; all private considerations must give way to it, however painful it may be." Petty considerations just do not apply.

The ultimate test for the Armed Forces is the survival of the nation; but the service of every sailor, soldier, airman, Marine or Coast Guardsman is tested in less awesome ways every day. It is the sum of the performance of all its members that defines the success of the Armed Forces. Each member of our military forces is accountable for his or her compliance with orders under law; but for the Guardian, compliance with orders alone is not enough. The security of the nation requires that you comply with orders and laws and regulations but it also requires that you comply with the unique sense of service to your fellow Guardians, the fellow members of your class. Matt Dillon used to say on *Gunsmoke*, "It's a chancy job and a little lonely."

There are no degrees of importance in the service you perform. Some of you will go from here to command ships and squadrons; others will be working in logistic outfits supplying weapons and equipment or doing research and development. Some of you will be buried in the anonymity of staff work. Some of you will go to faraway places that your mother-in-law will not be able to find on the map. One thing that I want to emphasize to you

is that whatever the duty, it is important. Under the code of the Guardians, there is no unimportant duty. Under that code, the sailor who died in insignificant sorties against pirates some place was as important as the crewmen who saved the remnants of the ill-fated Greeley expedition on the Arctic ice a hundred years ago, or as important as those Rangers who scaled Pointe du Hoc at Normandy 40 years ago, or as important as the naval officers who directed the gunfire to support that operation.

There is no Service that is more important than the other in our scheme of Armed Services and there is no duty that is more important than the other under the code of the Guardian. Once in a while we aviators like to think that when we are up in the air—free—that we have mastery over all. How many times have you sat on the ramp, waiting for a maintenance man to show up when the airplane was broken? You were not going anywhere until that maintenance man showed up. We, the fighters, sometimes think it all belongs to us. But, when we are wounded and picked up by some obscure medic to ease our pain, then we realize thar we are no more imporrant than he is.

The fighter pilots often think that recce guys do not do anything important. Yet, when you read the history of the battle of the Coral Sea, you will see that the Japanese losr the battle because a recce pilot did not do his duty correctly. The fighter pilot who was picked up out of the jungle or out of rhe water by a helicopter pilor knows that his duty is not more important than the other fellow's duty.

Recently, I was in Italy for the 40th anniversary of the Liberation of Rome—visiting some of the battlefields of my youth. At the ceremonies, I think I was the last of the World War II veterans on active duty; but I want to tell you I was only a drummer boy. A young television reporter cornered me and asked me if I was not disappointed about what had happened 40 years ago when Rome was liberated and then overshadowed by the D-day events in Normandy a couple of days later. He asked me if I was not disappointed to have participated in great battles which some historians later had characterized as unimportant? And I told him that if he was not a member of the warrior class, if he was not a Guardian, he would not understand the answer so there was no point in my telling him.

On Memorial Day, my present squad, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, fell in; and marched in step the six miles from the Capitol to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier for the burial of the Vietnam Unknown. We did that as sort of a sign to all present and future members of the Guardians, a confirmation of our belief in the code. That is that there are no unimportant duties, that whoever has fallen serving his country, wherever he is, even if he is unknown, has died performing important duty.

But I want to emphasize to you that whatever the tasks assigned, they are all imporrant. None can be left undone without peril to the nation. Twenty years or so from now, one of you, by the Grace of God and through the

confidence of your fellow members of the Guardian Class, may be serving as Chief of Naval Operations or as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For whomever that is, I want to tell you today it is important for you to recognize your service is no more important than that of your classmates here who will not have risen to such rank.

Inseparable from the concept of service is the concept of integrity. The citizens of this great nation place great trust in their military Services. They will continue to judge us by stricter rules than they apply to themselves. And they *should* do that because, ultimately, their security rests with us and the way we perform our duties. The people of this nation have entrusted their Armed Forces with the most awesome weapons the world has ever seen, but they have also placed the lives of their sons and daughters who serve, and the safety of their own families for now and in the future in the hands of the Armed Forces.

Do not confuse integrity with infallibility. There is a great tendency to do that. As Gary Cooper said in *High Noon*, you should "aim to be high-regarded"; but you should remember that you are human and fallible. Those who serve with you and under you are also human and fallible. Those who will lead you are also human and fallible. The code of the Guardian has room for fallibility. Certainly, the higher up the flagpole you go, the more of your fallible backside will show. There is room for that; but, there is *no room* for a lack of integrity or for those who place self before duty or self before comrades or self before country. Careerism is the *one great sin*, and it has no place among you.

Now, you may sit there and say, "Well, that's pretty well for you to say that when you are high on the lofty perch as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but we all want to get ahead." And I know you want to get ahead. I understand that. I applaud it. But if you get there over the bodies of careers and your comrades, you have served your nation poorly and you have violated the code of the Guardians.

There will not be any tribunal to judge your actions at the height of battle; there are only the hopes of the citizenry who are relying upon your integrity and skill. They may well criticize you later amid the relative calm of victory or defeat. But, there is a crucial moment in crisis or battle when those you lead and the citizens of the nation can only trust that you are doing what is right. And you develop that concept through integrity.

There is a marvelous passage in the last pages of Field Marshal Montgomery's book. He said, "But there are times in war when men must do hazardous jobs, and when success and the Nation's fate depend upon the courage, determination and tenacity of officers and men. When those who set duty before self give of themselves to see the task committed to them through to its completion, they win the day and the highest honor that mortal man can give."

To the international students here today, let me say, "Thank you for attending." I hope that your attendance here was as valuable for you as it was for us. I am sure that the United States students and the staff and faculty have enjoyed your company and profited from your presence. It is my firm belief that nurturing contacts among the military forces of the nations of the world will help reduce the risk of war.

I would like to say just a word ro the families here. Your husbands or wives, as the case may be, have reached a point in their careers that is very important to them, and it is important to you obviously. It is also important to the institutions they serve and important to the nation. They needed your support as they went through this school and they need your support now as they go on to new duties. I realize that lecture is not necessary for your families because if you had not supported them, they probably would not be here in the first place.

But I just want to tell you that I acknowledge that the family serves as surely as does the member of the family who wears the uniform, and I acknowledge your great importance to the military community. So, as you leave here tomorrow, know that you have my thanks and the thanks of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and best wishes for the exciting days ahead.

In the liturgy for morning prayer in the *Lutheran Book of Worship*, there is a prayer which is a good prayer for the Guardians and their families. It goes like this:

"Lord God, You have called Your servants to ventures of which we cannot see the ending, by paths as yet untrodden, through perils unknown. Give us faith to go out with good courage, not knowing where we go, but only that Your hand is leading us and Your love is supporting us."

I want you to know that that is my prayer for you and I give you my congratulations. Best wishes to all of you. It has been a pleasure to be here.



Intelligence and Low-Intensity Conflict

Lieutenant Colonel John M. Oseth, US Army

The term "low-intensity conflict" has eluded precise definition for as long as analysts have used it.[1] In common parlance, however, it denotes a wide variety of unconventional military or semi-military activities on both sides of the traditional distinction between peace and war: coercive diplomacy, security assistance missions in relatively benign and varying degrees of hostile environments, insurgency and counterinsurgency operations, terrorism and counterterrorism, surgical direct action military operations, psychological warfare, and even operations by conventional or general-purpose forces in which ends and means are circumscribed by national policy.

No doubt in part because it embraces such a diverse array of contingencies, low-intensity conflict as a concept has not had much staying power in academic or governmental circles. Certainly in America the scenarios it conjures up have never attracted the same degree of attention as those involving the more violent and more obviously dangerous modes of warfare. But there is now growing recognition that they are likely to be the most prevalent form of conflict confronting the nations of the world in the remainder of this century.[2]

The outlines of this analysis are easily sketched. As long as a military balance of sorts obtains between East and West, full-scale war between the blocs is unlikely. Moreover, fear of superpower confrontation and escalation to nuclear catastrophe will tend to limit regional conflicts where Soviet and American interests are clearly implicated. But in the Third or developing world there are different, more combustible forces at work. High rates of population growth, the introduction of new technologies and associated alien values and modes of behavior, and the inevitably dislocating effects of economic, sociological, and political change have vastly increased internal pressures on immature governing institutions. Regional interactions are complicated by ancient hatreds, hegemonism, and irredentist designs. The Soviet Union and its surrogates continue to seek international advantage in those circumstances by encouraging and manipulating revolution and regional strife. And our own desire to thwart Soviet opportunism, and our intent to work peacefully toward a world in which American values can flourish and the

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aspirations of others can be realized, have pressed us toward international involvements that have ambivalent consequences. Even our most benevolent economic connections with the developing world can be viewed, or described by our adversaries, as exploitative. The political relationships we develop are often seen as overbearing or insensitive, and security assistance relationships mark us all too often as defenders of an undesirable *status quo*.

It may be true that not all of this inflammable instability will impact directly and adversely upon American interests.[3] But it is equally clear that some foreseeable regional instability and localized confrontations will implicate American interests in ways that raise unarguable security concerns. The growing threat of international terrorism alone is grounds for vigilance, and for preparation to deal with isolated and remote outbreaks of violence. More generally, the global reach of American economic and political interests and presence brings the effects of distant conflicts home to many individual citizens. Many outbreaks of violence will not be immediately nation-threatening for the United States, to be sure. Individual incidents and even local wars may be tolerable, their consequences absorbable, without grievous effect on aggregate national interests. But at some point the security responsibilities and capabilities of the US Government will be challenged, even

"The challenge in low-intensity conflict is to monitor an enemy not yet conducting continuous or even frequent combat operations, not yet organized into easily identifiable military formations, whose sustenance depends . . . on diverse socio-economic factors . . . . "

if those responsibilities are conceived in the narrowest terms of protecting citizens' lives and property. Furthermore, although more expansive rationales for US preparedness for low-intensity conflict are contentious in some quarters, many believe that the United States should actively help foreign societies preserve security while they deal with the challenges of development, regional instability, and external intrigues and aggression.[4]

That, in any event, is the Reagan administration's view. Secretary of Defense Weinberger's Fiscal Year 1985 *Annual Report to the Congress* emphasized the need for increased American attention to the Third World, in light of expanded US interests and multiplying conflicts there.[5] He worried, in particular, about recurrence of unforeseen contingencies like the rescue mission in Grenada, and about enhancing US capabilities to respond to a wide range of low-intensity threats without impairing the readiness of forward-deployed forces elsewhere.[6] He also observed that increasing Soviet activity in the Third World—in the Mideast via support for Syrian forces, in Africa (Angola and Ethiopia), in Southeast Asia (Kampuchea), in Southwest Asia (Afghanistan), and in Central America (Grenada and Nicaragua)—has overlaid localized events in remote areas with significant strategic implications

for the United States: "Buttressed by their massive buildup of strategic and conventional forces, the Soviets have undertaken—directly and through surrogates—a global campaign of destabilization, focused on the Third World, that seeks to achieve their objectives without direct confrontation with the United States. This is, and will continue to be for some time, the most prominent direct threat to U.S. national security interests."[7]

Accordingly, the Administration has worked to revitalize US Special Operations Forces (SOF) uniquely suited to meet that threat. New units have been added to the defense structure—an Army Special Forces Group, Navy SEAL teams, and a Special Operations Aviation Task Force. Their equipment (especially aviation and communications) and training (especially language and area specialization) have received new attention, and command and control problems have been addressed (as in the formation of the Joint Special Operations Agency in the Pentagon on 1 January 1984).

Secretary Weinberger outlined three general situations in which SOF can be used to advance US interests:

First, their participation in security assistance programs, training foreign armed forces to deal with instability and aggression, enhances our friends' abilities to cope with Soviet expansionism, reduces the likelihood that American armed forces might be involved in those foreign struggles, and demonstrates U.S. determination to live up to its commitments. They also help to build good will between the United States and the assisted nations (currently about 15, around the globe). These are, essentially 'peacetime' functions in the sense that United States forces are not engaged in conflict as combatants—though in some circumstances their training activities may make them vulnerable to attack by terrorists or other anti-government forces.

Secondly, in crises, SOF provide decisionmakers an alternative tailored for situations where conventional forces are not appropriate. They might be used, for instance, where the safety of U.S. citizens or the security of American facilities abroad has been threatened (the Grenada situation is illustrative). They might also be useful in helping to cap crises or conflicts at relatively low levels of tension or violence.

Thirdly, committed in a major conflict, SOF would augment conventional capabilities, employed in a variety of roles: unconventional warfare, counterterrorist operations, security assistance, psychological operations, and intelligence missions, to name a few.[8]

The new emphasis on more flexible forces for use in subconventional conflicts and security assistance missions responds directly to the criticism that arose in the last few years of the US military's fixation on mid to high-intensity contingencies involving mobile armored combat in Europe. This focus, many argued, had neglected preparations both for conventional contingencies in vital areas outside Europe[9] and for subconventional, limited missions short of

the conflicts for which most US forces are structured, outfitted, and trained.[10] The SOF approach in the Reagan administration has extended concern for "defense modernization" to low-intensity capabilities which the military establishment itself had not emphasized for many years.

With all this renewed interest in readiness for a variety of subconventional contingencies, discussion of improved capabilities has focused mainly on what kinds of *forces* the United States should have, and also on how they should be structured, equipped, trained, and employed when committed. There has been relatively little attention devoted, at least in the public discussion, to the kind of intelligence support those forces would need both prior to and during their commitment.[11] The American literature on counterinsurgency operations, for instance, has never been large, and has not focused at length on the intelligence aspects of the problem. Such discussions of the intelligence challenge as do exist have been very generalized, amounting mainly to specification of the ingredients of insurgency, and general guidelines for monitoring them.[12] Foreign analysts, by contrast, have been more explicitly concerned with the intelligence problem, in some cases because of their own extensive personal experiences in limited, low-intensity wars.[13]

If hands-on experience leads to pressure for better preparation, recent events in the Middle East and Central America may prove to be the catalyst for change in American approaches. A former commander of American security assistance forces in El Salvador has now argued publicly that US policy goals there are within reach, if host country intelligence capabilities (as well as certain operational skills) can be improved or augmented with US help.[14] And the report prepared by the "Long Commission" on the 23 October 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon concludes pointedly that correctable deficiencies in intelligence support were partly responsible for that tragedy.[15] In their view, the time is past when preparation for the intelligence problem encountered in unconventional operations can be "accomplished" after the fact.

The Intelligence Challenge

Military forces depend upon strategic and tactical intelligence for two basic services: (1) collection of information on the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers, organizations, and persons, and (2) counterintelligence support, or the gathering of information and conduct of activities to protect against espionage, sabotage, assassinations, and international terrorist activities.[16] Though these two functions are clearly and closely related, they are regarded as separate professional disciplines within the intelligence community—each has its own personnel, organizations, and modes of operation. We need also to note here, for purposes of our later discussion, that in the American practice both these efforts are sharply distinguished from law

enforcement or police functions. As a result, intelligence and counterintelligence operations, serving national security interests, are governed by rules and procedures which permit more operational latitude, and which are contentious among many civil libertarians.[17]

There are three kinds of situations in which low-intensity conflict forces need support from these capabilities. First, they need strategic intelligence monitoring, prior to US military involvement, of situations which might require their deployment. Secondly, during their involvement in security assistance missions, they need support from all US and host country resources capable of assessing and countering threats. Finally, during crises or combat, they need support which draws battlefield and threat-relevant information from all sources and focuses specifically on the needs of operational forces—combat commanders.

Pre-Commitment Support. Properly directed and executed, the strategic intelligence effort helps Washington policymakers understand what US international interests are, how they may be affected by what kinds of events abroad, and what tools of policy may (or may not) be appropriate to deal with those challenges.[18] Additionally, the strategic intelligence apparatus provides the data which enables military commanders and planners both to advise about and to prepare for their employment.[19] In fact, it is the requirements of these "consumers" of information which are supposed to drive the intelligence community's operations.[20] Various categories of information are important for this: surveys of the political, sociological, and economic (or other) features of foreign countries and regions; identification of central causes and characteristics of strife or instability, both internal and external; and assessments of the capacities of governments to maintain security and internal order, to name just a few. With community-wide collection and production fully orchestrated, all the nation's intelligence resources can theoretically contribute to a comprehensive library of data, in order to help both national-level policymakers and those who execute policy decisions understand and address the problem.

And this is a central point: tactical military units which we have earmarked for low-intensity conflict have great interest in the ongoing strategic intelligence function managed at the national level. The forces which will be at the "cutting edge" of policy need to know what the policymakers know—and *even more*, because they must have and assimilate details about the operating environment which national decisionmakers do not need. The strategic effort, then, must look beyond the needs of Washington policy councils to take cognizance of the special interests of the operators, and there must be institutions and mechanisms which facilitate communication of requirements and information between the strategic and tactical levels of command and of intelligence. All this must occur even though the areas and issues monitored may not present critical policy problems at any particular time.

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Support for Security Assistance Missions. Elements of the armed forces which may be called upon to perform security assistance missions in foreign countries include any or a combination of the following:

(a) Military Assistance and Advisory Groups (MAAG) may be formed to administer U.S. military assistance programs in foreign countries—and in conflict situations they may be called upon to assist host country armed forces with internal defense and development programs ranging from intelligence efforts to tactical operations against guerrillas.

(b) Security Assistance Teams of various kinds may be tailored to specific needs of particular countries. Mobile training teams, for instance, may be constituted to train indigenous personnel in needed technical, administrative, or operational skills, so that they in turn might train others.

(c) Security Assistance Forces employing a number of mobile training teams and small detachments may be used to augment the capability of a MAAG in advising and training indigenous armed forces. Where assistance to ground forces is the focus of U.S. efforts, Army Special Forces provide the nucleus of the organization. They maintain area, cultural, and language proficiency, in addition to military and training skills, that make them uniquely qualified for such missions.[21]

The activities of the 80-man US military mission assigned to train the Lebanese Army (LA) during the recent strife there are illustrative of this kind of use of the American military. Despite the collapse of several LA units under increasing battlefield pressure, and despite the sporadic attacks upon US Marines assigned to the multinational peacekeeping force, this training contingent, composed mostly of Green Berets, continues its effort to conduct basic and advanced infantry training, artillery training, and development and expansion of Lebanese regular and Ranger forces. No trainers are involved in planning military operations, in combat situations, or in artillery support of the LA. They do not go on combat operations.[22] Nor can they be sure that their efforts will have appreciable effect on the outcome of the conflict in that country, since they can address only one aspect of the causes of social unrest there. But the Administration remains committed to this security assistance as an important tool of US policy in Lebanon.

The security assistance effort elsewhere is adjusted to particular situations "on-the-ground," and US military presence and activities will differ in each case. But there is one constant: US military units are present, in-country, and associated with a government whose security forces need improvement and whose stability may in some cases be threatened or even precarious. The Americans' role is that of trainers, not of operators. They provide advisory and other assistance to foreign regular, paramilitary, or irregular armed forces and government agencies, and it is those forces which carry the main operational burden in the event of hostilities. But they are nevertheless

vulnerable to the same security threats that face the troops they advise or assist.

In this environment the distinctions between strategic and tactical intelligence, and between intelligence and CI, become blurred. Commanders and trainers must operate tactically in the situation previously described to them by US "strategic" sources. Because of the nature of the security assistance mission, and the nature of the internal security problem faced by the assisted government, the tactical intelligence interests of US forces extend beyond data on hostile military forces (there may, after all, be none of these) to information on fundamental causes of internal unrest, on any external connections to that unrest, and on the general capability and competence of the host authorities. And especially with the rise of sabotage, terrorist, or subversive activity, US intelligence interests will focus on "security" threats and on problems that the host regime in all probability regards as law and order or police matters.

There is also a premium on coordination and integration of all sources of information and all analytical expertise—both American and indigenous (civil and military). Whether United States forces conduct intelligence operations in-country will depend upon the level of US military support being provided. But there will be inevitably some unilateral operational and analytical requirements on both sides, necessitating independent action by both civil and military authorities. Close cooperation and planning will be required in order to maximize the information available to US and indigenous forces, and to ensure that actions are complementary.

Intelligence, whether host country or American, must be concerned with a wide range of information on the security situation in the country, particularly in cases of incipient or emergent insurgency. Cadres and cadre recruiters must be identified; insurgent cells must be located and penetrated; counterguerrilla forces must be formed; and host country capabilities to do these things must be improved. In the case of more mature insurgent movements, attention expands to such activity as locating safe houses and base areas, discovering supply sources and routes, and developing informant networks in potential guerrilla operating areas. When guerrilla forces become "operational," in the sense that they appear in small formations to conduct organized military operations, intelligence efforts widen in an effort to identify, locate, and describe those forces, while also maintaining the operations instituted earlier to neutralize or manipulate the insurgents' leadership and logistical infrastructure. Population controls may also be instituted. As guerrilla units grow larger and more competent in the conventional sense, collection on military data is expanded. Meanwhile, the effort to understand political factors underlying the rebel movement also continues.

Not all security assistance missions occur in a context of insurgency as described here. But this progression of concerns and missions nevertheless

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outlines the range of intelligence activity which the general security assistance mission must anticipate.

Support to US Forces Engaged in Combat. In this scenario the United States may continue its security assistance projects—training and advice—with the host country, but American forces also conduct, or are authorized to conduct, combat operations. There may well be restrictions placed on the kinds of operations American forces may conduct, or on the techniques they are permitted to use. For instance, they might be called upon to secure areas or population centers and respond to attacks, rather than to seek out and engage enemy units. But the distinguishing characteristic here is that US forces have been deployed to fight in support of the assisted government, or in defense of US citizens or property, not just to outfit host country forces to fight.

The intelligence challenge here has all the elements surveyed in the previous scenarios—a need for integration of strategic and tactical efforts, a need to coordinate information and activities with host country authorities; a concern for "non-military" data on societal factors tending to sustain the insurgents; and the merging of security or counterintelligence concerns with information collection concerns (the "enemy" may merge with the population when he is not operating as an identifiable combatant). But there is, additionally, a need to prepare to support a variety of US units, conventional and unconventional, whose vulnerability has increased as the size and visibility of the US presence have increased, and as the American troops increasingly assume the status (or perceived status) of belligerents. As the investigation of the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon pointed out, the popular perception—which grew over time—of the Marines as belligerents was itself enough to raise the threat to them, and the resulting intelligence challenge, to a more critical level. Ultimately the threat to them was not a function of their understanding of their mission, but of others' understanding of it.

In some cases, furthermore, where SOF are deployed, they may themselves be used as intelligence assets, augmenting the capabilities of US or host country forces that operate against opposing military units. They can be sent on missions to gather order-of-battle information on enemy forces, to locate targets behind enemy lines or in their base areas, to conduct post-strike damage assessments, to gather information on political/social/economic indicators of insurgency, or to identify and locate indigenous collaborators. Elements of US forces can thus become important resources for meeting the larger intelligence challenge.[23]

Impediments to Meeting the Challenge

A number of factors make it difficult for the intelligence community to provide the kind of support just described. The survey here is not intended to be

exhaustive, but only to identify main attitudinal and organizational problems.

One has to do with what James Rosenau has called the "belief systems" of national leaders.[24] These perspectival lenses lead some to focus on the Soviet Union as the main threat to the United States, and (inter alia) on the need to respond, with force if necessary, to Soviet expansionism wherever it appears. Others, by contrast, may understand the USSR as a country with great disabilities outside the military sphere, and they seek ways to move toward world order without confrontation. Still others may believe that the United States has limited capacity for leadership and military excursions abroad, and they work toward minimizing foreign involvement and commitments.

These are, of course, general "types" of attitudinal orientations. In reality, individual perspectives might combine beliefs that are separated here into different systems. One can, for instance, believe the Soviet Union is the main threat to peace but accord Third World regions a relatively low priority in the range of US global interests even if the Soviets are active there.[25] But the point is this: that identifiable, pre-existing perspectives of the national leadership will filter the information provided them in what we have called the "pre-commitment" stage of US preparations for low-intensity conflict. For some, information about contingencies in the Third World will simply not seem particularly relevant, and they, on their own motion, are unlikely to energize the intelligence community to serve the interests of military forces charged to be ready for employment in those contingencies. The most reliable impetus for monitoring of low-intensity conflict situations must ultimately come from below, from the forces themselves, and from their spokespersons in the national intelligence and policymaking establishments.

A related phenomenon is the American tendency to treat low-intensity conflict as a "lesser-included-case" of conventional war.[26] At times we have assumed that the forces, equipment, training, and tactics which prepare the armed forces for conventional battlefields also serve to prepare them for operations at lower levels of violence.[27] Low-intensity conflict may be conceived in that sense as a kind of lazy or slow-motion version of "normal" combat. This may reflect a wealth of confidence in the efficacy of standard modes of operation.[28] Or it may result from traditional aversion to creating "special formations" markedly distinct in structure and capability from the rest of our forces.[29] But in any case that mindset is profoundly disabling. Low-intensity conflict—most fundamentally, the nature of the "low-intensity" enemy, his tactics, his sources of strength and support—is *sui generis*. Preparedness for finding, describing, and assessing a conventional military foe is not preparedness for intelligence functions in unconventional war. Where this lesser-included case thinking prevails in the national security establishment, it will skew not only operational doctrine, force structures, and materiel procurement for fighting forces, but also the preparedness of intelligence

officers, who are not brought up in the SOF tradition—to understand the strategic and tactical problem, the unconventional enemy, and the resources needed to support their commanders well in low-intensity conflict.

The US Army's doctrinal description of the expected enemy in "modern battle" illustrates this point well,[30] focusing on cardinal concepts of Soviet military doctrine such as Mass and Momentum. It prepares intelligence officers well for finding massed and mobile forces in the field. But this image of the enemy and his tactics is hardly appropriate for most low-intensity conflict contingencies. To be sure, a special doctrine has been written for them, focused mainly on counterinsurgency, and intelligence responsibilities are outlined at least in general terms there. But it does not reach far enough into the mainstream of military intelligence, which remains preoccupied with the Soviet-style conventional threat.

Another difficulty has to do with the position of the human intelligence (HUMINT) discipline within the intelligence community, and within the military services. Practitioners of this specialty have long argued that their capabilities must be fully exercised if the United States hopes to maximize its appreciation of plans and intentions of potential adversaries, and its understanding of developments in Third World countries. Technical means of collection (interception of communications and other electronic signals, and photographic and other imaging techniques) are well-suited to collect data on observable indicators of military strength and on the structure of enemy units—on military capabilities, in other words. HUMINT, by contrast, has the capability to help determine what kinds of people are at the helm of foreign governments or armed forces, what they care about as individuals and as a group, and what they may be planning to do. Additionally, HUMINT is singularly important for monitoring developments in Third World or underdeveloped societies which do not have large, observable military formations, and which are not so technically sophisticated that their military communications are fruitful sources of information. Human resources can also monitor indicia of strength—such as political cohesion—for which the technical means of collection, in their focus on observable data and objects, are unsuited.[31]

HUMINT fell on hard times, however, in the 1970s: eclipsed by a fascination with technical collection sources; neglected in the budgeting process; tainted by spectacular revelations and allegations about operational excesses (e.g., assassination plots); and, in the view of some, decapitated by wholesale firings of experienced personnel in the Carter administration.[32] Meanwhile, collection systems tailored for detection of observable indicators military strength were considerably upgraded, because of rightful concern about increasing Soviet military power. This in effect constricted America's operational inventory and rendered the intelligence community less able to identify and monitor threats outside the East-West axis.

Within the military services, moreover, there have been additional disabilities. The espionage specialty has always been understood mainly as a strategic effort, not directly related or responsive to mainstream tactical concerns. Accordingly, there has been no great effort to develop and reward expertise in it. In tactical intelligence, as in the national intelligence community, there has tended to be much greater concern for developing technical—and technology dependent—collection systems appropriate for direct observation, sensing, or listening.

Insofar as the military has engaged in HUMINT activities, it has been focused at the national level on collection of *military* information. This is a function of "turf" divisions among intelligence agencies in Washington,[33] and in that sense a student of bureaucratic politics would hardly be surprised by it. But in low-intensity conflict situations it makes little sense to distinguish between political and military data. Institutional relegation of the military intelligence effort to military subjects narrows it to a very small part of the low-intensity conflict problem. The turf division applies as well to *analytical* responsibilities—military agencies assess military capabilities; nonmilitary agencies assess political and other factors. And talents and expertise are accordingly narrowed.

At the tactical level, military HUMINT is conceived mainly as a small, adjunct enterprise conducted by long-range patrols and debriefers of refugees and prisoners. The same can be said for the military counterintelligence effort, though the Army at least in the last few years has emphasized "operational security" as a way to amplify combat capability.

The institutionalized distinction between civilian and military intelligence agencies' missions—and ultimately areas of expertise—is worth expanded discussion as an impediment in its own right. Because of it, military officers raised in the conventional war tradition have little opportunity or incentive to develop competence in the grey areas of political-military assessment so important in low-intensity conflict. They know how to use battlefield collection resources to find an enemy's combat formations and logistical networks. They know how to make educated guesses about what enemy forces will do, based upon knowledge of standard operational doctrine and force structures. They know how to depict that array of forces and likely actions so that US commanders can plan to engage them. They know how to do this at all levels of command. But these are *wartime*, combat functions, and classical ones at that. The challenge in low-intensity conflict is to monitor an enemy not yet conducting continuous or even frequent combat operations, not yet organized into easily identifiable military formations, whose sustenance depends not at all on battlefield success but on diverse socio-economic-political factors which cannot be photographed or electronically tracked. Performing intelligence functions well in that environment requires area knowledge, cultural sensitivities, ability to make use of diverse HUMINT collection and CI

capabilities, and capacities for sophisticated political-military analysis that are not widely available in the military.

It is true, of course, that the smaller SOF units do attempt to maintain and exercise these skills. But in the larger military establishment, and at higher levels of military intelligence the pre-occupation is with the mainstream, conventional intelligence resources, skills and missions. As a result, to the extent that incipient low-intensity conflict situations are monitored and understood in Washington, as a rule it will be the *non*-military agencies which do it and which develop the necessary skills for it.

The interagency process for producing national intelligence estimates of course gives the military perspective an opportunity to participate and to widen its focus and influence beyond descriptions of military forces and aggregate assessments of national power. But this does not alter the fundamental orientation of the intelligence center-of-mass in the military, nor does it expand military roles and functions at the national level. What this means, in the end, is that the military elements of the strategic intelligence establishment most responsive to the tactical intelligence needs of operational commanders are *least* comfortable with low-intensity subjects. And the civilian elements most comfortable with low-intensity subjects are preoccupied with supporting larger foreign policy interests—and, for areas of DoD policy interest, with socio-economic-political analysis of major adversaries (and friends). What begins as a formal division of labor between civilian and military subjects ends in a bifurcation of organization, functions, and expertise that draws each effort away from the agreed boundaries toward central missions. But it is precisely at those boundaries that the low-intensity conflict phenomenon demands coordination, concentration, expertise, and regularized attention.

Moreover, even within the sphere to which military analysis has been consigned at the national level, there has been a good deal of concern about its quality.[34] Two sets of observations tend to recur. First, it has been observed that the military personnel assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency, the joint intelligence arm of the Department of Defense, cannot and do not forget what color their uniforms are, and their analysis inevitably reflects service-oriented perspectives about war, about enemies, and about peacetime preparedness. The services do not send them out to *colonize* the joint intelligence arena, but the effect is the same: pursuit of service policy interests in the guise of intelligence assessment. This complicates the problem of focusing on the most critical problems (low-intensity or other), because the services each are interested in diverse threats most relevant to their own central missions.

A second criticism notes that most of these analysts spend only short tours of duty at the strategic analytical level and they generally are quite new, when they arrive, to that business. Few, in any event, have had exposure to low-intensity conflict concerns at the tactical level. Perhaps most importantly,

moreover, a tour in the strategic intelligence establishment may not be regarded as particularly career-enhancing because of service emphases on career patterns centered around field duty. Ambitious and talented officers, as a result, do not vie for jobs at the national level. The result, the argument runs, is second-rate analysis done by nonspecialists working temporarily in unfamiliar positions that are not appreciated by their services. This, combined with incapacity in political-military analysis of non-hardware, non-order-of-battle data, means that there is little constituency or competence in military intelligence for monitoring low-intensity conflict situations. The impetus and talent for that has to come, if at all, from other institutions in the intelligence community.

Another major difficulty is the distinction we Americans have carefully drawn between counterintelligence and police functions. That distinction is a product of important American political values and an abiding suspicion of government power.[35] It results in application of full constitutional constraints to law enforcement activities, but a wider operational sphere for national security operations. It also results in development of entirely separate civil and military organizations and professional disciplines for each specialty. This may make perfect sense within our own society but when transported to other societies afflicted by internal instabilities of mixed domestic and foreign origin, it may make no sense at all. What we term a "peacetime" security assistance situation is for them, in many cases, a law-and-order problem requiring a blending of intelligence and police expertise and also a merging of internal and external security functions and forces. US military personnel assisting or cooperating with foreign security forces can find themselves dealing, or requested to deal, with missions which in our own society belong to the civilian police (or to nonmilitary intelligence authorities), and for which they have little background. While we have neatly divided up responsibilities for coping with internal and external security functions, the nations we assist probably will not have made similar differentiations.

There is an even larger point to be made here, too. In view of the low-intensity threat—especially the terrorist threat—and also remembering that other societies do not apply the same restraints to government powers as we do, it is foreseeable that beleagured regimes may try to cope with those threats in ways that most Americans would consider unacceptable.[36] Further, we must expect to encounter a home of generalized concern about association with repressive regimes and more specific fears about American forces' involvement in abusive activities.[37] That sentiment has, in fact, already been manifested in national policy. Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, prohibits the use of US funds "to provide training or advice, or provide any financial support, for police, prisons, or other law enforcement forces for any foreign government." The former commander of US military advisers in El Salvador has already complained that

this is too restrictive, preventing American personnel from working with police forces or other agencies that have internal security missions vital to US policy goals.[38] While the purpose of that statute may have been to prevent US involvement or implication in inhumane practices, in actuality it diminishes American leverage on supported regimes, and prevents American advisers from attempting to professionalize and humanize indigenous security forces. It works, in the end, *against* the interests of human rights.[39]

The difficulty, then, is twofold. On the one hand we segregate our own relevant skills in a way that carves law-and-order concerns out of the intelligence or national security sphere, limiting our own ability to operate in the low-intensity environment. And on the other hand we have excluded law enforcement skills from the inventory of security assistance resources available to friendly governments. Both strictures spring from central values within our society, and may be difficult to undo. But both, it must be recognized, are important factors undermining the effectiveness of American forces in low-intensity conflict, and reducing their ability to keep indigenous actions within established bounds of decency.

Some General Prescriptions

Some of the disabilities just surveyed cannot be managed or restructured away, and the most we can do is remain sensitive to them and attempt to moderate their effects. For example, leaders will always see the world through special, idiosyncratic prisms that color their appreciations of incoming data. And national-level security policy concerns will continue to focus on contingencies that seem directly nation-threateuing, while events "at the margins" will receive less attention, fewer resources, and limited monitoring impetus. But even with these as parameters, there are steps we can take to enhance our intelligence capabilities in the smaller, peripheral contingencies.

First, the HUMINT discipline must be revitalized, especially in the intelligence arms of the military services. The Reagan administration has been moving in this direction for some time, seeking a better community-wide balance between technical and human source collection. The Long Commission's recommendations may provide more specific pressure for accomplishing that in the armed forces. In part this will require a thorough renovation of attitudes, to accord HUMINT its place as a collection tool of special value, and seeking to exercise it vigorously and to use its contributions. In part it is also a matter of budgeting, of allocating sufficient resources to sustain operations over considerable periods of time. But it also will require structural initiatives designed to make the specialty more attractive for intelligence officers in all agencies. In the military this means that there should be increased attention to development of viable career tracks for HUMINT (and CI) specialists, even though these people may be diverted for long periods of time from the duty

with field troops so important to advancement in the mainstream. There is also a need for expanded interagency cooperation at national and operational levels between military and civilian specialists—for cultivation of mutual confidence and respect, as well as coordination of specific operations and goals.

Secondly, the product of the HUMINT effort—much of which will come from nonmilitary collectors—must be fused with data from other sources in analytical products useful both to leaders in Washington and to commanders of units having low-intensity missions. This, too, was a recommendation of the Long Commission. While on its face it speaks only to the analytical process, in reality the true tactical-responsive fusion of data presumes full integration of the total intelligence effort, from announcement of information needs to satisfaction of them, among military and nonmilitary agencies. And it also presumes that the needs of operational commanders will be placed in the forefront of the collection and analytical effort. It requires, in other words, mechanisms which can transcend the boundaries between strategic and tactical information needs and systematically focus on the needs of operators. Initiatives already underway to this end need continuing emphasis.[40]

The fusion imperative has certain other implications pertaining to development of talent. Fusion of data cannot be accomplished without analysts who are sensitive to the strengths and weaknesses of the several collection disciplines, and who are expert in the regions or subjects for which they are responsible. Such expertise takes years to develop. Whether the military services have the inclination or capacity to develop and retain such persons is, as many have noted, problematical. But it seems likely that little can be expected in the way of improved intelligence for low-intensity contingencies without some more systematic efforts in that direction.

Third, the elevation of HUMINT and fusion, and their connection to low-intensity missions, must be given an institutional expression—an organizational home—in the intelligence community. Without that, the initiatives will not survive, as they are distinctly counterculture in the national security establishment. At the national level, at the regional level (perhaps in the unified commands, or in the newly established Special Operations Forces command channels), at the operational units both in garrison and during missions, and on country teams abroad there should be offices responsible for monitoring low-intensity conflict situations: identifying information needs, energizing the apparatus which can satisfy those needs, collating and evaluating information, and distributing it on a continuing basis to concerned operational commanders. The armed forces should actively seek to place military persons in that analytical infrastructure, wherever it is located.

A fourth and very sensitive area involves minimizing the constraints on cooperation with security forces of other nations. American concern for promotion of decent, humane behavior abroad ought to work for *more*, not less, influence over governments whose security interests align with ours. But, as

the Kissinger Commission and practitioners alike have now testified, statutory limitations on such cooperation now have the opposite effect. They amount, as well, to substantial operational handicaps in the intelligence arena so critical to the success of security assistance missions. They diminish the ability of our security assistance forces to help cap incipient threats before they reach the crisis stage when the United States must face decisions about enlarging its military roles or aid commitments. It is no doubt wise, indeed necessary, to promulgate standards for US assistance to internal security forces. But a flat prohibition now seems most unwise, and reexamination of it wonld seem to be in the best interests both of the nation and of the forces we maintain to deal with low-intensity conflict.

These four initiatives—perhaps more accurately, policy orientations—would hardly be a panacea for the entirety of the intelligence challenge. But taken together, and properly understood, they point in fruitful directions, and they suggest some initial steps toward resolving critical problems. At bottom, however, we must be concerned primarily with finding practical ways to transcend concepts, and distinctions among concepts, that govern our preparations for conventional conflicts. We must search out and set aside the debilitating organizational, functional, and operational consequences of the peace/war distinction, the strategic/tactical distinction, the civilian/military distinction, and—without compromising central values within our own society—the counterintelligence/law enforcement distinction. It is also true that we must deal with a persistent and probably intractable, paradox—that low-intensity conflict arenas must be a lively intelligence concern even when they are not a pressing policy concern. How well we deal with these general challenges will importantly affect US interests, and our national position, in much of the world throughout the remainder of this century.

Notes

1. The definitional problem as seen by a group of scholars is surveyed in Sam C. Sarkesian, "American Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict: An Overview," in Sam C. Sarkesian and William L. Scully, eds., *U.S. Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict: Potentials for Military Struggles in the 1980s* (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Books, 1981), pp. 2-5.

2. See Bruce Russett, "Security and the Resources Scramble: Will 1984 Be Like 1914?" *International Affairs*, Winter 1981-1982, p. 42; Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), pp. 530-533; William J. Taylor, Jr., *The Future of Conflict: U.S. Interests* (New York: Praeger, 1983) (*The Washington Papers/94*), pp. 39-58.

3. For several formulations of this perspective, arguing especially against a policy of "global containment," see George C. Herring, "The Vietnam Syndrome and American Foreign Policy," *The Virginia Quarterly Review*, Autumn 1981, p. 594; Robert E. Osgood, "American Grand Strategy: Patterns Problems, and Prescriptions," *Naval War College Review*, September-October 1983, p. 5; and Norman A. Graebner, "Coming to Terms with Reality," *Naval War College Review*, September-October 1983, p. 91. See also Gregory D. Foster, "On Selective Intervention," *Strategic Review*, Fall 1983, p. 48.

4. See, for example, the "Kissinger Commission" Report, *Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America*, Washington, D.C., January 1984; and John M. Weinstein, "The Effect of the Third World Poverty on U.S. Security," *Parameters: Journal of the U.S. Army War College*, December 1983, p. 8.

5. US Department of Defense, *Report of the Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the Congress on the FY 1985 Budget, FY 1986 Authorization Request and FY 1985-1989 Defense Programs*, 1 February 1984 (Washington: US Govt. Print. Off., 1984), pp. 18-19.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 54, 276. Not all observers give Soviet military activity (and therefore US military tools) such a large place in the rationale for US action to assist developing nations. But many do. Compare the views, for instance, in Richard Ullman, "At War With Nicaragua," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1983, p. 39; and Walter La Feber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America* (New York and London: Norton, 1983) with the perspective in Frank N. Trager and William L. Scully, "Low-Intensity Conflict: The U.S. Response," in Sarkesian and Scully, p. 175; and with Thomas T. Hammond, *Red Flag Over Afghanistan* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 224, 225.

8. *FY 1985 Annual Report to the Congress*, p. 54. More elaborate discussion of roles, missions, organization, and modes of operation for these forces can be found in several of the US Army's doctrinal manuals, notably: US Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-20, *Low-Intensity Conflict*, Washington, DC, 16 January 1981; and US Department of the Army, Field Manual 31-22, *Command, Control, and Support of Special Forces Operations*, Washington, DC, 23 December 1981. See also David J. Baratto, "Special Forces in the 1980s: A Strategic Reorientation," *Military Review*, March 1983, p. 2.

9. See, e.g., Samuel F. Wells, Jr., "Limits on the Use of American Military Power," *The Wilson Quarterly*, Winter 1983, p. 121. See also the analysis of the US Army's newly revised operational doctrine in an article written by the main authors of the revision: Huba Wass de Czege and L.D. Holder, "The New FM 100-5," *Military Review*, July 1982, p. 53.

10. See Edward Luttwak, "Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare," *Parameters: Journal of the U.S. Army War College*, December 1983, p. 11. See also the earlier views of serving military officers in Donald B. Vought, "Preparing for the Wrong War," *Military Review*, May 1977, p. 16; John M. Oseth, "FM-100-5: A Need for Better Foundation Concepts?" *Military Review*, March 1980, p. 13; and George K. Osborn and William J. Taylor, Jr., "The Employment of Force: Political-Military Considerations," in Sarkesian and Scully, p. 17.

11. One observer has argued that, *in general*, the intelligence community has devoted too little attention to wartime requirements. Angelo Codevilla, "Wartime Collection Requirements," in Roy Godson, ed., *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Clandestine Collection* (Washington, DC: National Strategy Information Center, 1982), p. 129. But see US Department of Defense, *Report of the Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the Congress on the FY 1984 Budget, FY 1985 Authorization Request and FY 1984-1988 Defense Program, February 1, 1983*, suggesting that the Defense Intelligence Agency has established an office to facilitate such planning, p. 258.

12. Probably the best American treatments of the limited war intelligence problem are Maj. (now Lieutenant General) John S. Pustay, *Counterinsurgency Warfare* (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 158-181; and Theodore Shackley, *The Third Option: An American View of Counterinsurgency Operations* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981). See also John J. McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counter-Insurgency* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1966), pp. 113-118. The US Army's Field Manual 100-20, *Low Intensity Conflict*, lists the items of information needed by American and Allied counterinsurgency forces (pp. 284-296), and this may be the most rigorous official attempt of its kind.

13. Frank Kitson's classic work, *Low-Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1971) includes an extended treatment of "the handling of information."

14. Alvin H. Bernstein and John D. Waghelstein, "How to Win in El Salvador," *Policy Review*, Winter 1984, p. 50.

15. US Department of Defense, *Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983* (Washington, DC: 20 December 1983), pp. 63-66; 130-133 (hereafter cited as the *Long Commission Report*).

16. For definitions of these operational functions, see US President, Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," *Federal Register* 46, No. 235, 8 December 1981, p. 59943, paragraphs 3.4(a) and (d).

17. The rounds for the distinction lie in the different purposes of the two kinds of operations. The ultimate punitive purpose of law enforcement operations is said to set the right of individual privacy against the security needs of society, necessitating special protections for the former from intrusive government activity. In intelligence operations, by contrast, there is no such punitive purpose—the interests of the individual and of society in the aggregate are not at odds. See the discussion in Arnold Beichman, "Can Counterintelligence Come In From the Cold?" *Policy Review*, Winter 1981, pp. 93-101.

18. See the discussion in Adda B. Bozeman, "Covert Action and Foreign Policy," in Roy Godson, ed., *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Covert Action* (Washington, D.C.: National Strategy Information Center, 1981), pp. 15, 70-73. See also Pustay, p. 181.

19. As Harry Summers has pointed out, the failure to understand the true nature of the conflict in Vietnam effectively disabled all thinking—strategic or tactical—about how to deal with it. Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1981), pp. 53-57.

20. The intelligence production process is often conceived as a "cycle" which begins with the announcement of decisionmakers' needs, and proceeds through stages of tasking collection resources,

conducting collection operations, analyzing the data collected, and disseminating responsive products that satisfy the original requirements. See US Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Final Report: Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence*, S. Rept. No. 94-755, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, pp. 17-18, 83-92. See also Robert E. Hunter, *Presidential Control of Foreign Policy: Management or Mishap* (New York: Praeger, 1982) (The Washington Papers #91), pp. 37-38.

21. Special Forces capabilities are outlined in Field Manual 31-22, *Command, Control, and Support of Special Forces Operations*. See also the discussion in Howard D. Graves, "U.S. Capabilities for Military Intervention," in Sarkesian and Scully, pp. 69, 72-76.

22. The commander of the US military advisers described their missions and activities in David B. Ottaway, "U.S. Resumes Training Shaky Lebanese Army," *The Washington Post*, 1 March 1984, p. A21.

23. *Long Commission Report*, pp. 39-41, 57.

24. James N. Rosenau, "Fragmegrative Challenges to National Strategy," in Terry Heyns, *Understanding U.S. Strategy: A Reader* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1983), pp. 65, 75.

25. See the analysis in Donald E. Nuechterlein, "National Interests and National Strategy: The Need for Priority," in Heyns, p. 35.

26. Luttwak, pp. 11 ff.

27. The Army's capstone manual of tactical doctrine in 1976 (it has since been revised) said that it was written with high-technology, mobile armored warfare in Europe in mind, but that "the principles set forth in this manual. . . apply also to military operations anywhere in the world." US Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, Washington, DC, 1 July 1976.

28. Summers, p. 95.

29. Trager and Scully, "Low-Intensity Conflict: The U.S. Response," in Sarkesian and Scully, pp. 175-180. See also the remarks of Noel C. Koch, Principal Deputy Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, printed in *Congressional Record-Senate*, 3 April 1984, p. S3660.

30. US Department of the Army, Field Manual 34-10, *Military Intelligence Battalion*, 3 July 1981, p. 1-2.

31. William J. Barnds, "Intelligence Functions," in U.S. Commission on the Organization of Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (the "Murphy Commission"), *Report of the Commission, Appendix U: Intelligence Functions Analyses* (Washington, DC: US Govt. Print. Off., 1975), pp. 7, 15; Herbert Scoville, "Is Espionage Necessary for Our Security?" *Foreign Affairs*, April 1976, pp. 482, 484. See also the Senate testimony of former CIA Directors George Bush, William Colby, and Richard Helms, in US Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *National Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978, Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on S. 2525*, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978, pp. 59-60, 60-61, and 210, respectively.

32. See the discussion in Shackley, pp. 158-159.

33. EO 12333, paragraph 1.12 (d) focuses armed services' intelligence elements on "military and military-related" information (though their capabilities can be activated on wider subjects at the instance of requirements from the DCI). See also the similar provisions for the Defense Intelligence Agency (paragraph 1.12 (a)). The CIA's charter is much broader, covering the whole field of intelligence interests and activity (paragraphs 1.8 and 3.4 (d)).

34. See e.g., John M. Collins, *U.S. Defense Planning: A Critique* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 128-129; Davis B. Bobrow, "Security Futures: Intelligence and Intelligence," in Philip S. Kronenburg, ed., *Planning U.S. Security* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1981), p. 55.

35. The Senate Committee investigating intelligence abuses in 1975-1976 wrote in its *Final Report* that "The natural tendency of Government is toward abuse of power. Men entrusted with power, even those aware of its dangers, tend, particularly when pressured, to slight liberty." US Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Final Report, Book II: Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans*, S. Rep. No. 94-755, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976.

36. As F.O. Miksche observed, the business of countering conspiracy, subversion, terrorism, and sabotage is not a chivalrous exercise. Ferdinand O. Miksche, *Secret Forces: The Techniques of Underground Movements* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1950), pp. 159-160.

37. There is a small segment of the professional military literature which has worried about this problem. See Roger A. Beaumont, "Preventing Atrocity in Low-Intensity Conflict," *Military Review*, November 1983, p. 65; James M. Dubik, "FM 100-5 and Counterinsurgency Warfare," *Military Review*, November 1983, p. 41; and John M. Gates, "Indians and Insurrectos: The U.S. Army's Experience With Insurgency," *Parameters: Journal of the U.S. Army War College*, March 1983, pp. 59, 66-67.

38. Bernstein and Waghelstein, p. 52. See also the *Kissinger Commission Report*, pp. 96-97.

39. *Ibid.*

40. For some time the Department of Defense has been concerned about devising mechanisms that will permit operational commanders to use and benefit from the "strategic" resources (satellites, "all-source" analytical facilities, etc.) managed at the national level and normally devoted to the needs of Washington policymakers. See Secretary Weinberger's FY 1984 *Annual Report to the Congress*, pp. 257-258.

Alliance Crisis and Consensus: Western Experience

William P. Bundy

This essay reviews the experience of the Western Alliance since World War II in dealing with crises outside the geographical areas specifically covered in alliance agreements. Obviously, by far the greater part of that experience has concerned the relationship among Nato nations in dealing with crises outside the Nato area. However, I shall make some reference to Japan, which has become an increasingly important partner in the broad alliance and whose association with past crises in East Asia—and today with those in the Middle East—is a significant part of the total picture.

But let us start by going further back into history, as tensions between the immediate geographical areas to which alliances are directed and the interests, concerns and behavior of the participants outside that atea ate as old as the very formation of such alliances. Thucydides tells the story of Athens' disastrous expedition to Sicily, undertaken in support of a peripheral "ally"—essentially a campaign involving Sparta conducted without substantial support from Athens' Attic allies. The debacle that resulted would perhaps have doomed Athens, but a reality that followed was that the Greek cities previously allied with Athens deserted her in dismay. The lesson is clear: if a lead nation in an alliance truly wrecks itself in an effort outside the treaty area, the alliance itself is likely to come apart.

Moving on to the nineteenth century—when the nations of Europe had developed substantial interests outside their own continent—one is bound to note that the reversal of British policy that led to Britain's withdrawal from the Holy Alliance was in considerable part, as Henry Kissinger puts it, because Britain was "increasingly aware of its extra-European role" and of a range of interests it wished to pursue for itself.[1] Then as a new alliance structure involving France, Russia and Britain began to take shape after 1893, the clearest of these alliance relationships—that between France and Russia—had as a tacit basis the fact that these two nations were not conspicuous rivals

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elsewhere. This was not true of Russia and Britain, still involved in the "Great Game" for influence in Southwest Asia, making an alliance between them not possible. And the entente between France and Britain, from 1906 onward, became possible only after the most acute of their colonial rivalries had been eased after the Fashoda incident of 1898.

So it is clear that, both in entering and preserving alliances, nations have always weighed the importance of the interests that could be served by the alliance in proximate areas against the effect of such alliances on their perceived interests and concerns outside that proximate area. The problem did not become a serious one in the interwar years from 1919 to 1939. Yet the sorting out of French and British interests in the Middle East in 1918–22 was not without friction, the scars of which surfaced time and again, and exerted a marked effect on the relationship between Churchill and DeGaulle during World War II. The recent book by François Kersaudy brings out repeatedly how frictions over Syria, in particular, drove these two leaders apart and even gave rise to bloody incidents relevant to the later tragic history of Lebanon.[2] And there was throughout World War II a significant latent tension between American pressures to end colonialism, and the desire of the British (especially Churchill) and French to retain or restore their major positions, notably in India and Indochina.

Nonetheless, in the immediate postwar period such frictions came to seem minor or secondary in the face of the perceived Soviet threat. This manifested itself at an early stage outside Europe in the 1946–47 Azerbaijan crisis and in the threats to Greece and Turkey, which until 1952 were themselves outside the area of the 1949 Nato Alliance. And so there came into being a North Atlantic Treaty, perhaps unique in history in the size and importance of its members, in the degree of shared values and institutions, and in the firmness of the Article V commitment (an armed attack against one or more . . . considered an attack against all).

The first real test of that alliance came outside the Nato area in Korea. This was a clear case of conventional aggression in which the Soviet hand was evident. The response was backed by a UN Resolution, and the attack was seen as a quite likely precursor of Soviet military action in Europe itself. And, of course, the heightened sense of the Soviet threat led directly to a massive US military buildup and to the transformation of the Nato structure into a genuine military alliance with US forces deployed in Europe. Thus within two years it undid, as Secretary Dean Acheson's memoirs remind us, what he had specifically told the Senate at the time of the ratification of the treaty.[3]

So it was natural that the record of allied cooperation over Korea was on the whole excellent. While Britain alone of the major Nato nations sent forces (West Germany and Italy being still disarmed and France preoccupied with Indochina), the war and its essentially American conduct were stoutly

supported—despite misgivings in the period when MacArthur's drive to the Yalu brought in the Chinese and for a time threatened defeat. It is worth recalling, however, how quickly a loose remark by President Truman concerning the authority of field commanders to employ nuclear weapons brought Prime Minister Clement Attlee flying to Washington. This act dramatized an intense and continuing concern among the European allies about any possible use of such weapons in peripheral areas. It perhaps helped to nail down a later progressive evolution in US policy that moved a long way from the original implications of "massive retaliation" worldwide and meant that, notably in Vietnam, the United States never contemplated or threatened such use.

Perhaps it was fortunate that in the Korean War the European members of Nato were apparently not even aware of the veiled threats of nuclear employment conveyed in 1953 to the Chinese, via India. In any event, shortly after the 1953 armistice, America's Nato allies joined in a 16-nation declaration clearly suggesting that should there be a renewal of hostilities in Korea, there might be no limit to the weapons employed. The very fact that it was made shows the degree of cohesion of Nato at the time.

Finally, one should note that in Korea the American conduct of the armistice negotiations was accepted by the allies, but not without rumblings. There was, for example, a brief 1952 foray by Canada into the prisoner-release issue that was holding up the armistice. It is both amusing and instructive to re-read Secretary Acheson's account of how he dealt with this intervention by the country that was his father's birthplace and which he later styled the "stern daughter of the voice of God."[4] The episode itself was isolated and of little lasting importance, but it foreshadowed an important and continuing strand in the postwar story. Namely, that in situations where one member of the alliance is in a lead role in a crisis outside the Nato area, others (either with sincere official ideas or in response to domestic opinion) feel themselves free to offer helpful advice or mediation that is not always welcomed by the lead actor. Subsequent examples abound: from Suez to Vietnam to the Falklands War.

With the test of Korea successfully passed, and with West Germany and Italy moving to full military partnership, the Nato Alliance in 1953 stood strong. Britain and the United States shared a number of ideas concerning the Middle East, including a brief flirtation with the idea of a Middle East Defense Organization; moreover, there was in 1950 a tripartite agreement with France to limit and balance arms supplies to Israel and the Arab countries. More especially, Britain and the United States collaborated closely from 1951 to 1953 in actions to counter and eventually to remove the perceived threat of Mossadegh in Iran. In Indochina the United States acted vigorously, largely to keep France as a strong partner in Nato itself, to

support the French effort to defeat Ho Chi Minh. The latter was a clear case of the perceived communist and Soviet threat being regarded as paramount, in a colonial situation the United States basically regarded as outdated and unlikely to persist. And of course American support was accompanied by determined, and as usual unwelcome, efforts to get the French to create a non-communist Vietnamese government that would shortly become genuinely independent along with the other nations of Indochina.

Then came the test of 1954, when the siege of Dien Bien Phu abruptly made clear that the French were in deep trouble. President Eisenhower rejected last-minute French pleas for drastic US air action. Then in April and May, John Foster Dulles tried hard to create a basis for a vaguely defined "united action" with Britain, France and the United States at its core. The effort elicited a tart response from Anthony Eden, who complained that "Americans may think the time past when they need consider the feelings or difficulties of their allies."[5] Britain was not prepared to undertake joint military action, and its attitude played a significant part in negative congressional reactions that foreclosed carrying out what I have never been sure was a firm intent on President Eisenhower's part.

The British reaction was such that even Dulles' notion of a united threat, as a bargaining weapon in negotiation, went for naught and it was left to Pierre Mendès-France to negotiate at Geneva. The manner in which the United States dissociated itself from the process left a significant legacy of bitterness, at least among French officials. In a sense it was Dulles' consolation prize that Britain and France did become founding members of the SEATO alliance in the fall of 1953, although the degree of their commitment was always less than appeared on the surface. Essentially, each sought to placate Washington for the sake of continued cohesion on the main Nato front. In the aftermath the United States moved into the dominant position in support of South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, with the French taking a carping back seat while retaining substantial private interests there, a pattern later repeated in the Middle East and in parts of Africa, and not just with France.

The next crisis came in 1956 in the Middle East over Suez. There and in North Africa there had been a running history of more or less private frictions between the United States on the one hand, and Britain and France on the other—such frictions described in Acheson's memoirs became more marked with the advent of Dulles, specifically over Egypt. After that country became independent, the United States undertook support for the Aswan Dam on a bilateral basis, and it was the abrupt cancellation of this undertaking that brought on the 1956 crisis—Anglo-American relations were under a cloud from the outset. Moreover, Nasser's seizure of the Canal was bound to have a much greater effect on British and French interests, and the British (especially Eden) had special feelings of hostility toward Nasser.

Thus the stage was set for a diplomatic minuet in which the parties were at cross purposes all along: the British and French seeking to bring Nasser to heel by concerted pressures and threats (similar to what Dulles himself had attempted in 1954 over Indochina) and the Americans, as the Europeans perceived it, pulling the plug on such essential pressures. From that point onward, the British and French went to great lengths to conceal their plans for intervention from Washington, plans which enlisted Israel as a third partner. There developed a notable breakdown in what had been up to then an almost complete Anglo-American sharing of serious intelligence judgments on all situations. I well recall, for example, that in the CIA estimates shop we had concluded that Egyptian pilots would have no difficulty in keeping the Canal operating (contrary to official and private British views) and we also did an estimate on what would happen if Britain did resort to force—concluding that even a quick victory would in the end mean only that Britain would have to pull out eventually and would have antagonized both Egypt and much of the Arab world in the process. But none of this was shared, in a striking but hardly the only example of this kind of failure of essential communication. Its central role is surely one of the important lessons of the whole period.

The denouement is well known. The tripartite intervention in late October came as a total surprise to Washington and its timing—coinciding both with the Hungarian uprising and with the US presidential election—doubtless made some contribution to the harsh American response. In effect, Britain was cut off at the ankles by an explicit US threat to cease supporting the pound, a dire threat at that time. An expedition that was already extraordinarily ill-planned (largely for reasons of secrecy) never even attained initial British and French objectives, although the Israelis were completely successful in the Sinai. The United States proceeded to take the lead in denouncing the intervention and enforcing early British and French and eventual Israeli withdrawal, while Lester Pearson pursued the Canadian penchant for mediation—this time constructively and to the tune of a Nobel Peace Prize.

It was clearly a nadir in alliance dealings on an extra-Nato crisis, the only case where there was not only criticism and hampering action between major Nato allies but total frustration of two allies by the action of a third. That the intervention came to seem feckless and misguided to most British opinion helped to ease the strain and to prevent it from inflicting deep damage on the cohesion of Nato. But the deeper effect was certainly to accelerate a withdrawal of the British and French from taking responsibility in difficult parts of what later came to be called the Third World. "Leave it to Uncle Sam," and the growth of an essentially spectator and critical attitude in much of Europe toward US efforts can be traced in considerable part to Suez.

Yet Washington and London did work closely together in handling the aftermath of the coup in Iraq in 1978—the United States taking the lead in sorting out the situation in Lebanon and Britain acting to shore up Jordan.

France's conflict in Algeria was a different story. There the persistent US criticism of French purposes and methods (including Senators such as John F. Kennedy), with such actions as the reception of Algerian representatives in the United States, annoyed France but played little part in the outcome brought about by the subtle policy of Charles DeGaulle from 1958 to the final French withdrawal in 1962. Again the fact that most of the French public came to see the effort to retain Algeria as hopeless tended to mute hostile feelings toward the United States over the issue.

Then came the Congo crisis that ran from 1958 right through to 1964, again a case of sweeping up after withdrawal from a colonial position. There the United States did become a principal actor, to the intermittent great pain of Belgium, and on the Katanga secession with some criticism from Britain and France. But in the end the outcome seemed tenable and the frictions faded.[6]

Reviewing the period from 1951 to 1965 or so as a whole, one could conclude that there had been indeed recurring frictions and a serious confrontation over Suez. But at the same time this series of crises outside the Nato area did not, I would judge, significantly shake the alliance in terms of its central focus. Perhaps DeGaulle's 1966 withdrawal from the Nato military structure owed something to Suez and to Eisenhower's 1958 rejection of DeGaulle's proposal for a tripartite "directorate" of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, to consult on worldwide matters and if possible act jointly. The fact that London was no more receptive to that idea than Washington may also have contributed slightly to DeGaulle's rejection of the British candidacy for membership in the European Community in 1963 and again in 1967. But the roots of DeGaulle's actions lay much deeper, as any reader of his writings would attest.

What, then, did enable Nato to hold firm? Partly, I think, that there were no serious difficulties or differences over Nato strategy or the division of labor during this time. Indeed, the Berlin Crisis that ran from 1958 to 1962 was on the whole handled with remarkable cohesion and with a unique degree of quadripartite cooperation involving the German Federal Republic as well as the United Kingdom, United States, and France. The alliance simply had to hold together and deal with that Berlin threat, and the successful outcome brought Nato to another high pitch of cohesion in the early 1960s.

And there was another factor, taken for granted at the time, but more noteworthy in hindsight. This was that the members of the alliance were making great strides in the economic field, under a US leadership that was both accepted and seen as wisely handled. This underscored the essential fact that the alliance—from the Marshall Plan onward—had not only the foundation of a common perception of the Soviet threat but a degree of

economic collaboration and interdependence unique among historic alliances. That the economic part of the shared undertaking was a success story right up to roughly 1971 is surely a key reason why alliance cohesion remained generally firm despite the recurring differences over problems and crises outside the Nato area.

In retrospect the period from 1953 to 1961 can be seen to have been characterized by overwhelming US dominance and by a series of crises in which the European interest related in large part to past colonial positions in which individual European countries retained major interests. Broadly speaking, the period from 1961 to 1972 can be seen as a transition period, with US dominance somewhat eroding by the end of that time, and with crises outside the Nato area relating less to the transition from colonialism (with the Congo as a notable exception).

The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 resembled Korea in basic respects, although of course in a vastly compressed time frame. In each case the threat came out of the blue and was visibly serious. But unlike Korea the Cuban missile crisis was handled exclusively by the United States. The US response was perceived as wise from the outset, and resulted quickly in visible success. In these circumstances it is hardly surprising that Nato completely supported what the United States did—although it is amusing to note that the ever-precise General DeGaulle pointedly asked President Kennedy's emissary, Mr. Acheson, whether he was being informed or consulted, with Acheson replying frankly that it was the former. But it was evident that the circumstances had precluded genuine consultation; success carried all before it, including the subsequent withdrawal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey, which in effect meant that Nato no longer had intermediate-range US weapons in any part of the Nato area.

As it happened, the Cuban missile crisis virtually coincided with the brief Chinese invasion of India in the fall of 1962. There cooperation between the United States and Britain (the only Nato nation with major South Asian past ties and present interesrs) was close and effective, with military assistance to India coordinated and agreement briefly reached on a joint program for the future (at Nassau in December 1962). Such cooperation reflected the strong sense at the time of a new Chinese threat to the area. As that sense of threat receded, however, British interest ebbed, and the United States found itself briefly conducting parallel programs of military assistance with both Pakistan and India—in the latter case in increasing competition with the Soviet Union.

Here one must look back for a moment at the original 1954 US decision to arm Pakistan and to take the lead in enlisting that nation in the CENTO alliance. While I do not recall the British ever remonstrating over US policy toward Pakistan—at a time when Britain itself was pushing the CENTO alliance (originally the Baghdad Pact) for the sake of its own Middle Easr

interests—and while the British did join with others in consortium arrangements for economic aid to Pakistan, the underlying fact was that from 1954 on the United States became the principal Western actor in South Asia and tended to deny the British any significant role there. Moreover, if one sees the United States as to some degree playing the role that Britain had played in the earlier "great game" to bar Soviet expansion in the area, the US embrace of Pakistan both set off predictable frictions between Pakistan and India and (because of the Pushtunistan issues) inhibited US efforts to assist Afghanistan. Again I do not recall significant British criticism of these policies, but they did leave the United States playing a lone hand. This was not without some bearing on the subsequent alliance response to the Afghanistan crisis that emerged in 1978-80.

As for Pakistan and India, Pakistan (almost certainly egged on by China in its brief assertive phase of 1962-65) picked a fight with India over Kashmir in 1965. It suffered an unforeseen debacle that, in hindsight, led directly to the progressive weakening of Pakistan, the 1971 war over Bangladesh, and the emergence of India as the clearly dominant power in the region. But in all of these events there were no significant Anglo-American frictions visible, although, I can well imagine the mutterings among old "great game" hands about the ineptness of American policy, especially the handling of India in 1971.

Vietnam was of course an entirely different story. There the initial British position was heavily affected by the 1963-65 Indonesian confrontation in Malaysia, to which Britain contributed a major force alongside contingents from Australia and New Zealand. In effect, in 1964 and early 1965 there was a perceived division of labor, especially on the part of the Conservative government that yielded to Harold Wilson in October 1964. And in the process, the British—exposed to the full range of US intelligence concerning North Vietnam actions against South Vietnam—came officially to accept the American view that this was indeed essentially a Hanoi aggression against the South.

Yet, even after the Indonesian coup of late 1965 that ended the Malaysian confrontation, Britain quietly but steadfastly declined to participate directly in the Vietnam conflict, as Australia and New Zealand did. This was a source of private pain to Secretary Dean Rusk, my chief at the time, and his irritation and that of President Johnson were hardly eased by a number of opportunistic, ill-timed and apparently politically self-serving peace initiatives by Wilson. But there were always bigger fish to fry in Anglo-American relations and these official US criticisms remained muted.

France, of course, took a different position from the start. DeGaulle bluntly felt that the situation in Vietnam was hopeless ("pourri," as he told George Ball).[7] DeGaulle's Foreign Minister Couve de Murville was equally blunt in private, notably in a talk with Dean Rusk at Manila in April 1964, that any US resort to direct intervention would founder. Moreover, as polls of the

period demonstrate, there had evolved in France a strikingly different view of China from that held in the United States and indeed in most other countries: the French, both generally and officially, perceived China as becoming the great and dominant power in Southeast Asia in a fairly short time frame, and it flowed from this that to attempt to resist China there was to play King Canute. So from 1963 onward the French were not only openly skeptical to sharply critical, but from time to time launched peace initiatives under various "neutralist" labels that seemed to Washington mischievous.

Yet in any overall assessment of Vietnam, even the sharp French differences with US policy had only a slight effect on the outcome and—at least in my judgment—did little to affect behavior in the Nato area itself. (While some have argued that the United States could have drawn more fully on French advice and past experience in Vietnam, I do not believe this deficiency was truly significant.) On the US side, the French and British positions came simply to be seen as a given. Even when criticism of lack of allied support became a significant factor in US decisions in 1967-68, it was primarily the inadequate efforts of Asian allies that were singled out, by Clark Clifford for example, in urging the change in US policy that came after the Tet debacle of the spring of 1968.

The rising tide of public criticism of US policy in Europe, from 1965 onward, came likewise to be accepted. And the reason, I think, was simply that such criticism in effect mirrored, and resounded back and forth with, similar criticism within the United States itself. As with the British over Suez, the fact that one's own policy is increasingly perceived as unwise or worse makes it unlikely that one will blame one's failure on the criticism or even the actions of others. And, to repeat, the most controversial and emotional years over Vietnam—from 1965 through 1970—coincided with a high tide in economic performance and cohesion among the alliance nations. As in the 1950s, economic success and interdependence were a big plus for the alliance throughout the 1960s.

Ultimately, of course, Vietnam was a tragedy with lasting impact on US policy. While the United States did not "truly wreck itself" as Athens had done in the Sicilian expedition, the American failure was surely the beginning of a serious decline in allied confidence in US wisdom. Its impact on subsequent US conduct, the so-called Vietnam syndrome, has remained important and, in the judgment of many, debilitating if not crippling.

In the story of Vietnam, the role and attitudes of Japan deserve special mention. In the 1964-65 period the Japanese government basically shared the US perception of the nature of the conflict. When Prime Minister Eisaku Sato signed a strong communiqué on the subject in Washington in early 1965, he was both sincere and confident that to do so would not hurt him politically. Moreover, Japan benefited considerably from being (as it had been in the Korean War) an important base area for the war. Most of all, the Japanese

were still dealing with their postwar anxieties, preferring a reserved role in foreign policy on all fronts and deferring to the United States. Over time, the Japanese public did become increasingly critical, and such US actions as the use of Okinawa for B-52 missions undoubtedly helped to accelerate Japanese sentiment for the return of that island. But in the main the Japanese simply let things run their course, and there was no perceptible effect on the US-Japanese relationship.

I would like to note one procedural lesson from Vietnam. All through the 1964-69 period, especially in the later stages, the US government was at pains to share its perceptions with its major allies (France perhaps largely excepted). Though almost none of these exchanges could be described as genuine consultation, the fact that our major allies knew what we were thinking and usually had advance notice of special actions was, I think, of great significance in muting official criticism and in assisting allied governments in dealing with public criticism. This may have been especially true in the case of Japan.

Discussion of the Vietnam War inevitably involves US policy toward China. On the basic issue of recognition of the People's Republic and admitting it to UN membership, there were I suppose no true "crises" between 1953 and 1971. But the hard-line US position was clearly not shared by Britain or France, or in time by Canada, and one can readily identify periods of significant friction, for example, when Canada unexpectedly took an initiative at the United Nations in the fall of 1966. But this running criticism of US policy was somewhat muted by the briefly assertive policies of the People's Republic in 1964-65 and then by the Cultural Revolution. That US policy on recognition and UN membership throughout this period was seen as rigid and unrealistic hardly helped overall allied confidence generally, and was at times a running irritation; however, I would not put it stronger than that.

Then in 1971 the United States made a dramatic change in its China policy, symbolized by the Kissinger visit that year. Here was a very clear lesson involving Japan. Nothing could have been plainer over the years than the Japanese fear of being dealt out by a unilateral US rapprochement with the People's Republic. That they were not given advance notice of the US change was a procedural failure that happened to coincide with important changes in US economic policy. The two events gave the Japanese twin "shokkus" that left a mark for years on Japanese-American relations. The lesson in terms of advance notice is all too clear. No nation—especially an ally—ever likes to be taken by surprise, and the reaction can go beyond hurt feelings. This was as true of Japan in 1971 as it was of Margaret Thatcher over Grenada in October 1983.

But it is the tensions that have surfaced since 1972 that have raised our greatest concerns. In this time frame we have seen not only growing divisions within the Nato Alliance (and with Japan) over the handling of

Third World crises, but the onset of important changes in the underlying cement of the alliance in economic terms.

To begin with, the oil crisis that began in 1971 and came to a head in 1973-74 and again in 1978-79, has been profoundly divisive. Apart from the teasing question whether a more united negotiating front could have stemmed the early price rises obtained by Qaddafi in 1971, and then under the Tehran agreement shortly after, the plain fact was that rapidly increasing US demand for oil—under what seemed to Europeans profligate US practices—was instrumental in putting a hitherto weak OPEC in the driver's seat by mid-1973.

The availability of an "oil weapon" then contributed to Anwar Sadat's attack on Israel in October 1973. The Arab oil producers promptly imposed an embargo on oil to the United States and the Netherlands, because of their support of Israel, and the other Nato allies moved by fear of similar action were to deny—with the sole exception of Portugal and the Azores—any intermediate facilities for the movement of US assistance to Israel. An already beleaguered President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger, taken by surprise by the attack itself and hardly to be blamed for it except possibly in terms of intelligence foresight, found themselves faced with what was in effect passive resistance by their Nato allies. The European reaction came as a great shock to them and to much of the American public. However, the US aid did get through, Israel held out and reversed the tide, and a precarious armistice was achieved.

But the crisis was a revelation for Nato. It demonstrated that the allies cared more about their oil supplies than they did about working with US policy, and it thrust the United States even more strongly into the role of sole and key supporter of Israel that it had already assumed after the Six-Day War in 1967. Prior to that war, there had been brief but ineffective efforts to put together an allied naval effort to reopen the Gulf of Aqaba, but in the war itself the allies had cooperated in allowing US aid to Israel to flow freely—which simply underscored the contrast between 1967 and 1973.

In the aftermath, the allies were not unsympathetic to Kissinger's successive negotiations with Egypt and Syria, and there was no renewed Arab-Israel crisis for a few years. But that of 1973 had clearly revealed the newly divisive effect of Europe's oil dependence and had opened up another latent source of division in the increasingly close ties between the United States and Israel, with which the Europeans felt themselves to have no real connection.

Moreover, over the years that followed the 1971-72 Ostpolitik and détente agreements, there developed a clear and increasingly marked difference between European and American perceptions of the success of these policies. Whereas Europe's trade with the USSR expanded along with important new

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ties between West and East Germany, Congress (in the Jackson and Stevenson Amendments of 1974) sharply limited US trade participation. Meanwhile, successive Soviet actions in Angola, Ethiopia and South Yemen and the Soviet arms buildup dispelled the oversold impression that détente would operate to moderate Soviet behavior or to diminish Soviet adventurism in the Third World. Both official and public opinion in the United States became progressively disillusioned with détente, while for the Europeans it seemed a visible success. Their expanding trade also led to important domestic political pressures not to disturb it, notably in the Federal Republic.

There was no true "crisis," at least in allied terms, over what happened in Angola, Ethiopia or South Yemen. In Angola, an attempted "covert" US intervention may already have been failing before Congress put an end to it, a clear example of the "post-Vietnam syndrome" that ran through US policy from 1973 onward. In conjunction with the debacle in Vietnam in 1975, Angola and later Soviet gains were perceived, in Europe and elsewhere, as indications that the United States had lost its touch in Third World situations. But there was little inclination among the European nations to pick up the slack, although France did act effectively against the brief invasion of the Shaba area of the Congo in 1978.

Then came the Iranian Revolution of the fall of 1978, leading to the departure of the Shah in early 1979 and the advent of the Ayatollah Khomeini. Although major Nato nations, as well as Japan, bought a lot of Iranian oil and were by then heavily involved in projects within Iran, the United States was still by far the dominant Western power in a position to advise the Shah. The relevant American accounts do not suggest that there was much US consultation with other nations, although the British ambassador, Sir Anthony Parsons, was in close touch with US Ambassador Sullivan and apparently shared most of his judgments—including the belief that at least from November onward there was no way to save the Shah.[8] The Carter administration's indecisive and divided handling of the crisis can hardly have impressed these other nations, but recrimination was avoided and all the Western nations simply tried to hang on as best they could under the new regime. What the crisis did above all, in allied terms, was to highlight the continued absence of effective cooperation on oil matters. With the oil shortfall just below the seven percent benchmark for action developed in contingency planning by the International Energy Agency, there was a good deal of backing and filling among the major oil consumers but no effective action to prevent the spot market going clear out of control and raising oil prices much further than could have been the case.

When Iran then seized the US hostages in November 1979, the allies totally supported the United States in principle, at the United Nations and later at the World Court. Moreover, when the United States seized Iran's assets and extended its reach to holdings of US banks abroad, the nations concerned did

not object and the relevant court proceedings were still dragging on when the matter was finally resolved in January 1981.[9] The allies did agree to limited sanctions against Iran, notably on military equipment, but were not initially prepared to join in more comprehensive measures. The issue came to a head in April 1980, with the Europeans apparently reluctantly persuaded to join in stronger economic measures ill-fated but then came the rescue attempt. It was not a happy experience in allied terms, but the quick failure of the attempt tended to drown out allied recriminations. In the final negotiations, Britain in particular cooperated handsomely.

All in all the Iran crisis and hostage seizure were a messy case in allied terms. There were isolated bright spots—including the Canadian rescue of several of the hostages—but on a broader basis the Nato allies and Japan must have seen themselves sharing in the geopolitical setback and incurring major losses, for which US policy (both at the time and over the years) bore a heavy responsibility.

This background can hardly have been irrelevant to the allied response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. US memoirs make it all too clear that in its preoccupation with Iran the US government never came systematically to grips with the possibility of a Soviet invasion, with Brzezinski firing off intermittent unilateral warnings to the Soviets and the State Department confining its allied consultations ro the lesser possibility of increased Soviet military assistance to its beleaguered client regime.[10] This may have changed at the last minute, but basically the invasion took all by surprise and there does not appear to have been even a systematic sharing of intelligence judgments that one surmises must have pointed strongly to the possibility of invasion at least a month before it occurred. This deplorable situation was hardly helped by President Carter's offhand comment that the Soviet action had sharply changed his view of Soviet behavior—a remark universally judged as naive, to put it mildly.

Moreover, it is important to note the Carter administration's uneven record in its dealings with Nato. On the one hand there was an agreement on a conventional military Nato buildup, on the other the "neutron bomb" fiasco, contributing directly to the December 1979 decision for a new Nato missile deployment. Basically, whereas Europeans had come to find Henry Kissinger's strategic mind-set, sophistication and Europe-sensitive style to their taste, many in Europe had been put off by the contrasting style of the Carter administration, with evidence of inconsistency, divergent views and erratic presidential decisions. And there was downright bad feeling between Helmut Schmidt and both Carter and Zbigniew Brzezinski (shades of the earlier transition from Acheson to Dulles and of the personal friction between Dulles and Eden). As in all foreign policy, the importance of personality and style can never be ignored.

In the early stages of the Afghanistan crisis, ambiguous European written statements seemed to minimize Soviet motives in the invasion, while the US initial approach was hesitant and included a number of mixed signals. When the Carter administration did decide to press, not for any coordinated responsive action in the area of Afghanistan itself (where its own early offer of renewed aid to Pakistan was rebuffed), but for other "punitive" actions against the Soviet Union, it ran head-on into strong European sentiment that nothing should be done that could disturb the ongoing "détente in Europe." The result was a most uneven and unconvincing Nato response. Some joined the United States in boycotting the 1980 Olympics but others did not. Considerable initial European support for the partial US grain embargo soon dissipated and there was no willingness to participate in any wider reduction in Soviet contacts, certainly almost nothing in respect to trade.

In sum, the allied response to Afghanistan was another nadir, more widely perceived as such and more serious even than 1956 or 1973. And, in the wake of Iran and Afghanistan, the United States proclaimed the Carter Doctrine and pushed ahead with a Rapid Deployment Force designed to protect the Middle East. There was a general feeling in Europe that US policy tended to see the situation far too much in military terms and too little in terms of political relationships. By December 1980 the issue of "out of area" cooperation in Nato had become a specific and important item on the Nato agenda. Would the other allies "compensate" for any withdrawal of US forces in Europe for a Middle East intervention? Would they "facilitate" the deployment of such a US intervention force? And might they themselves "participate" directly at least to meet some forms of threat? These questions have reverberated ever since in Nato consultations and meetings, with no clear contingency agreement yet emerging.[11]

And here one must again stress the division between American and European views and interests concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict, which had by then widened. The Europeans had welcomed the Camp David Accords of 1978, but when negotiations on autonomy in the West Bank bogged down visibly from late 1979 onward, they were moved to issue the Venice Declaration of June 1980 stressing the rights of the Palestinians. The Venice position—almost the only example of a serious Community statement on foreign policy—was not basically at variance with the position of the Carter administration or of the Reagan administration later, but it did strike a different note and one discordant to American ears. The fact that it was issued at all reflected deep European doubts about the rigidity and objectives of the Likud government in Israel, and frustration over the inability or unwillingness of the United States to affect the Israeli position. Here the Europeans have always seen American policy as being to some degree tied to American domestic political pressures. Likewise major European governments have frequently diverged with the United States in their votes on relevant UN

resolutions, particularly over Israeli settlements on the West Bank. This clear divergence of views, no doubt influenced to some degree by Europe's dependence on Arab oil but essentially much deeper and broader, has now become a serious element obstructing coordination on almost all Middle East matters.

To complete the story of the Carter administration, the outbreak of war between Iraq and Iran in the fall of 1980 was met with divergent but not seriously discordant responses among the Western allies. Most concurred with the US "hands off" approach, while at the same time seeking to preserve significant interests in the warring countries. One exception was France which from the first tilted substantially to the Iraqi side, expanding its existing position as a military supplier to Iraq. Although there was no coordinated allied position, there was a generally shared view that victory for either side would be more serious for Western interests than a stalemate leading eventually to peace. Basically, there was little that the United States or the European nations could do to resolve the situation.

This brings us to the Reagan administration and the record since 1981. Here one must note again the importance of overall relationships, including economics and what are accepted as clear-cut Nato issues.

On the one hand, Europeans have never taken kindly to an evangelical "hard line" from Washington and the President's intermittent pronouncements of this sort (even more than those of John Foster Dulles before him) have struck a jarring note in European ears, as have the initial casual comments concerning nuclear war. Moreover, although US economic policy generally paralleled that of European nations in its attack on inflation, huge US budget deficits and their perceived impact on high interest rates have been a continuing bone in the European throat.

On the other hand, the need not to let Soviet pressure prevent the Nato missile deployment that finally began in late 1983 has forced the Nato nations to work closely together, both minimizing reservations about US negotiating strategy and tending to mute differences over policy in other areas. Moreover, there was considerable compatibility in outlook between the Reagan administration and the Conservative government of Mrs. Thatcher and the Kohl government in West Germany, while François Mitterrand broadly shared US views on the necessity of a firm posture toward the Soviet Union.

In one early case—the initial US near-obsession with Libya—European feelings were plainly opposed to confrontation, and it was perhaps fortunate that a minor shootdown of Libyan aircraft in August 1981 tended to defuse US feelings. At later stages, the United States found itself exerting unwelcome pressure on France to assist Chad against Qaddafi's invasion, and the moderate official British reaction to the Libyan gunplay in London in April

1984 once again underlined that Europeans generally felt they must stay in some sort of working relationship with Qaddafi, for the sake of his oil supplies, however much they may detest him.

In Africa what had seemed a brilliant Anglo-American collaboration in turning Rhodesia into Zimbabwe in 1979-80—with primary credit to Britain's Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington—has been dimmed by Robert Mugabe's subsequent behavior. But substantial European differences with US policy toward Namibia were eased by the tentative successes recorded by the US "constructive engagement" approach as of early 1984. Here one might note the ironic contrast between South Africa and Israel. Whereas US ties with Israel and domestic political pressures (at least as perceived by Europe) tend to make US policy lukewarm toward Palestinian aspirations, in South Africa the shoe is on the other foot, with European economic ties to the South African establishment much stronger than those of the United States and with a black and liberal constituency in the United States strongly on the side of meeting black aspirations.

In the Middle East the picture has been uneven at best. While major European nations were persuaded to participate in the Sinai peacekeeping force established in early 1982, negotiations to this end were tortuous and at times strained. And when Israel invaded Lebanon in June 1982, European official and public opinion was markedly hostile to Israel's action, while in the aftermath several European governments joined in visible actions to give the Palestine Liberation Organization renewed respectability. This was again not at variance with the US position, confirmed in the Reagan peace initiative of September 1982, an initiative to which the Europeans were sympathetic. But they continue to judge its failure, first in the spring of 1983 and then again in the spring of 1984, in considerably different terms from US official and most US public opinion. Europeans tend less to blame King Hussein and Yasser Arafat (or even Hafiz Assad) and more to see the root of the impasse in the hard-line position of the Likud government in Israel and the inability of the United States to alter that position.

In Lebanon itself, the French, Italians and British participated alongside the US Marines in a multinational peacekeeping force, the French doing so with a will reflecting their own past Lebanon connections. (The terrorist attacks of the fall of 1983 were almost as disastrous to the French contingent as to the Marines.) But it never helps an alliance to have its members participate together in a venture that fails. One cannot judge the degree of recrimination in Europe, although it seems evident that the abrupt US withdrawal of the Marines in early 1984 came without adequate notice or coordination with the participating allies.

A major question, as of mid-1984, concerns support for Iraq and arms supplies to the Gulf nations. In the latter case the United States which had long taken the lead in meeting perceived arms needs of Saudi Arabia and

others, has found itself partially frustrated by congressional (and Israeli) opposition.

France in particular seemed to be pursuing its own course in this area. In addition to being the major arms supplier to Iraq, including the controversial Etendard aircraft with its Exocet missiles, it was apparently bidding for major orders from Saudi Arabia and the smaller states of the Gulf. On the one hand, such action could be seen as a wise way of meeting local needs and evading oversensitive Israeli objections; on the other, it might tend to commit France, at least, more firmly to the Arab side in the event of a renewed crisis between Israel and any of its neighbors.

Any renewed crisis in the Middle East could put the gravest strains on allied unity and cohesion. In the case of the Iraq-Iran war, there has apparently been significant coordinated contingency planning for naval action to keep open the Strait of Hormuz, in which European navies might participate alongside the US Navy. But US efforts to develop cooperative defense arrangements with the Gulf States—notably the expansion of the Rapid Deployment Force (now Central Command) and the abortive efforts of Secretary Haig to develop a "strategic consensus" in 1981—have never enlisted clear-cut European support. As before they tend to see this effort as too concerned with strictly military planning and tending to neglect crucial political relationships, some of course affected by US ties with Israel.

Thus, if a future crisis in the Gulf should go beyond a strictly maritime threat to the Strait of Hormuz, it would be a bold prophet who foresaw a coordinated allied response, and there would be a strong chance of renewed deep differences and recrimination. Significant opinion is already evident in the United States that America is being left to handle, largely alone, a situation where European and Japanese oil dependence is vastly greater than the now-minimal direct US dependence on Gulf supplies. To be sure, European nations now have substantial oil reserves, and likewise, in the global oil market, the United States too could be significantly affected indirectly by a cutoff. Yet there remains considerable feeling that the United States is being asked to take most of the responsibility for pulling European and Japanese chestnuts out of the fire, and there does not seem to the outside observer to be any agreed division of labor.

All in all, the Middle East as of mid-1984 was a witch's brew, not least in terms of its possible impact on alliance relationships. That factor, indeed, was an important additional reason for hoping that some way could be found, perhaps after the Israeli elections of July 1984, to get a genuine Palestinian peace process under way. Otherwise, or even if this should happen, one could too readily imagine scenarios that would turn into nightmares and sharply divide the United States from its major Nato partners and perhaps also from Japan.

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Meanwhile Central America itself reached crisis status at least for the United States. As in Vietnam, European criticisms of US policy have tended to mirror parallel criticisms from within the United States itself, but this has hardly made them more palatable to the Reagan administration. The Europeans have apparently come to take a more realistic view of the nature of the communist regime in Nicaragua; yet their reaction to the spring 1984 controversy over mining of Nicaraguan harbors was sharp, including a specific French offer to sweep the mines. The Europeans themselves no longer volunteered to play a role in peace negotiations, but they were watching closely to see whether the regional Contadora process could achieve results, and their impression was that the United States had not been wholly cooperative in that effort.

Central America is of course remote in terms of direct European interests, and recognized as a special US concern. Nonetheless, there are continuing grave doubts both in official quarters and especially in public opinion, and if push should come to US shove, the European reaction would almost surely be sharply negative—unless the US action had the clear support of the key neighboring countries such as Mexico and Venezuela. In sum, the picture concerning Central America, while disturbing, is not remotely at the same level of potential divisiveness as the Middle East.

In both cases, and perhaps especially in Central America, one of the clear lessons seemed to be one that applied almost equally to the American government's presentation of its policy to the US Congress and public—that is, there had never been a clearly articulated statement of just what the US policy and strategy are, and specifically what was contemplated with respect to Nicaragua. A policy of pressure intended to lead to negotiation is always hard to distinguish from one that contemplates (and perhaps even welcomes) the direct use of force, and the distinction is particularly hard to handle for democratic nations with inquisitive media and sensitive public opinions. The fact that the Europeans, like American public opinion, were neither totally persuaded, even in official quarters, of the reality or at least the importance of continued Nicaraguan intervention in El Salvador, nor above all clearly informed (let alone consulted) concerning US intentions was bound to be unhelpful. Even if the lesson cannot be always followed, it is surely plain: if one really wants allied understanding and support, one must be as clear and honest as possible about what one is doing and why.

Finally, let us consider briefly the Falklands and Grenada. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins have written a remarkable early and authoritative case study of the British side of the Falklands war, including the fairly high degree of support extended by the European Community, the mediation effort of Secretary Haig, and the subsequent material US support for Britain,[12] and on the latter aspect there is Mr. Jenkins' subsequent revealing report in *The Economist*.[13] To these there is little to add—while Britons were querulous

about the US position at the time, most must surely have come to recognize that the United States in the end came through handsomely. In my judgment the decisive factor in US policy was in part the alliance connection but in larger measure the fact that Argentina's action represented by any standard a case of conventional aggression, whatever the underlying provocation in terms of previous British foot-dragging.

As for Grenada, I cannot myself suppose that the United States would have acted differently under any administration. But the handling of dealings with the British by this one was clearly inept to the point of outright deception—as the Simon Jenkins' parallel report in *The Economist* makes clear—and the effect on Mrs. Thatcher, and her outright criticism, must surely (as Jenkins notes) have played a big part in the negative European reaction at least at the time.[14] Several European nations joined in the General Assembly's condemnation of the US action, while others abstained—and in a few European quarters there were takers for the Soviet attempt to compare Grenada with Afghanistan. As of mid-1984, it may be too soon to assess the ultimate impact of Grenada. My own hunch is that these adverse reactions will tend to recede and that Grenada will not have left serious lasting scars.

Finally, let me briefly examine two proposals for structural change within Nato that are sometimes aired, and then briefly summarize the lessons I would draw from this whole postwar experience. My basic premises are, first, that the Western Alliance has all along been, and remains today, by far the greatest structure of its kind in world history, that its cohesion and effectiveness in the Nato area itself are vital, and that both the maintenance of these and reasonably effective handling of crises outside the Nato area require the maximum attainable degree of allied cooperation on such crises and threats. Second, that the greatest threats to world peace, as well as the greatest possibilities of Soviet gains that could cumulatively alter the basic balance of power in the world, now lie outside the Nato area. Thus, how the Western allies deal with situations outside the Nato area has always been of great importance, and seems overwhelmingly likely to be even more so in the future, above all in the Middle East and contiguous areas.

For this very reason, the suggestion is occasionally made that the geographic scope of the Nato Alliance might be expanded to include the Middle East. This I shall not argue at length, but only say briefly that it reminds me of an old saying of Justice Brandeis: "The way to solve a difficult problem is not to turn one's attention to an impossible one." A "Nato embrace" of the Middle East would surely be highly unwelcome to key nations there and enormously complicate what are already deep and intractable divisions there.

A lesser suggestion, put forward seriously and responsibly in a memorable 1981 pamphlet by the four heads of leading private foreign policy organizations in the United States, Britain, France, and the Federal Republic, would

call for a formal and accepted structure of consultation and review, with stress on these four nations.[16] Such a formal structure, presumably with links to other Nato nations and Japan on a case-by-case basis, has echos of the old DeGaulle idea of a directorate. But the proposal has already aroused strong negative reactions within Nato. At least on a formal basis, I take it to be a non-starter.

But this has not meant, and should not mean, any lesser concern over the constant need for close consultation among the allied nations specifically concerned with particular problems and areas—again with the Middle East to the fore. The *informal practice* of such consultation—among what might be called "principal nations"—has been in effect in recent years, though the outsider cannot easily judge how close it is or how effective. But it does seem clear to me that it is in this informal direction that the Western Alliance must move.

And this brings me to a quick summary of the lessons that might be drawn. Of these the first and most basic is the importance of central alliance relationships, in the broad sense, both on the security and economic fronts, with much greater emphasis than before 1971 on the importance of the latter. As I have stressed over and over, the economic condition of the alliance makes an enormous difference both in government attitudes and especially in those of public opinion. And while the United States is no longer as dominant as it was in earlier periods, it remains today the essential leader, something more than simply *primus inter pares*.

Second, shared or at least understood perceptions are essential to getting the maximum attainable allied cooperation on crises outside the Nato area. It is extraordinarily hard to have truly common perceptions—notably on the always difficult question of the mix of local and Soviet factors in a given situation—but there is a constant need for unremitting effort to narrow differences and, at any rate, to understand them clearly. Again, the United States is the inescapable leader to this end, although it is almost equally important for the European Nato nations to get their act together much better than they have hitherto done.

On all counts, the importance of personalities and diplomatic style speak for themselves. The Western Alliance is fortunate that it now has individual governments that are each of a conservative-to-moderate stripe, with professional diplomats in close touch and with few of the personality clashes at top levels that have often had a serious negative impact. But such a situation cannot at all be assumed for more than a few years at best.

As in all dealings between democratic nations, the state of public opinion can be a very important factor. In some cases—notably Vietnam—public opinion in individual countries may be almost beyond the control of their governments. But in most cases that are less long-lived or dramatic, public opinion does tend to take its lead from government attitudes.

Finally, there is a need to face frankly the recurrent fact that deference to allied views may on occasion mean that the lead actor in a given situation will have to weigh whether it is better to take stronger unilateral actions with which other allies are not prepared to agree, or to lower the response to a level that commands broad allied concurrence and cooperation. While the natural gas pipeline case of 1982 did not arise over a crisis outside the Nato area, it seems to me that like Afghanistan it argues strongly for the general proposition that it is better to do lesser things in unison than to attempt unilateral action, especially if that cuts directly into the perceived interest of one's allies.

These points may seem simple to the point of being bromides. Yet each has been neglected at frequent points in the postwar story. Ultimately, as I said at the outset, there is bound to be continuing tension between the need for alliance cohesion and the perceived interests and attitudes of individual allies on situations falling outside the Nato area. The trick is not to remove these but to work unremittingly to reduce them to as low a level as possible.

Notes

1. Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), p. 315.
2. François Kersaudy, *Churchill and DeGaulle* (New York: Atheneum, 1982), pp. 146-50, 191-210, 299-301, 397-409.
3. Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation; My Years in the State Department* (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 285.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 700-05.
5. Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), p. 216.
6. George Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern* (New York: Norton, 1982), pp. 222-59, 322-25.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 378.
8. Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices: Four Critical Years in Managing America's Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), pp. 328-338; Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memairs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1983), pp. 354-398; William H. Sullivan, *Mission to Iran* (New York: Norton, 1981); Ball, pp. 455-62.
9. Robert Carswell, "Economic Sanctions and the Iran Experience," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1981-82, pp. 248-252.
10. Vance, p. 387; Brzezinki, pp. 426-29.
11. I am indebted, for clarifying these terms and the present state of discussions within Nato, to unpublished research and writing by Elizabeth Sherwood, currently at the Brookings Institution in Washington.
12. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands* (New York: Norton, 1983).
13. Simon Jenkins, "America's Falklands War," *The Economist*, 3-9 March 1984, pp. 29-31.
14. "Britain's Grenada Shut-out," *The Economist*, 10-16 March 1984, pp. 31-40.See also David Watt, "As A European Saw It," *Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1983*, pp. 525-26.
15. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "Toward an Overall Western Strategy for Peace, Freedom and Progress," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1982, pp. 45-46.
16. Karl Kaiser, Winston Lord, Thierry de Montbrial, David Watt, "Western Security: What has changed? What should be done?", Council on Foreign Relations (New York), 1981.

Crisis and Consensus in the West
The Boundaries of Shared Interests

Kenneth Hunt

The West has faced and will surely face in the future crises which call for rapid political or military responses. Some of these may have been anticipated and prepared for by allied consultation and coordinated planning. Some may arise for which responses are less well prepared, perhaps because there was insufficient agreement about them, even a reluctance to consider them in detail beforehand for one reason or another. Some, of course, may take an unexpected shape or come out of the blue. Examples of all of these come readily to mind.

There have been crises that have affected the entire international community, such as the events in Czechoslovakia or Poland. Others have been regarded as more in the nature of national problems, or were the result of national policies that did not command an allied consensus. The actions of France in Algeria or Portugal in Africa divided allies, as more recently did those of Britain in the Falklands or of the United States in Grenada and Central America.

Nations are unlikely to see crises from quite the same perspectives: their histories, geography and, above all, their interests may also be different. But the concept of interests is a very broad one and rather rubbery. It can encompass anything from the preservation of a political system or way of life to the smallest of economic stakes. Clearly, interests must be important to provoke crisis and vital, or something approaching it, to provoke war; but in both cases their degree of importance ought to be plain to the adversary too, if there is not to be miscalculation or if crises are to be properly managed. In passing, it might be noted that the description vital may be used somewhat indiscriminately: it was, for example, said not long ago that Lebanon was a vital interest for the United States; important for American foreign policy it may have been but that it was vital, is open to argument.

Security interests will obviously figure prominently in defining crises or deciding on responses to them. But even here, leaving aside the threat of direct attack or of broad concerns like the freedom of the seas, the action of an

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opponent can vary from the undesirable to the unacceptable. For the West, a Soviet presence in the Arabian Sea or in Ethiopia is undesirable but a Soviet interdiction of Gulf oil would be unacceptable. And while all may agree that Soviet expansion ought to be contained, it may be much less easy to agree on where and how the line should be drawn.

Perhaps even more difficult is the concept of political interests. National interests may be defined in political, even ideological terms according to the view of the government in office. A left or liberal leaning administration can look at international relations or crises from a particular viewpoint, maybe making moral judgments where the activities of socialist or authoritarian regimes are involved, while more conservative leaders may show opposing tendencies or be more "realistic." So while all may share the unexceptionable wish to support friendly governments, particularly those important in various parts of the world, there might not be ready agreement on which these are. There can be reservations even about the governments of allies: some Nato countries have gone through marked, almost extreme shifts of political color. The inconsistencies of policy that democratic changes may bring can mean that national interests and purposes are suddenly redefined, an upsetting process for an alliance, particularly if the changes are in Washington.

So it will not suffice merely to talk of interests in a general way even where they concern security; it is necessary to be more specific both as regards countries and political circumstances. Accordingly this paper will look at a range of possible crisis areas to see where interests may or may not be shared, what those interests might be and the value that nations might place upon them. This detailed approach may provide a better vehicle for the consideration of responses.

For ease of analysis, crises will be discussed under three broad headings:

- those arising within the Nato boundaries,
- those falling outside it but which concern the West as a whole or in part,
- and those which may be regarded as primarily national problems, even if the nation at the center of them feels that others should be concerned too.

These categories are not used to press problems into a particular mold but only for purposes of examination.

Alliance Contingencies

All the Nato countries share a common interest in deterring war and in defending Nato territory if deterrence should fail. Strategies are in force, military preparations made, physical commitments visibly exist. Yet, within this broad consensus on the vital issue of security, there are national concerns which may govern the approach towards crises—certainly those where the danger of major war may not be the immediate fear or the issue.

In the Scandinavian countries there is the well-known view that the special nature of the Nordic balance—Denmark, Iceland and Norway within Nato, Sweden in traditional neutrality and Finland in an aligned neo-neutrality[1]—should be taken into account. This means that the management of any crisis in the North should, as far as possible, rest firmly in Scandinavian hands. These Nordic sensitivities are well understood in the Alliance, as is their political value, yet the connected fact that there are no allied troops on Norwegian or Danish soil does place constraints on allied operations, and reinforcement in the North and in the East Atlantic. In major crisis some clash of allied interests and priorities cannot be entirely ruled out.

In the South there is the bitter dispute between Greece and Turkey. This handicaps allied defense and could complicate crisis responses for which joint agreement by Greece and Turkey to desirable allied steps is by no means guaranteed. The dispute spills over into the American domestic debate and so into Congress, which has made it harder still to keep the fabric of allied defense intact and strong.

In the Center the French view of the national interest puts independence of policy foremost and so places some political reservations on France's military commitment to the Alliance. West Germany has a national concern to improve relations with East Germany and with Central Europe, and so feels a need for reasonable relations with Moscow. Throughout Western Europe the view is held that the Alliance sorely needs a political strategy for living with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The United States is not of quite the same mind, seeming to see its own interests in a somewhat different approach towards Moscow. The absence of allied agreement makes it harder to coordinate responses to events such as those in Poland and has led to disputes over issues like the gas pipeline and grain deals. The special position of West Germany may be at the center of the problem but be this as it may, all the European allies have seen benefits from détente and wish to see it restored under the right conditions. The United States seems more conscious of the Soviet challenge worldwide and so of confrontation. Interests are thus perceived differently and responses to crises may not be the same.

But this should not be seen out of proportion. The Alliance commands deep support and the security link with the United States is regarded by all European governments as an overriding need, not least in West Germany. The point to be made is that in crises which do not appear to threaten war, there are differences of national perspective, probably inseparable from geographical location, that can stimulate transatlantic frictions or hesitations. Therefore, there is need for sensitive consultation if common policies are to be forged.

Out of Area Contingencies

There is a consensus within the Alliance that contingencies outside its boundaries should formally be handled outside its framework, though

consultations about them can go on within it or between members bilaterally. Any responses taken will be by allies, not the Alliance, though what responses and by which allies is another matter. There is a regrettable tendency in Europe—with honorable exceptions—to leave things to the Americans, despite the fact that some possible threats such as a denial of Gulf oil could affect Europe more than the United States.

The crises with the most serious implications for Nato allies seem likely to occur in the Middle East. There are threats to the West in parts of Africa that could have unwelcome political and strategic effects and an impact on economic interests. Further away, Soviet-supported activities by Vietnam in Indochina are recognized as hostile to local and Western interests in Southeast Asia and as such to be opposed or contained. Similarly, stability in the Korean Peninsula is seen as important but, from Europe, it is a problem largely to be faced by nations in the Western Pacific. European horizons are now more limited, as is European power, so crises nearer home have priority. For the United States, both interests and responsibilities are wider.

The Middle East. The problems in the Middle East are many but the most urgent are in the Gulf. The Arab-Israeli dispute, to which the Lebanon issue, despite its own complexities and causes has become linked, does not only produce tensions that surface throughout the Arab world, it also leads to some division of views between the United States and its allies. The reason is that the ties between the United States and Israel are much closer than those between Israel and Europe, and policies are accordingly affected.

In the Middle East as a whole, but particularly in the Gulf, Washington has tended to focus on a Soviet threat while Europeans see regional tensions as the more dangerons. One result is that American responses since the enunciation of the Carter Doctrine[2] have emphasized military measures to deter Soviet military expansion, while the Europeans see this as running the risk of neglecting, even endangering political and diplomatic attention to indigenous issues such as the Palestinian problem. This they regard as an important one, since it colors all thinking throughout the region and cannot be divorced from potential threats, internal or external. The United States, on the other hand, has appeared to regard the security of the Gulf as somehow separable from the wider problem of Middle East security. To some extent this is a valid view: for example, the threat by Iran to close the Straits of Hormuz is a discrete one, which could be met by military measures for which there is allied agreement and some support from Gulf states, but only in the right circumstances. But wider strategic threats to the region may be affected by alignments on which Arab-Israeli tensions have an impact. Put more simply, the Soviet Union and Iran can exploit the American identification with Israel in their relations with the Arab world or in subversive actions against Gulf regimes.

So what community of interests do the allies share? There is certainly a broad Western strategic interest in the region and a more narrowly economic one of access to oil. This is one which weighs more heavily for Europe, since it draws around 25 percent of its oil from the Gulf as compared with some 5 percent for the United States. The Japanese figure is even higher, at about 60 to 65 percent. American willingness to protect oil supplies would largely benefit its allies, but, also serves an American interest by protecting allied strength. It would simply not be in the strategic interests of the United States to see the economies of major allies threatened with strangulation. Not unreasonably, Washington might look for some contribution to Gulf defense or something else instead.

There could, of course, be more than one threat to oil supplies: closure of the Gulf to tankers through Iranian or Iraqi activities, Soviet military action, and instability in the producing states. The most immediate threat arises from continued fighting between Iraq and Iran. There is a general wish to see the war ended. It is seen as brutal and pointless, as wars are apt to be by states not engaged in them. But no Western or Gulf state, or indeed the Soviet Union, wants Iran to win, since its military victory or predominance would bring heightened tension to the region and further attempts at exporting the revolutiou or militant Islam. Allied interests might best be served by a speedy ending to the war with neither side dominant. Most Western countries are keeping a political distance from the belligerents but France is supplying weapons to Iraq.

Since the mid-1970s France has taken the view that some Western influence in Iraq was important, complementing that of the United States in Iran at that time. That particular initiative, which also served France's commercial interests, was probably welcome to the United States but the recent supply of Etendard aircraft and Exocet missiles may not have been. Yet containment of Iran does seem to be a common interest, so while the French means of assisting Iraq may have been frowned upon, the ends of France and the United States are the same.[3] Many allies are of course supplying weapons and advisors to Gulf states, recognizing that the first line of security is that these states should be able to deal with regional threats, such as from Iran, and deal with internal problems too—though specialized help from outside, such as France gave at Mecca and Britain in Oman may be invaluable, perhaps essential.

There would surely be broad allied agreement that if Gulf states cannot defend themselves or their interests there should be military power ready to help them, if they want it. In the extreme case, and it is regarded in the region as the extreme, a threat of Soviet military action would call for the counterweight of the United States; no regional balance will alter this. Even o meet regional threats there may be no substitute for external assistance, given the very limited manpower of the Gulf states. Over time there will be irtue in trying to build a link between the Gulf and wider Arab security; the

states themselves would prefer this politically but it would be quite impractical at the moment with the Arab world divided as it is. For the time being, one element of Gulf security is underpinned by the implicit (and so acceptable) Western guarantee to the Gulf Cooperation Council, just as British assistance to Oman averted similar threats to neighboring regimes—quite apart from preventing the installation of a hostile presence on one shore of the Straits of Hormuz. More specifically, the US military presence in the Arabian Sea is there to deter other external threats to stability.

American preparations for possible military intervention are, however, on a scale designed to meet a Soviet threat rather than just regionally inspired contingencies, as shown by the forces that could be available to CentCom. Such a threat would not merely be to oil, serious enough, but to the whole strategic position in the South Asian region. Europeans have tended to regard Soviet military expansion as having a low probability, as have the regional states, seeing Soviet political expansion as much more likely, notably if events in Iran or Iraq offered opportunities. They are content that any Soviet military threat should be deterred by American readiness to act and raise the stakes, provided that military preparations for this are not of a kind that would aggravate regional and internal instabilities, because this would work against Western interests.

As has been said, they hold the view that Washington has been laying too much stress on military means and on the Soviet Union, at the expense of political action. To be sure, Moscow will exploit regional tensions where it can do so without too much risk, but it is not the source of them; the active threats are largely indigenous, multiple, often interactive, and perhaps internal and ambiguous. Many of the problems of the Gulf states are with each other, Iran being an obvious case in point. The Iranian revolution threatened Gulf stability at many levels. It led to the Iran-Iraq war, which was of course, in no way deterred by Western military preparations directed at Soviet threats, even though these preparations can help with connected or spillover contingencies such as ensuring that the Straits of Hormuz are kept open.

None of the above is to suggest that Europeans do not have a general interest in underpinning diplomacy by military force, though not all of them would see it as in their national interest to be directly involved. Many European Nato nations have very limited military resources, which they see as best employed at home; it is probably sensible for the Alliance, militarily and politically, to accept this. West Germany is closely committed to the Center and is best able to replace any military resources that might have to be diverted by other allies to areas outside Europe; there are also constitutional and so political problems involved in any deployment of German forces abroad. Scandinavian countries have shown a preference, and readiness, to work within United Nations auspices. But Britain and France and perhaps Italy accept that military force may have to play a part and have done so for a

long time in the Middle East, pre-dating any American concern and even interest in the Gulf. France's military presence in the Arabian Sea, often larger than that of the Soviet Union, is evidence of this, as has been the historical British presence in the Gulf and continued support for Oman. Both have been ready to take part in measures needed to deter a closure of the Straits or needed to reopen them.

Europeans make clear that any action, military or political, must be sensitive to local needs and feelings and be acceptable to the rulers. Though any military action would be in defense of Western interests it must also be seen to be in local interests too, or it will be unwelcome and handicapped. Loose talk of "seizing the oil" is positively harmful, as may be an insistence on East-West considerations to the exclusion of others. Above all, there should be no attempt to persuade regimes to bear more political weight than is good for them through overt links with outside powers, notably with the United States. The very diversity of the allies can be a strength here.

Europe may not add a great deal to the military component of security (and Japan none) but allied contribution to the political and economic elements of it, by reason of standpoints and interests that can be discernibly different from those of the United States, can be a help rather than the hindrance that it may sometimes appear in Washington. Allies do have some comparative advantage with individual Gulf states and their diplomacy can be more sensitive to Arab considerations than that of the United States, tied as it is so closely with Israel. They may thus be able to provide some political reassurance to complement the military strength which only the United States has in quantity. All, however, have to recognize that regional problems are deep-seated and not susceptible to quick solutions; Western strategy and diplomacy have to be for the *long haul* and must possess continuity, something that is not easy when administrations oscillate in their policies.

These policies cannot neglect the Arab-Israeli issue and here the close US links with Israel help define American interests just as the looser ones condition those of European states. The Soviet Union takes full advantage of the US alignment to further its relations with Arab states and the Western interest as a whole suffer.

It is undeniable that certain Western allies place weight on their ties with Arab countries. Italy, both as a Mediterranean country and one with traditional links with Libya is one, and Greece is another. Turkey's geographical position and Islamic background, together with its strong trading links with a number of Arab countries, is bound to be affected. Though attention has been drawn to the strategic value of Turkish airfields by reason of their proximity to the head of the Gulf,[4] their use by Western forces in non-Nato contingencies would depend on Ankara's view of its own interests at the time; they would obviously be heavily influenced by Arab views towards military action.

Many European countries depend on Arab oil and their policies must take these interests into account. Japan is similarly affected. The allies have, however, little ability to affect the outcome of the Arab-Israeli dispute, such influence as there is over Israel being in the hands of the United States. They ought to do what they can to see that Washington continues to search for some resolution of the issue, taking any initiatives themselves that may provide momentum or help with a concerted approach. But they have to work, in their own interests, to persuade the Arabs as well, who must put their own house in order if negotiations are ever to have any chance of success, however limited.

Stability in Lebanon is a shared aim, as shown by the way that French, Italian and British forces were deployed alongside those of the United States. The issues are bedeviled nor only by community strife and complexities, but by Syrian-Israeli tensions and the all-pervading Palestinian problem. The overt strategic link between the United States and Israel now inhibits the formation of an allied policy, as may traditional French interests. New crises may accentuare the differences but depending on the nature and gravity of the threat, could act ro submerge them.

Africa. There are again traditional European links with Africa which have led to economic and political interests: France in Francophone West Africa and in the Horn; Portugal in its former territories; Britain in West, Southern and East Africa. The United States has interests too, and much economic involvement. Virtually all allies are dependent to some extent on strategic raw materials from Africa.

On rhe whole, allied interests in Africa are shared. Soviet attempts at replacing Western influence or gaining strategic positions are a clear threat, as are the activities of Soviet proxies or Libya. Apartheid is universally condemned. Various allies take the lead in different parts of the Continent—examples are France in Chad and Britain in Zimbabwe, and each have generally received support for their policies. There has been a joint effort over Namibia. Policies towards South Africa could produce divergence, with the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries markedly more hostile to Pretoria than are some of the larger countries. This is nor entirely a matter of economic interests but more of political attitudes, which responses in a crisis would have to take into account.

If black African states concert their policies effectively they could exert leverage on those countries that have trade and other links with them. Black voting strength in the United States may prove an important influence over time. There is, however, likely to be continuing turbulence within black African states as they try to find the forms of government that best suit them, or as factions compete for power. Given this situation it will be a Western interest not to become involved, but crises may bring the risk of external

manipulation, as for example by Libya. A formula for dealing with such situations may be to try to concert responses among those allies most immediately affected, and not look for wider agreement or associate others with them where this is not essential. In other words, a temporary grouping for a specific purpose may be sensible.

South Asia. When the invasion of Afghanistan took place the American reaction was prompt and strong but Washington had to work hard to get some of its allies to lend full support for its policies. One underlying issue was whether tensions in that part of the world should be allowed to affect relations with the Soviet Union elsewhere, in West Germany for example. It was argued by some that Afghanistan had long been a Soviet sphere of influence, with which the West had shown no particular concern; while the invasion was to be condemned (as were the invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia) it should not be allowed to result in the West hurting its own interests as well, which it did not long do in the case of Czechoslovakia. The clash of interest was thus not about the invasion but about the impact of sanctions against the Soviet Union as a result of it. The strategic threat to the West represented by the new Soviet bases in Afghanistan was recognized clearly by the United States and perhaps by Britain and France, but given less importance by some other allies.

This example of Afghanistan is quoted to highlight the different interests that allies may have where political and economic links with the Soviet Union are concerned. These are seen as more important or desirable in Europe and Japan than they are in the United States. Where proposed responses to future crises take similar shape like frictions may recur, depending of course on the nature of other stakes. Afghanistan was "a far-away country" whose fate did not weigh too heavily, it seems, in some national considerations. Crises nearer home might have different patterns.

A crisis in Pakistan caused by internal upheaval would seem unlikely to produce divergent allied views, given the general Western interest in the strategic position of that country. But some allies might not want to be actively involved in measures to provide support for an authoritarian regime, or possibly for other reasons. Obviously it would be very difficult to do much about internal instabilities in a country going through such a critical period, except for support to an established government. If Soviet manipulation were in evidence there would most likely be a consensus on the need for some action, which is best left to those allies willing and able to take it, with others assenting or not dissenting. However, there will always be the problem that any assistance given to Pakistan may be looked on with disfavor by India, with which relations are also important. Europeans have paid more attention to this concern than has the United States. It may be in the common interest that they should continue to do so.

East Asia. Allied interests in Southeast Asia—both political and economic—are long-established and widespread, with the United States, Britain, Australia and New Zealand having some treaty commitments there. Vietnamese actions in the region and Soviet support for them are seen as both destabilizing and antagonistic and there is a shared interest in countering them. There will be shades of opinion as how best to do this, but the views of the ASEAN states on appropriate responses will carry great weight. The policies and actions of China will certainly have to be taken into account as well. A crisis could arise through the Soviet Union responding to Chinese actions against Vietnam, though it has refrained so far. This would not be a direct Western problem if it happened, but it could call for precautionary moves by the United States, in which case consultation with ASEAN and Japan would be highly desirable. There is among all the Pacific basin states a shared interest in regional stability, even if they carry no responsibility for preserving it.

In Northeast Asia, the Korean Peninsula is the most likely arena for crisis. The United States would be immediately and directly drawn in through its ties with and military presence in the South, but Japan would also be intimately concerned since US forces in Korea would have to be supported from US bases in Japan. The circumstances of the crisis, as for example whether or not it resulted from unambiguous actions by the North, would clearly affect allied reactions to it, but political support for the integrity of the South should be readily forthcoming.

The United States would have to attempt crisis management with China and the Soviet Union, depending on their attitude to events, and would have to consult with Japan. While the Japanese government will not want to talk any more than it has to about Korean contingencies, there is official understanding of the need of the United States to use the bases. Japanese public support for this would seem more likely than not if the crisis were plainly the result of actions by the North. If the circumstances were not so clear, such support might be more conditional, but it has always appeared probable that the shock of actual hostilities in the Peninsula would blow away some of the mists that can surround Japanese domestic attitudes towards national security issues.

National Problems

Membership of an alliance concluded for one shared purpose has never prevented allies from differing on others. Few countries gave much support to the United States over Vietnam or Grenada; Britain had problems with some allies over Argentina; the United States hardly helped Britain and France over Suez or indeed Britain over the Gulf. That is not to say that such support should have been forthcoming, but only that some foreign policy issues found allies on different sides.

Some problems and their attendant crisis may result from the policies of one country that have no particular significance for any other. Attitudes towards them can therefore be decided upon on their merits or, if nothing else is at stake, according to any patterns of alliance or friendship that may exist. If, for example, there were to be a crisis between Spain and Morocco over the Spanish North African enclaves, it is far from evident that all Nato allies would support the Spanish case. If Spain's claim to Gibraltar rests on ir being part of the Spanish mainland, the ownership of Ceuta and Melilla, in Morocco, would seem to be indifferently grounded. But there could be other considerations. If a transfer of Ceuta from Spanish ownership risked it falling into hands hostile to the allies, their stance might be affected; the United States has military links with Spain that it might not wish to prejudice by a lack of support; Spain might put its attitude towards Nato membership at stake; Britain would be mindful of the Gibraltar problem. So interests are not only varied but could also vary with circumstances. The only consensus available might be on attempts to defuse the issue.

The invasion of the Falklands by Argentina found Spain and Britain on opposite sides politically and some other Western nations lukewarm on the issue. Britain certainly looked to its allies to give support and received it in full measure from Commonwealth countries and from the United States, despite the political costs in Latin America that Washington risked. But London could not rally everyone behind the principle that nations should not be given support when attempting to settle political disputes by force, others weighed their political, economic or cultural ties with Latin America more heavily or maybe saw the sovereignty issue much as Argentina saw it. So there was no overwhelming perception of shared interest among all Western nations. The East-West dimension was virtually absent apart from some early talk of Soviet help for Argentina, and the strategic importance of the islands did not provide a compelling case.

Events in Central America represent a problem on an altogether different scale and one which might not seem to fall necessarily under the heading of a national problem. Grenada and Belize provide interesting footnotes to it.

US policies in Central America are not easy for its allies or perhaps for many Americans to understand. Nor is there any ready acceptance that the problems there directly affect them in any important way; US interests and stakes are clearly very much larger. Soviet expansion into that region would, of course, be unwelcome; the Cuban missile crisis dramatized this in terms that the Nato allies could see and accept with no difficulty. But the problems of the region now tend to be seen by Europeans and others not as Soviet-inspired but as the result of long-standing political, social and economic inequities that need political and economic rather than military remedies. Only if these are taken will the ground become less fertile than it is for communist exploitation.[5]

This view, simplified for purposes of argument, does not address the problem of what should be done about local regimes determined to spread their political views to neighboring states, by violent means if necessary. It does not allow for the position of Britain, which has for some years kept military forces in Belize to defend that former colony, now independent, from the claims of Guatemala, a defense still judged to be necessary. It would be conceded that state-sponsored subversion is a problem, but probably not one for which the solution is outside military intervention, from whatever quarter; rather should it be left to regional auspices, such as those of the Contadora Group, to try to promote peaceful change and encourage some form of moving equilibrium.

Thus far the United States has certainly not managed to persuade its allies, or even Congress for that matter, that the policies it has been following are the right ones or likely to succeed. The mining of Nicaraguan ports has not helped, indeed it has brought France openly into opposition—though it should be noted that this is also useful for domestic reasons, enabling the French government to proclaim its socialist credentials while under criticism for pursuing somewhat conservative economic policies. There is feeling that the Soviet and Cuban threats are being exaggerated and that, as with the Middle East, problems are being pressed into an East-West mold when their causes lie elsewhere. Not everyone would agree with this; some who were opposed in principle to US action in Grenada were less so in practice, on the grounds that there were certainly some Cubans there, who could in time have established an unwelcome presence. On the other hand, the inference that Grenada fell within an American sphere of influence made allies living on the Soviet borders nervous of that principle. The successful action in Grenada was welcomed by the American public; yet it aroused mixed feelings in Europe.

So consensus on how to deal with crises in Central America and the Caribbean is probably not easily attainable and it will also be hard to demonstrate that it is or should be an allied problem. The Monroe Doctrine may be recollected. It would seem better that the United States should accept this as an American problem and not try to make the Alliance bear this particular weight, for which it was not designed. The Western Alliance should certainly be one for all seasons, including adversity, but not be expected to be for all purposes.

When Europeans and other allies of the United States do not find themselves able to share American views in various parts of the world, they may be pressed to do so as a test of alliance cohesion or wisdom or both. To rally round under such circumstances may be good alliance politics but if it is not also based on the politics of the issue concerned, it may do more harm than good in the end.

Yet if allies do not give assent they may feel they will put at risk, over time, the American support on which they rely for their security. This feeling may

not be well-grounded. It is a demonstrable American interest to help maintain the security of Europe and Japan even if allies do not appear as grateful for this as they should be, or do not pull their proper weight. One has to only conjure a world in which the United States no longer had a position in Europe or Japan to appreciate that the balance between the United States and the Soviet Union would have changed markedly for the worse. However, allies do get fearful and such fears can concentrate minds wonderfully. Thus interests elsewhere will have to be very important if disagreements about them are to be allowed to put the central security interest in jeopardy.

Allies must respect each other's interests and be ready to seek compromises where these are on less than vital issues. This may not be immediately helpful in times of crisis, but a search for compromise should follow when a quieter period is reached. Some such process went on after the events in the Middle East in 1978–1979, and is in train now over East-West policy. It is part of the problem of forging a consensus in a coalition. Of course, if there were full consultation and readiness to compromise before a crisis, difficulties might not arise and responses could command assent and be swift. But such is probably not in the nature of coalitions in crises.

Notes

1. See Erling Bjøl, *Nordic Security* (Adelphi Paper No. 181, London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983), p. 2.

2. State of the Union Address, 1980; *Department of State Bulletin 80*, no. 2035, February 1980, special section, pp. A–B.

3. I am indebted for this point to Dominique Moisi of the Institute Francais des Relations Internationales.

4. See Albert Wohlstetter, *Meeting the Threat in the Persian Gulf* (European American Institute for Security Research, Reprint Series RS-11-1, April 1981).

5. The article by Haynes Johnson, quoting Lyndon B. Johnson's testimony on the problems of Southeast Asia before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1961 and applying the remarks to Central America, mirrors this view (*International Herald Tribune*, 27 April 1984).

The North Atlantic Alliance: External Threats and Internal Stress

A.W. DePorte

Defensive alliances are formed to deal with threats which the participants perceive to be common to them all. They are brought together in the belief that they can each best deal with the threat by dealing with it together. They are held together for as long as the perception and the belief survive. At the same time, the members of an alliance usually have interests to protect and promote other than the one which it was formed to address. They may pursue policies which, outside alliance business, can be independent of or even incompatible with those of the other members.

The Atlantic alliance has been a classical defensive alliance, but with several important differences. The members' perception of the Soviet threat and the success of their response to it, in continually changing circumstances, have been unprecedentedly durable. At the same time their relations with respect to both alliance and nonalliance policies have been remarkably turbulent. Because the allies have often said that the Soviet threat was global, they created expectations of common global policy-making which have often been disappointed. These failures have misled many into the error of thinking the alliance was doomed. Yet, because of the persistence of a common commitment to meet a persisting common threat in Europe, the alliance has survived and even prospered. The allies have disagreed constantly on the nature of the threat, how to respond to it, and the extent to which they should or could concert their policies about other issues, including East-West trade and Third World and economic problems. But these divisions have not prevented the alliance from addressing its primary business, which is to deter attack or intimidating pressure by the Soviet Union against any member by being prepared to resist such attack or pressure if deterrence fails.

The history of the alliance, as outlined by William Bundy, shows that it has fulfilled this primordial task well while doing much less well with other self-set tasks. There has been no Soviet attack in Europe, no successful intimidation of a West European country, and no change of boundaries or alignments unfavorable to the West. But there has also rarely been a moment

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since 1949 when the allies were satisfied that their cooperation was as effective as they thought it should be. Today, as at almost every other period during the last 35 years, the alliance's achievements and capabilities are obscured by a fog of doubt and complaint. It sometimes seems as if its ability to continue to respond to the Soviet Union in Europe is threatened as much by expectations that it should do more than it has, or can, as by anything else. There is an urgent need to probe the causes of *this* threat if the true strength of the alliance is not to be misjudged, with possibly dangerous consequences.

One of the principal sources of the unending doubts about the alliance's continued efficacy arises from the obvious fact that many things have changed in the world since it was established. The illogical conclusion too often drawn from this fact is that its founding premises have changed so much as to be no longer valid. It is perfectly true that the Europe of 1984 is very different from that of the late 1940s. But beneath the changing surface of things the structure of the European political system has been remarkably stable.

- The Soviet Union, now as then, is vastly more powerful militarily than the countries of Western Europe.
- West European understanding of this fact has not changed any more than the fact itself.
- Nor, as a consequence, has there been any appreciable diminution in West European belief in the need for a security tie with the United States—the alliance—as the necessary element of balance in an otherwise unbalanced European state system.
- The United States continues both to understand the military imbalance in Europe and to believe that if this were ever to lead to Soviet predominance or even a marked increase in Soviet influence, the abiding American interest under all administrations in maintaining a global balance of power with the USSR would be gravely jeopardized. For this reason the American interest in maintaining the alliance tie with Western Europe which provides balance in the European state system has remained qualitatively unchanged, notwithstanding innumerable other changes, since 1949.

These fundamental continuities do not mean that the United States and all the European allies have always perceived the Soviet threat in identical ways. It would be absurd to expect that they should. The United States is a global superpower on the far side of the ocean, the European allies are a diverse group of middle-level and small countries variously located at different distances from the Soviet bloc. The European members have often seemed less concerned about the prospect of actual military attack than the distant United States. This has exasperated some Americans and confused others, leading them to think that the Europeans had lost their perception of a Soviet threat and, therefore, their belief in the usefulness of the alliance.

In fact the allies have maintained a steady state of concern about the Soviet Union. This is based not so much on fear of imminent attack—unlikely to be maintained over decades—as on a permanent sense of dangerous proximity to a totalitarian superpower much stronger than any or all of them and having intentions toward them of which they can never be sure. As a result, the allies did not much agree with the United States that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan increased the prospects of war or crisis in Europe. But neither were they tempted by "détente fever"—so much feared by the United States in the early 1970s—to throw over the alliance even while they were negotiating improvements in the European *status quo* with the Russians. The Europeans seem less inclined than some Americans to pass from alarm to euphoria in their thinking about the Soviet Union. They know that it adjoins them, and will be *where* and remain *what* it is for a long time. Their concern is equally long-lasting and steady and so is their fundamental commitment to the security arrangements which have given them a considerable degree of confidence in face of this enduring threat.

It should be noted in this connection that the European allies do not accept the comparison, often made in the United States, between the American commitment to them and to beleaguered Third World countries. They do not believe that the American resolve to defend Western Europe is "tested" by American behavior with respect to Taiwan, Vietnam, Angola, Iran, Afghanistan or El Salvador. On the contrary, they think that Western Europe is uniquely important to the American policy of containing the Soviet Union, that the Soviet Union knows this and acts in light of the fact. This means they believe also that the United States maintains the alliance not for love of them but for its own self-interest. They are not easily frightened by periodic American threats to withdraw from Europe if the allies fail to satisfy American policy demands. In their judgment, withdrawal from Europe would amount to abandoning the policy of maintaining a global balance of power with respect to the Soviet Union. They cannot believe that the United States will do that. These differences among the allies in perceiving and appraising the Soviet threat explain many of the divisions they have experienced over the years.

The history of the alliance shows that the members have not always agreed on the central issue of how to resist and repel a Soviet attack should it come. If we become absorbed in the alliance's almost permanent internal debate on this question, we might well overlook the important fact that there has been no attack or successful intimidation. Apparently the allies have been doing some things right. Yet we cannot overlook the roots of their many differences if we are to prepare ourselves for those that the alliance will undoubtedly experience in the future.

Part of the problem lies in simple geographical facts of life. For the United States, Europe is a theater in a global struggle. For the Europeans, it is much

more than that. Everyone wants to deter war. But acute differences can arise between an American propensity to give credibility to deterrence by advertising how war would be conducted across Europe and a natural European malaise in face of a vision that seems to imply the devastation—nuclear or conventional—of their countries. The Europeans want the alliance to have credible means to meet and halt a Soviet attack at any level. But they like neither the prospect of nuclear conflict on their territory nor the costs of the massive conventional buildup needed to significantly reduce that threat. Moreover, they fear that too great an emphasis on nonnuclear conflict might decouple the United States from European security and weaken the nuclear deterrent on which, with all its risks and ambiguities, they rely. For this reason the notion of alliance renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons had much less appeal in Europe than its American proponents might have expected.

This Scylla and Charybdis of contradictory fears and needs with respect to security policy is muted from time to time by alliance decisions on strategy (and also, during the 1970s, by détente). But the march of military technology constantly reanimates this permanent debate among the allies. There seems to be no prospect of a generally satisfactory once-and-for-all resolution of these issues in the absence of an arms control agreement between the superpowers that would be so broad as to end the arms race. That is an unlikely prospect. We must therefore expect that the alliance will continue to have to wrestle with the ever-changing implications of technological progress for the diverse geographical, political and psychological outlooks of a disparate group of allies. In terms of the gravity of the issues, this prospect would seem very disquieting for the future of the alliance. In light of alliance history, however, we have reason to believe that the allies will continue to be able to live with less than perfect agreements on strategic issues, reassured as they are by the fact that the Soviet Union has up to now, through decades of intra-alliance debate, been sufficiently impressed by the strength of the alliance to be deterred from doing whatever it might have done had it been less impressed.

Relations between the allies have been the source of intra-alliance discord in other ways. Trade has been a perennial issue. The Europeans on the whole tend to see trade as mutually beneficial to the parties and as a means of keeping channels open between the two halves of divided Europe. The United States, they think, sometimes overvalues what trade can do with respect to encouraging Soviet good behavior or punishing bad behavior. From this has arisen a series of disputes. The most recent and perhaps most acute was the clash over the Soviet gas pipeline that took place in 1982. In no case, however, have the allies allowed these disagreements to poison security cooperation in the alliance. They continue to negotiate on the limits that should be imposed on East-West trade, which in any case, for quite other reasons, has not grown at a very marked pace even during the heyday of détente. Such disputes will

no doubt continue, but there seems no clear reason why they will not also continue to be contained for as long as the allies, beginning with the United States, find the alliance useful to their interests in Europe.

More broadly the allies have shown that they are very well able to coordinate their diplomatic activity towards the East when it is likely to impinge on the viability of the alliance. The most important illustration of this was the cooperation they displayed in managing détente in the early 1970s. There were differences and strains, but on the whole the United States meshed its policy towards the Soviet Union, especially arms control, with the Federal Republic of Germany's *Ostpolitik*—directed to improving relations with the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic. At no time did "détente fever" threaten the stability of the alliance. The allies showed then that they could improve their relations with the East in concrete ways without overlooking the persistence of the permanent Soviet threat and while maintaining the alliance as the ultimate bulwark of their security and the underpinning of the relaxation of tension which they were pursuing.

The winding down of détente in the late 1970s, culminating in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, deepened divisions among the allies about East-West relations. For a time the United States acted and spoke as if it believed that "détente was indivisible," a phrase which implied that Soviet behavior outside Europe warranted cancellation of some or all of the agreements negotiated in the early 1970s. But neither the Carter nor Reagan administration really believed this. The Berlin agreement, the SALT I treaties, the *Ostpolitik* agreements—all these and other fruits of détente went unchallenged despite the sharp rise of East-West tension. Further, it does not seem now that even the United States, and certainly none of the European allies, wants a diplomatic freeze with the Soviet Union. Political contacts continue along with trade and other dealings. It is too soon to foresee a revival of neo-détente, but a neo-cold war of the intensity of the confrontation of the early 1950s has not taken place, notwithstanding circumstances that seemed all too propitious to such a development.

The reasonable success the allies have had in coordinating their diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in Europe has not been matched by anything resembling a grand strategy to meet an allegedly global threat. In words the allies have set a high standard for the cooperation they expect of each other in dealing with economic and Third World problems that affect their interests in Europe. In practice, however, the history of their divisions is long. We need only think, for example, of the Suez war in 1956, which was perhaps the most serious internal crisis the alliance ever experienced, or the absence of concerted policies in the Middle East, or the lack of European support for American ventures supposed to contain global communism in Indochina and, now, Central America.

These policy differences have reflected not so much divergent interests among the allies—none of them wants Soviet influence to expand in the Third World or Gulf oil to be cut off—as different judgments about the causes and likely consequences of developments in Indochina, the Middle East, Latin America and elsewhere. All American administrations, supported by a large segment of public opinion, have tended to believe that conflicts and upheavals in Third World countries which challenge governments ftiendly to the United States are essentially stirred up by, or at least setve the intetests of, the Soviet Union. These upheavals are seen, therefote, as episodes of the East-West struggle, engaging American prestige even when specific interests seem marginal. They should be dealt with, in the American view, by supporting all regimes, whatever their defects, that ate challenged by gtoups aligned with or supported by the Soviet Union or its allies.

In practice, of course, the United States has not always acted on these premises. There have been cases when it judged that nothing could help the falling friend (China in 1949, the Shah of Iran in 1979) and others when Congtess or public opinion would not sanction the indefinite prolongation of US involvement (Indochina in 1975, Lebanon in 1984). But these "abandonments" have often been painful and politically costly. The "loss of China" was a heavy burden to the Truman administration and the Democratic party. It not only inhibited the development of a rational policy toward China for two decades but made it difficult for later administrations to let the dust settle in such cases.

Some Europeans share these Ametican policy premises but the mainstream of opinion does not. To that mainstream there is a kind of inevitability in the replacement of post-colonial regimes friendly to the West with others which are less so. At the same time, Europeans do not believe that these "losses" are necessarily fatal to Western interests and, therefore, do not think that great efforts must be made to prevent what cannot be stopped and what is not so bad after all. Indeed, they would say that for the West to try to halt the inevitable only makes things worse because it further delays the establishment of at least tolerable relations with the next regime. They would point to Communist China, post-Farouk Egypt, post-Hashemite Iraq and others as examples of cases where friendly regimes were replaced by others which, however anti-Western at the start, sooner or later found that they had economic and often security interests in renewing ties with the West. These new regimes, whatever the professed ideology of their leaders and the degree of their initial support by the Soviet Union, have not proved to be Soviet satellites. If the ensuing new relationship was not as pleasing to the West as the old one, at least it was partially supportive of essential Western interests. Does the Soviet Union or the United States have the better reason today to regret that Communists replaced Nationalists as the rulers of China in 1949?

This difference in outlook about the implications of change in the Third World is obviously deep. No number of communiques and no amount of enhanced consultation will terminate it. Because of the widespread instability and diversity in and between many of the countries of the developing world, we must anticipate an indefinite series of developments there which may challenge Western interests.

At the same time, things may not be as bad in practice as they seem to be in principle. The allies will not agree to go along with US policy in important cases simply because it is the senior ally and sometimes thinks of itself as the custodian of their interests. But there are cases where they will defer to the United States to a large extent simply because of its proximity to and their distance from the scene of conflict, as in Central America. This is the more likely, of course, where American action can be quick and successful, as in Grenada. Further, the allies agree in substance more often than we might think. Even France, the most critical of American Third World policy in general, has been perfectly willing to work with, or alongside, the United States when its own interests were at stake, as in Shaba, Chad and Lebanon.

Much more could be said about the things which divide the allies with respect to Third World problems and it should be clear that they are numerous, serious and likely to be persistent. In each case there are, of course, possibilities for better consultation and compromise. Both sides have something to learn from the other. The United States is not always wrong in thinking that the expansion of Soviet influence in the Third World can be dangerous for Western interests and that there are times when something practical can be done to arrest or counter it. But the European allies are not always wrong to think that some Third World upheavals are not of Soviet making, should not be addressed as if they were, will not benefit the Russians in many cases, and cannot readily be stopped by acceptable Western actions.

The consequences of differences about the Third World are most likely to be contained in the future as in the past. Both Americans and Europeans, however high their passions on given issues, believe that a secure and stable Europe is important in itself and should and can be maintained—as it has been for 40 years—in the face of disagreements about many things, including even how to maintain it. For as long as that remains a priority concern of the allies, the alliance should be able to continue to handle its essential job: the deterrence of Soviet attack on or intimidation of Western Europe. That is the threat upon which the alliance was formed. It still must deal with that threat, whatever the Soviet challenges to Western interests elsewhere and however well or badly the allies work together in dealing with them.

Discussion of differences among the allies about Third World problems, as about East-West relations and other issues, thus leads us back to the importance to them of security cooperation in Europe, that is, to the

importance to the United States of European stability and to the European allies of the American tie.

The Europeans on the whole understand the continuing, irreplaceable and practically permanent importance of that tie to their well-being, however irksome and sometimes even demoralizing it may be. While not accepting subservience to the United States as the price of it, because they know that it serves American interests as well as theirs, they will maintain it if they can. The long agitation over deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles and its outcome have confirmed this fact once again.

For the United States the calculation about the importance of security in Europe and the value of the alliance is more complex. Americans believe that they could maintain their security without the alliance and, therefore, are of the opinion that they put more into it than they get out of it (a consciousness that is at the root of many of their discontents with the European allies). They may be right as concerns physical security in the narrow sense. But the question of American involvement in Europe is a subordinate issue in the more fundamental question of American involvement in the world. The United States can choose to continue to seek security in a broad sense—that is, to promote a tolerably stable world as the necessary environment for a tolerable national life—by, among other things, trying to maintain a global balance with respect to the Soviet Union, with all the costs, risks and exasperations of that choice. Or, it can withdraw from the game and try to find security by letting the world take its course in the (relative) absence of the United States. What it cannot do is maintain an effective policy of global containment without maintaining the stability and security of a rich, populous, strategic, weak and divided Western Europe.

This fundamental issue of American foreign policy calls to mind the great debate of 1939-41. That debate has never been quite renewed again because the facts of international life since World War II seem so clearly to rule out a return to isolationism pure and simple, or even isolationism tricked out in such guises as hemispheric or Pacific predominance. It is difficult to imagine that a substantial number of Americans would find the costs and risks of this course very attractive. No president has done so, or is likely to. If that is the case, then the long-threatened great debate about the American commitment to Europe may never take place, for it cannot take place outside the broader context of the country's role in the world at large.

It is ironic that the hitherto dominant American concept of the need for a global policy (however debated in practice) to deal with a global Soviet threat inhibits the United States from writing off its commitment to European security. This remains a fact even if the allies, among other provocations, deny that there is such a threat as the United States defines it, or at least refuse to join the United States in dealing with its alleged manifestations. The future of the alliance, therefore, depends not so much on

achieving a better US-European understanding than in the past with respect to the many contentious issues that will divide it (though that should be worked for) as on the continued firm commitment of the United States to maintaining the stability that has been established over the last decades in Europe (and almost nowhere else) as an essential part of its long-term policy of trying to maintain a tolerably livable world.

Ψ

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE SEEKS ALUMNI

The Naval War College has begun to increase contacts with its alumni, so as to promote greater camaraderie, better exchange of information, and added professional enrichment among its graduates and former staff and faculty members.

In the 100 year history of the Naval War College there have been more than 21,000 students, faculty and staff members. They include officers from all uniformed services, from many US government agencies, and from the navies of more than 65 nations.

Many of the alumni functions will be performed by the Naval War College Foundation, a nonprofit, charitable corporation which was established to support the college.

Graduates, and former members of the faculty and staff are invited to provide their names and addresses to the Naval War College, Code 4, Newport, RI 02841. Telephone: 401-841-3373. Autovon 948-3373.

The Legislative Role of the French Parliament in Crisis Management

Loïc Bouvard

In examining the subject of crisis management, I shall reflect on the role of the French Assembly—as I have seen it—over the past eleven years and then consider whether this role is a proper one. Or should it be different or could it be improved? Of course, one should bear in mind that we are considering such a role within the larger framework of the Nato alliance which has been binding, and protecting, our countries for the past 35 years.

To be blunt, in France Nato is taken for granted. I do not mean to say that everyone is happy with it, nor that issues do not arise which occasion bickering or minor conflict. I do mean that the French have achieved a wide consensus and have struck a nice balance by being part of Nato without being completely in it. It is a little bit like having your cake and eating it too.

DeGaulle's decision to put allied troops outside France, to disengage French forces from the integrated command and to develop the nuclear weapon on our own—providing France with a so-called *Force de Frappe*—is "unanimously" accepted today as the right one. Rare is a dissenting voice either in public opinion or in Parliament, save for the Communists who, along with the Warsaw Pact, would of course rather have Nato dismantled—what an ideal world that would be!

The "best of two worlds," that is how the French view their own position in the allied structure of defense. And it would do well to recall that pacifism has not made many inroads into French public opinion, contrary to what happened in some other European countries. The French feel quite comfortable with the American nuclear deterrent and would not think of losing it. They are also adamant that there should not be any "decouplage" between the United States and Europe—remember the French stand on Euromissiles—and add their own small but nevertheless efficient and sufficient deterrent.

France takes the position that it is very much responsible for its own defense, that she contributes *essentially*, and on nuclear terms, to the common defense of the West by adding an uncertainty factor for any would-be

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aggressor. She takes pride in it. A recent poll showed that 66 percent of the population was in favor of the nuclear weapon and it is worth noting that the French bishops did not shrink from the "first use" possibility raised by the mere possession of such weapons, as the American bishops did. In the French Parliament there is no such issue, nor any debate on whether we should behave in any other way differently towards the United States or our other allies. The areas of contention are rather over the right balance between conventional and nuclear weapons, what kind of nuclear weapons should be deployed in the field, how high to raise the nuclear threshold, and whether the Americans are truly reliable with their flexible response.

". . . we do not have such a thing as the 'War Powers Act' . . . such an act would be unthinkable under the new [since 1958] French system of government."

Parallel to this, you may witness that within France and in its Parliament, there exists a growing awareness and consensus for a European defense within the alliance. The campaign which is presently being waged for the elections to the European Parliament is particularly interesting insofar as defense matters and the necessity for common European defense are in issue. The two-pillar concept of Nato—an American pillar, and a European pillar—is beginning to be widely talked of in France, if only to counterbalance the power of the United States within the alliance.

This is a relatively new phenomenon. I recall not so long ago that we in the UDF (the Giscard d'Estaing coalition in Parliament) could hardly talk about European defense matters without the orthodox Gaullist members reacting immediately and strongly. This was the time of the "défense tous azimuth" while the Socialists, then in the opposition, were again and again accusing us of selling France out to Nato and of behaving like colonialists in Africa. How quickly they have changed their minds for the better since they gained power in 1981. At the same time the Gaullists have become quite European-minded, even on defense issues, to the point that we are sharing with them a common opposition list for the forthcoming European election. But in any case, since 1958—whether it be under de Gaulle, Pompidou, Giscard d'Estaing or Mitterrand—the French National Assembly has had very little to say in terms of handling a crisis. The obvious question is, *why*?

In response to this question it would be useful to provide a few examples of the minimal role Parliament has played in some key crises. Take the problem of England's entrance into the Common Market, which was rather popular in France at the time if only to counterbalance the weight of Germany. General de Gaulle as President of the Republic single-handedly ruled it out on his own will in 1963. This is in contrast to the decision taken by

Parliament to veto the European Defense Committee in 1954, but then this was under the Fourth Republic, when Parliament held most of the power. When in 1971 President Pompidou decided that the time was ripe for England to be admitted to the EEC, he called a referendum, bypassing the National Assembly and the Senate entirely.

Take the sending of French troops into battle in Africa, such as the dropping of paratroopers over Kolwezi in 1977. President Giscard d'Estaing acted alone leaving Parliament entirely outside the picture, which infuriated the then leader of the Socialist opposition, M. Francois Mitterrand. Mind you, M. Giscard d'Estaing had himself criticized General de Gaulle for *l'exercice solitaire du pouvoir* (the unilateral exercise of power) after the well-known Quebec incident involving his call *Vive le Quebec libre*, and M. Mitterrand had fiercely attacked both General de Gaulle in his book *Le Coup d'Etat Permanent* and later M. Giscard d'Estaing for not warning Parliament of the upcoming action in Kolwezi!

And look how the present President of the French Republic handled both Tchad and Lebanon; such operations and the sending of French troops were solely decided by him, with Parliament being taken for granted and, if I may say so, also taken for a ride. The Tchad operation took place in August 1983 while Parliament was in recess, and it was not until September that the Minister of Defense came before the Armed Forces and Defense Committee of the National Assembly to give some explanations. I must state, to be honest, that he invited ten of us to spend three days in N'Djamena and the Tchad desert in October—this is the ride—so that we could see for ourselves the high morale of French troops there and so inform French public opinion upon our return. Political leaders of the opposition did criticize the President about the Tchad invasion, not because Parliament was not informed, but solely because they thought he had acted too slowly and let the Libyans occupy the northern third of that country.

I could multiply such examples inasmuch as France is involved almost everywhere in the world with more than 20,000 troops stationed outside France, especially in Africa (Dakar, Abidjan, Libreville, Bangui, N'Djamena, Djibouti) but also in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, in the South Pacific and in the Caribbean, without mentioning the 50,000 French troops in Germany. Apparent to the reader, there are lots of theaters of action and occasions for involvement and crisis. But rather than going down the list and exemplifying further the almost mute role of Parliament in dealing with such matters, let me try to explain why it is so.

To start with, we do not have such a thing as the "War Powers Act" enacted by the French Parliament; such an act would be unthinkable under the new French system of government. I say *new* because it goes back only to 1958, when General de Gaulle had a new Constitution adopted by the people and

thus created the fifth Republic. His aim was to curtail the powers of the French Parliament and, by so doing, to prevent governmental instability which had plagued the third and fourth Republics. Let me say that he fully succeeded, even beyond his expectation. The Constitution created a President of the Republic in charge of the main interests of the French nation, among them foreign affairs and defense, whereas internal matters concerning the day-to-day problems of government were to be dealt with by a Prime Minister responsible to the National Assembly. The President, on the other hand, far from being accountable for his actions to Parliament, can dissolve it.

The concept of balance of powers or checks and balances, dear to your Founding Fathers and derived by them from the French philosophers of the 18th century, was changed in 1958 very much to the benefit of the French President. Whereas your "War Powers Act" could be justified by the balance of power concept, the absentee role of the French Parliament in foreign and defense matters stems from a new concept of our own: *le domaine reserve*—the reserved field of the President. M. Chaban-Delmas invented that phrase in 1959, while President of the National Assembly. The notion cannot be found directly in the Constitution but naturally it has been accepted by everyone who has held the top position in the country, and now by everyone else.

It is true that Parliament has kept two essential prerogatives which theoretically should enable it to act in a crisis: the right to declare war and the power to vote the budget and military appropriations. As for the first, it is common wisdom that nowadays we wage war without declaring it, bypassing Parliament. And as for the budget we, in the House, hold very limited powers indeed, inasmuch as all opposition amendments are rejected and the majority automatically follows and supports the government. Of course, most bills originate in the government and very few in the National Assembly or the Senate. As an illustration, the billion francs needed to foot the bill for Lebanon and Tchad in 1983 were voted almost without debate as a supplementary budget bill. And when we hold a debate on foreign affairs, usually no more than one out of ten members attend.

To emphasize the point, our National Assembly Armed Forces and Defense Committee is not entitled, by Assembly regulations, to hear any Chief of Staff nor any other member of the Executive Branch but only and, solely, the two Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs. If we were to try to conduct a hearing, which is extremely rare, it would have to be solemnly authorized by the Assembly as a whole, and the proceedings would have to take place behind closed doors and be off the record to everyone concerned except committee members.

As a Deputy, I am not complaining. I am only stating the facts so as to make clear why the French Parliament has so little to do with playing a real role during a crisis or bringing about consensus; although, we are the institution designed to represent the people.

How does it compare with other Parliaments? Frankly, I am not overly impressed by what goes on in the United States where Congress and the President fight it out—each one trying to overpower the other. After all, the President of the Republic is also elected by the people. He is the one who would ultimately push the button of nuclear warfare and we have no alternative but to trust in him.

To be sure, as a parliamentarian I would like to see Parliament have more powers. However, I have also known the fourth Republic, the endless tumbling of governments and the paralyzing effect over public affairs which went along with it. I would say that if passivity on the part of Parliament is the price we have to pay for a solid and lasting government, then I am ready to pay that price. (As for the House of Commons, although it is a parliamentary rather than presidential system, I don't think there are many differences with the French National Assembly insofar as the reality of power is concerned.)

But in a structure of unilateral decision-making, how is consensus achieved, if it ever is? Let us look at the gravest internal crisis France has had to face under the Fifth Republic—the student uprising of 1968. The role of Parliament was of course nil, but during the crisis there was no Executive Branch of government worth the name either. People simply took to the streets, even building barricades. There was demonstration after demonstration, and finally one million people paraded down the Champs Elysees on behalf of de Gaulle, headed by Parliament members who were having to act *outside* Parliament.

Nowadays, people parade down the streets of Paris for any reason whatsoever. Lately we have had the miners and then the steel workers of Lorraine, followed by the civil servants and then representatives of liberal professions, while at about the same time 800,000 parents of private school children parade in Versailles on behalf of freedom of education. Quite a democracy France is—with its citizens peacefully parading down the streets chanting slogans, carrying placards and banners, and warning the government, while everything is being reported on TV and radio stations.

On problems which defy social consensus, political parties do take positions and political leaders express themselves as if they held a parcel of national sovereignty. Most of these leaders are Parliament members, although it is not only in the Assembly that they air their views but week after week in newspaper articles, TV broadcasts, political rallies, and press conferences.

Political parties, after all, are the real essence of a democracy, and the fact that so much takes place outside Parliament shows that Parliament per se, as an institution, is no longer the seat of power in France nor the place for bringing about real consensus; it is rather a place for bitter fights. On the other bank of the river Seine, at the Elysee Palace, sits the man—the President—who rules the country with powers far wider than those of any other chief of state or government of any democratic country in the world. A man who, almost once a year, at his solemn press conference—nothing much

in common with Mr. Reagan's frequent press meetings—hands down the main guidelines for the rules of the political game and the laws of the land, and who utters words writ in gold. France after all has a political history dominated by such monarchs as Louis XIV and Napoleon I.

As for political parties, General de Gaulle had intended to destroy them because of their grip and hold over Parliament; it is ironical to witness the fact that they are today reborn as the leaders of French political life but *outside* Parliament. Let me add that in 1968 Parliament nevertheless played a role in helping solve the crisis but, only by being dissolved by de Gaulle, thus paving the way for new elections.

Now everything I have said so far holds true because, up to now, the President of the Republic has always had a majority in the National Assembly. At times a very large majority, such as was possessed at one time by de Gaulle and nowadays by the Socialists, and at times a slimmer majority but nevertheless a majority even when the Gaullists were only half-hearted supporters of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. However, should this not be true and, come the next general election in 1986, should President Mitterrand face a majority in Parliament adverse to his Socialist and Communist coalition, then it would be quite a different story.

A new majority in Parliament adverse to the President could impose on him a Prime Minister and a Cabinet which would then try to enact policy which could not possibly be accepted by the President of the Republic. In that eventuality we would be in a deep crisis and Parliament, which according to the Constitution has to give a vote of confidence to the Cabinet, would then be in a position of holding the balance of power. I frankly do not know what would happen. The President could dissolve the National Assembly but only once, then he would have to wait for another year and if the same majority, adverse to himself, had been returned to power, he would have either to resign or to abide by the new majority system. The coexistence of an Executive and a Legislative Branch opposed to each other may indeed be very very difficult for the French Constitution in its present form to handle. Perhaps we shall see.

But inasmuch as past experience can be looked at and drawn upon, I dare say that under the Fifth Republic, Parliament has a very limited role to play in building consensus or solving a crisis in France.

Perspectives of German Security Policy

Captain Ulrich Weisser, Federal German Navy

There are critical voices questioning the viability of Nato strategy and in the same breath are demanding success in arms control. Concurrently, doubts are being raised as to whether a security approach confined to the North Atlantic region will suffice in the future, since crises in other parts of the world clearly have repercussions for the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). However, the heated debate about these important questions frequently suffers from two shortcomings. First, there is an almost insurmountable barrier in terms of understanding and language between the politicians and experts concerned with the difficult problems of strategy and arms control on one hand, and the public who have to live with the effects of this policy on the other. Second, owing to the preoccupation with highly topical subjects, the goals and precepts of our security policy are easily forgotten.

There are a number of factors that govern and condition German security policy. We are a divided country at the heart of Europe. We have common frontiers with nine other States which provides us with more neighbors than any other country in the world. We live at the dividing line between East and West, and our position and our history imply an obligation. Our situation requires that we not only come to grips with communist societies, both intellectually and politically, but that we also seek understanding and cooperation with them.

The Federal Republic of Germany is a modern industrialized country with the political weight of a medium-sized power, whose voice is heard but whose influence is limited; it is not a nuclear power, nor does it intend to become one. My country is not self-reliant and cannot defend itself on its own, consequently, we need allies and trading partners. Our integration in the world economy requires open markets and unimpeded access to raw materials and energy. We need free and safe sea routes for peaceful trade and for bringing in military reinforcements from overseas.

The FRG has to take account of all these factors in pursuing the goals of its foreign and security policy, which are:

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- peace and freedom
- economic stability, prosperity and social justice
- protection of the natural environment.

The Atlantic Alliance affords the FRG peace and freedom as well as protection against external threats. The basis for security is a functioning military balance between East and West. For many years the discussion of the military balance was confined to comparing the number of weapons possessed by Nato and the Warsaw Pact. Today the emphasis is less on quantifiable military capabilities than on questions of the political, strategic and moral viability of the respective security concept. For instance, the effectiveness of the principle of deterrence is increasingly called into question and its moral legitimacy queried.

These doubts are focused on nuclear weapons in particular. The spectrum of opinions ranges from undiminished faith in the peacekeeping potential of deterrence, as practiced by the Atlantic Alliance, to rejection of the principle of deterrence. For example by American bishops, who, in view of the immoral effects of a universally destructive weapon, regard the mere threat to use such a weapon as immoral.

This diversity of opinion is not a sign of weakness but a testimony to our peoples grappling with security as it affects our very existence. It is a basic characteristic of free Western democracies that the widespread public debate is provided with an abundance of information. Yet, this does not make it any easier to understand such complex problems as nuclear strategy and deterrence. Precisely for this reason three fundamental points must be made quite clear.

First: A nuclear and a conventional war can only be prevented if the military forces are capable of responding to an attack and of engaging in conventional and nuclear defense.

Second: Waging war under present-day conditions cannot mean "winning" it. Even in a conventional war it will be less and less possible to speak of victors and vanquished because the effects of conventional weapons alone are so devastating that there can only be vanquished parties to a war.

Third: Given that the goal of deterrence is to prevent a war, in the event of this deterrence failing, one of the major aims is to end war and restore peace quickly.

From these three concepts we can derive the following. Deterrence means exerting an influence on the will of a potential aggressor, making him opt for peace when choosing between war and peace. If the risk is incalculably high and unacceptably great damage is anticipated, deterrence is effective and the decision will be taken in favor of peace. The risk and anticipated damage are

dependent on the defensive capability of the forces of the country or alliance that is attacked. The will and capacity for defense must be materially visible to the potential aggressor, otherwise, the risk for him would be quantifiable as worth taking and deterrence would fail. In short, deterrence is a peace-preserving principle, which is militarily sensible and morally justified.

The strategy of flexible response which has been valid since 1967 envisages three types of response in order to counter any form of aggression appropriately:

Direct Defense. Nato uses the same means as the aggressor employs in launching his attack—for instance, purely conventional defense against a conventional attack. As a result, the aggression fails or the aggressor is confronted with the burden of having to opt for escalation.

Deliberate Escalation. An attack is to be repulsed by changing the quality of the defensive operations through the use of nuclear weapons or by expanding the regional scope of the conflict. The objective is to make the aggressor understand, through the selective use of nuclear weapons, that the prospects of success are not in proportion to the risk he incurs. Moreover, he is to be struck where he is most vulnerable. In the context of deliberate escalation the term "first use of nuclear weapons" comes to mind. In the public debate, it is stated time and again that Nato should forgo this option. In dealing with this issue at its summit meeting in Bonn on 10 June 1982, the Atlantic Alliance stated that none of its weapons will ever be used except in response to attack. There exists no good and compelling reason to separately forgo one element of the spectrum of deterrence. Furthermore, formal renunciation would completely eliminate the risk for the Soviet Union of having to reckon with the use of nuclear weapons by Nato.

Apart from direct defense and deliberate escalation there is a:

General Nuclear Response. The threat of this response is Nato's strongest deterrent and takes into consideration the use of Nato's most powerful military response. It is directed mainly against the nuclear strategic potential of the aggressor as well as his economic and social existence.

With these three types of response constituting our strategy the aim is to ensure that the type, scope and timing of the response is not calculable for the aggressor; he must reckon with the conflict being expanded and escalated—an inestimable risk for him. In other words, this high risk of incalculable and inevitable unacceptable damage is meant to make the potential adversary opt for peace when choosing between war or peace.

In the pursuit of this strategy Nato requires certain military means—intercontinental strategic weapons, intermediate and short-range nuclear systems, and conventional forces.

These three categories make up the Nato Triad. The three elements of the Triad complement each other but *cannot* replace one another. The deterrent effect of the Triad is dependent on each element being credible and on all

three elements being linked to one another through escalation. The Triad is designed as it must be, to afford Nato wide and flexible scope for action.

The second strike capability of the two superpowers—their capacity for assured nuclear destruction—is based on intercontinental missiles stored in bunkers, long-range ballistic missiles that can be launched from nuclear submarines, and long-range manned bombers.

These nuclear strategic potentials of the United States and the Soviet Union are more or less evenly balanced. Advantages in one potential are offset by advantages elsewhere in the other. In the triad of the American systems, submarine-launched missiles are the most numerous; the Soviet Union relies more on heavy ground-launched missiles, whose precise accuracy makes the American land-based missiles vulnerable. The modernization program initiated by President Reagan in 1981 is designed to close this "window of vulnerability," as the President calls it, and at the same time seeks to maintain a balance with Soviet nuclear arms. This balance has evolved in the last two decades, during the period in which the United States deliberately relinquished its superiority in strategic nuclear weapons.

In the early 1960s the United States possessed over 7,000 strategic nuclear weapons, and the Soviet Union less than 500. Under those circumstances the Soviet Union could attack neither military nor civilian targets in America by nuclear means because the Soviet arsenal of nuclear weapons was numerically insufficient and technically inefficient. A Soviet attack on American bomber and missile bases would have necessitated use of a large part of the small arsenal, without at all diminishing the American capability for a nuclear response. An attack on cities in the United States would have entailed for the Soviet Union the full force of a counterstrike with an armory several times superior. At that time the United States was in a position, by virtue of its strategic nuclear superiority, to make any Soviet attack become an unacceptably high risk for the Soviet Union and hence it could successfully deter such an attack.

During the 1970s the Soviet Union enhanced its strategic arsenal both quantitatively and qualitatively and gained equality with the United States. For the Soviet Union this parity with the other superpower has become the decisive political attribute of its own position as a superpower. Strategic nuclear inferiority is today regarded by the United States and the Soviet Union as tantamount to relinquishing one's superpower status. For the two sides, intercontinental nuclear weapons are the last refuge and in paradox, could be their doom, for their use virtually precludes their survival. In view of this development, it was in the joint interest of the superpowers to preserve the strategic nuclear parity and at the same time curb the nuclear arms race, possibly even securing a stable nuclear stalemate at a lower level.

Naval War College Review, Vol. 37 [1984], No. 6, Art. 1

In the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, these efforts led to an initial success in 1972 in the shape of the SALT I Treaty in which long-range strategic offensive weapons were limited to a specific number. At the same time, the two sides agreed not to take any action which would affect the second strike capability of either side. In 1974 President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev agreed that in the SALT II Treaty the number of ground and sea-launched intercontinental missiles and of heavy bombers should not exceed a total of 2,400 and that not more than 1,320 of the launchers should be equipped with multiple warheads. At the same time they agreed to aim for a substantial reduction in strategic nuclear weapons in a third round of negotiations. The Geneva Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, known as START, were to serve as the means to achieve this goal.

Like the governments of its European partners in Nato, the Federal Government welcomed the fact that the two superpowers were willing to conclude an arms control agreement. The following points were advanced as the decisive political advantages of such an agreement:

- It would put an end to the strategic nuclear arms race.
- It would give recognition to parity of these weapons as an important element of political stability and thus strengthen the international security situation. At the same time, however, the Europeans realized that strategic nuclear parity between the two superpowers is a double-edged sword for Western Europe.
- For the United States and the Soviet Union, consolidated and even codified parity in intercontinental nuclear weapons means stable deterrence—neither side stood to gain anything, but both sides would *lose everything* if they were to make use of these weapons.
- For the European members of Nato, this parity means primarily that the United States has relinquished its strategic nuclear superiority and the advantages it provided.

For we Germans, as a nation without a nuclear deterrent of its own, this loss marks the most important development of the last two decades as there is no longer anything to offset the Warsaw Pact's superiority in conventional weapons. The disadvantages due to geographical asymmetry are now all the more emphasized. What is meant by this?

North America and Western Europe are a political and strategic unity separated by over 6,000 km of Atlantic Ocean. Owing to Western Europe's weakness in conventional forces, vital logistic support and reinforcements from the United States have to be brought on long and hazardous sea routes to Europe. The Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, is a single mass of land. The Soviet Union has not only the advantage of overland routes but can also reinforce its forces in Central Europe over short distances of 600 km or less within a brief space of time. As long as the United States enjoyed strategic

nuclear superiority, this asymmetry and the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority were not overly important since the Americans, and hence the entire Alliance, benefited by the offsetting advantages of strategic nuclear superiority. However, in the present period of parity there is no superiority left to compensate for this deficiency.

The effects of parity on the conventional balance are not the only consequence. In addition, there is nothing to compensate for the Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range missiles, a rapidly expanding potential not covered by any arms limitation agreement. These missiles are mobile, have a long range, can be reloaded and are equipped with three warheads each.

Western Europe's security situation thus differs fundamentally from that of the United States. The United States is not threatened by either conventional weapons or intermediate-range nuclear missiles. The missile threat to the American continent is offset by corresponding American weapons. Meanwhile, Western Europe is threatened by the Warsaw Pact's superiority in conventional weapons, by the increasing nuclear potential for blackmail on account of Soviet intermediate-range missiles, and finally by Soviet intercontinental missiles which can be used against the United States or against Europe. The Nato two-track decision of December 1979 is designed to remedy this situation. The Soviet Union is faced with the choice of either accepting the same dual nuclear threat as Western Europe—the threat posed by intercontinental and intermediate-range missiles—or of renouncing the category of Eurostrategic weapons together with Nato.

Why then were the Geneva INF talks so difficult? The answer is quite simple. The Soviet Union does not want to grant Western Europe the same security as it is willing to allow the United States and itself. It regards Pershing missiles deployed in Germany, which can reach Soviet territory in about 10 minutes and for which there is no defense, as a new strategic threat to itself; at the same time, the Soviet Union does not accept the fact that Western Europe objects to living with a similar threat, that posed by the SS-20 missiles. These divergent concepts of security and stability are what prevented the Geneva talks from being successful. Furthermore, the subject matter of the talks is difficult and complex—let me cite two examples. First, the two sides must take account of the different conditions and constellations of their alliances, and their respecrive geographical location. Next, the two sides are trying to prevent the intermediate-range potential from being undermined while enhancing both the long and short-range potentials.

The public debate on the two-track decision touched the central nerve of the peoples of Europe. Even those who were not acquainted with the above discussion would have comprehended by intuition that fundamental issues of our security are involved. The question is whether Western Europe's security is to be of a lower quality than that of the superpowers; the question is whether the Alliance resists the pressure of the Soviet Union, which does

not want to allow the balance to be redressed. Furthermore, the question is whether additional nuclear weapons afford additional security. There is growing doubt as to whether the inconceivable destructive power of these weapons is at all morally justified and whether deterrence and the principle of maintaining a capacity for mutual destruction can safeguard peace in the long run.

In this context I should like to quote from a policy statement of the Federal Chancellor, Dr. Helmut Kohl, made to the Bundestag on 4 May 1983:

"We cannot overnight eliminate nuclear weapons from the face of the earth. Unilateral renunciation of such weapons would not in the least reduce the nuclear threat directed towards us, but only increase the danger of war. There is only one way out of this dilemma: We must drastically reduce the number of nuclear weapons on both sides, those which threaten our existence and those which we are now forced to maintain for the sake of our security....

As long as comprehensive disarmament does not render military means of securing peace superfluous, we remain dependent on the valid and proven Alliance strategy of defence and deterrence."

In their pastoral letter of 28 April 1983, German Catholic bishops said the following on this subject: "Under the present conditions, deterrence based on equilibrium can still be regarded as morally acceptable—of course not as an end in itself, but as a stage along the path of progressive disarmament."

The bishops gave a decisive piece of advice to all those who are perturbed at the destructive force of nuclear weapons and do not see the point of military service when they stated: "A soldier serving the cause of safeguarding peace must withstand the strain of arming himself on the instructions of the State, preparing himself for battle and learning to do things which he hopes he will never have to carry out because he wants nothing more strongly than to preserve peace without the use of force and to resolve conflicts through negotiation."

Even in the face of this debate, which is indeed necessary and conducted in a very serious manner, one must have the courage ro put the overall problems into perspective.

In the discussion of the military potentials of Nato and the Warsaw Pact, both the fearful and those toying with fear frequently ignore a fundamental consideration—nowhere else in the world is there a more stable region than in Europe. The East-West security system functions within these regional limits for two simple reasons: First, the Soviet Union knows that Nato will never attack the Warsaw Pact; and, secondly, the Soviet Union knows that any attack on the Atlantic Alliance will culminate in a Third World War, whose outcome it cannot predetermine. Thus, today we may be prepared for the most dangerous conflict, but not for the most probable one.

There is a greater probability today of a crisis in the Middle East, southern Africa or the Caribbean region quickly leading to an open conflict between the superpowers. This is especially true when any of these regions becomes unstable owing to a power vacuum, ethnic rivalry or social tension, and vital interests of the two superpowers or their respective allies are simultaneously affected. On 4 May 1983 Dr. Kohl said the following before the German Bundestag: "Everyone knows that our vital interests go beyond the limits of Nato territory. Critical developments in other parts of the world affect us as well. Accordingly, we need and we practice solidarity and close co-ordination with our allies who assume worldwide responsibility."

Dr. Kohl's remarks lead to the obvious conclusion that future FRG policy will have to perform a difficult dual function. It must preserve the freedom, security and strategic unity of Western Europe, the Atlantic and North America; it must ensure that the political and military balance between East and West is maintained. Also, the members of the Atlantic Alliance must defend their interests worldwide and above all ensure that critical regions in the Third World are stabilized. This is to be achieved by a preventive policy of aid afforded in a spirit of partnership so as to secure greater economic and social stability. In our security calculations, we must therefore take account both the most dangerous and the most probable case; in other words, East-West and North-South policies must be complementary from the point of view of security as well.

Allow me to sum up this essay be making ten essential points:

1. German foreign and security policy is committed to peace in freedom and the principles of democracy, rule of law and social justice.

2. Our history and our geographical position, our dependence in the economic and security spheres, but also our weight as a trading partner and ally—all these factors—do not make our security policy in Europe, in the Alliance and in the world any easier.

3. The Atlantic Alliance has afforded us peace and security for over 30 years now. Its strategy and concept of deterrence and defense have stood the test and remain valid in the 1980s.

4. Functioning deterrence requires an adequate potential of conventional land, air and sea forces, which must be closely linked to the nuclear deterrent.

5. We cannot forgo nuclear weapons as long as the other side possesses them and does not let up in its efforts to expand its conventional superiority.

6. For the time being we must live with weapons of mass destruction and thus with the tension caused by their vast destructive potential, on the one hand, and their peacekeeping effect on the other.

7. The accumulation of increasingly efficient military potentials in East and West and ever rising military expenditures, render to disarmament and

arms control a crisis of urgency not only to the alliances in East and West, but also to the Third World.

8. The East and the West are at the historical crossroads where they must choose between success in disarmament or further nuclear arms. A successful outcome is contingent on the two sides acknowledging each other's security needs.

9. However justified it is to question our security policy, gloomy fear and doubts that offer no alternatives are of little use. Pacifists and radicals promise us peace, but they neglect the values we want to preserve and the realities of this world.

10. German security policy, which keeps idealism and realism in equilibrium, which is equally capable of defense as of dialogue, and which defends our vital interests in the world by relying on the vitality and strength of the Alliance, will continue to ensure peace in freedom in the 1980s.

Ψ

IN MY VIEW . . .

Ian Oliver

The Press, The Chiefs, and the War Colleges

Sir,

The May-June 1984 issue of the *Review* is of truly exceptional quality, made so in large part by the three honest and provocative articles on military-press relations and by Rear Admiral Swarztrauber's sifting out of conflicting views "On Reorganizing the Pentagon."

The value of the press analysis was considerably lessened, however, by Major Mitchell's choice of the Lefever study as his basis for analyzing television biases. The Lefever study cannot be separated from its author's own political involvements and espoused biases. That judgment might be just or unjust. It is simply a matter of effective Aristotelian debate.

Strange to say, Major Mitchell had ready at hand a more persuasive source, but he somehow managed to misread it. He states that "the net effect of television's coverage of the events of Tet was to exhort the American *public* [emphasis added] into its first real misgivings about the war and to initiate the movement of the *public* into active dissent," ascribing this view to Peter Braestrup's study (*Big Story*) of the 1968 Tet Offensive. That is not what Braestrup and his polling collaborator, Burns W. Roper, say! In short, what the Braestrup-Roper analysis says is that the public was ready to go out and win the war—possibly *because* they may have perceived the Tet Offensive to be a defeat—but shifted to opposition to the war only because the President, their Commander-in-Chief, did nothing, and then quit. Later in his article, Major Mitchell comes around to the Braestrup-Roper conclusion that the defeatist impact of the distorted press coverage was not on the public, but on the President and his advisers who were operating under the stupefying illusion that Walter Cronkite, et al, were in tune with the public. In fact, what we had were two groups not only isolated and insulated from the American public at large but to a considerable extent contemptuous of that public. These were, on the one hand, the majority of the academicians who had taken over the Government during the Kennedy Administration and whom President Johnson kept on to his ultimate sorrow, and a dominant group in the press who virtually worshipped the academics-become-bureaucrats. The blind were indeed leading the blind, and it was Johnson who was led into the pit.

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It is ironic indeed that Major Mitchell would cite none other than David Halberstam as his source for the role of public spokesman Johnson may well have ascribed to Cronkite. From beginning to end of the American tragedy in Vietnam, Halberstam was the personification of the central flaw in American journalism's notion that a liberal arts degree from a respected university qualifies its possessor to report with discernment and accuracy everything from an Asian war to the election of a Pope. That delusion persists because that is the cheapest way to operate. It will change only when the public demands that people assigned to cover wars have at least the level of specialized expertise the public long ago demanded and got in the sports departments.

The same academic elite that Mr. Cronkite scared literally out of their wits at the time of Tet is, of course, the same civilian OSD bureaucracy lamented by Admiral Swarztrauber. Often, as is the case with many in the press, these people are the products of extended academic draft deferments. The psychological burden of knowing that other men were sent to Korea or Vietnam to die or be maimed in their stead is a factor that would have been hard to consider in Admiral Swarztrauber's analysis, but it is there, and it had a profound effect in the reaction of the Defense Department civilian leadership to the misreporting of Tet.

For this and all the other reasons Admiral Swarztrauber has stated, it is essential that the direct Presidential-military adviser relationship of World War II be reestablished, but I can't see how that will be accomplished or aided by restoring three squabbling service secretaries to the Cabinet.

The OSD bureaucracy did not displace military advice. It moved into a vacuum. The military will not be able to reassert a proper advisory role until it can convince the country that it is capable of coming up with alternative and recommended courses of action that are not dominated from first to last by service vested interests, separate or collective. The place to develop such strategic alternatives, it seems to me, is in a true National War College operating direetly under supervision of the National Security Council. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be a member of the NSC, his vote balanced by the political and economic views of the civilian majority. Once a course of action is chosen the job of carrying out the military component should be given to the Chairman and the CinCs through the Joint Staff. That would make the Joint Staff solely an operating rather than a notoriously weak strategic planning agency and force the services to assign their very best talent.

I support wholeheartedly Admiral Swarztrauber's belief that the separate identities and voices of the land, sea and air services must be maintained. They cannot go on, however, with the preposterous assertion, institutionalized in so many separate "war colleges," that each service is capable of training senior officers for Joint and Combined operations. That is the role of the National War College and of the Joint staffs. Except for some consolidation of real estate, mainly in the Army, that does not imply any great change. Newport logically should continue to operate as the country's center for the study of maritime operations, the same for Maxwell Air Force Base as the center for air warfare, and with Fort Leavenworth as the logical center for the study of land warfare. All of these could be tied in with the electronic war gaming of Joint and Combined operations at the National War College.

Change is on its way, driven by the powerful economic and political forces set in

motion by the $200 billion deficits. This time, hopefully, the military leadership of the country will be able to come up with something more attractive than the intransigence that brought on the MacNamara regime and disaster.

William V. Kennedy
Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania

A Management Error of the First Magnitude

Sir,

The authors of *The Trident Submarine in Bureaucratic Perspective* (*Review*, March-April 1984) appear to have missed a crucial point in Electric Boat's troubles with the Navy. P. Takis Veliotis's first act after becoming the yard's manager in 1977 was to fire some 3,500 employees, almost all of whom were so-called "overhead" people. Unfortunately, what he apparently succeeded in doing was to cripple the yard's quality assurance program by eliminating many of the "non-productive" personnel performing this function. Failure to protect the integrity of quality assurance was a management error of the first magnitude, a lesson learned most painfully by the Navy in the late 1960s but apparently ignored by Mr. Veliotis, who came from a surface ship job at the company's Quincy yard. Lapses in quality assurance usually come to light many months or years later, and this is obviously what happened to Electric Boat with regard to the poor welds, misidentified steel, etc.

According to recent newspaper reports, Mr. Veliotis is currently in Greece, a fugitive from a federal indictment for allegedly conspiring with a supplier of insulating material to divert over $2 million in kickbacks from shipbuilding contracts under his management.

Commander John D. Alden, US Navy (Retired)
Pleasantville, NY

Primary Source Material?

Sir,

I am writing in reply to an article, "Central Mediterranean Sea Control and the North African Campaigns, 1940-1942," by Rowena Reed, that appears in your July/August 1984 issue. Your editorial statement purports that you publish articles on the "basis of their intellectual and literary merits." I assume as well, relatively to the interests of your readers. While I understand the attraction of Reed's topic, I am at a loss as to why you chose to publish this particular work.

The article is replete with factual errors. The British counterattack against the Italians at Sidi Barrani, Operation COMPASS, was launched in December 1940, not

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October (pp. 84-85). Benghazi was captnred in February 1941, not November 1940 (p. 85). On page 88 Reed states that Rommel fell back to El Agheila in December 1941 because of his "troublesome logistical situation." Rather, he had been forced to retreat by the British CRUSADER offensive of November 1941. Reed writes (p. 90) that on 21 May 1942 Hitler began to have doubts about the Malta invasion plan because of "the success of Rommel's advance." Yet Rommel's attack on the British Gazala position did not begin until 26/27 May.

Nnmerous factual errors could be overlooked if Reed's work was based on new, primary source material. But it is not. Reed cites only ten secondary works. Nevertheless, had she provided a synthesis of the relevant literatnre on the wat in the Mediterranean, her work would have been worthwhile. But examine her footnotes and note the publication dates of the works cited: 1957, 1946, 1951, 1951, 1954, 1960, 1950, 1962, 1953, 1946. The most recent work cited was published in 1962. Most of the books were written before 1954, over thirty years ago. Has nothing been published on the Mediterranean theater since 1962? This is neither the time nor the place to go into the historiogtaphy of World War II, but might not the author have mentioned the breaking of the German Enigma codes—ULTRA? Reed cites neither F.H. Hinsley's history of British intelligence during the Second World War, nor the relevant chapter in Ronald Lewin's *Ultra Goes to War*. In fact, Reed never mentions ULTRA at all. When was this article written?

How could you have published an article full of errors, based solely on ten outdated secondary works, that ignores a quarter-century of research and writing, and that fails to mention ULTRA?

Michael A. Palmer
Washington, DC

Reed rejoinder:

My article never claimed to be based on new documentary material; it is an overview of a very large and complex subject. Besides, published papers and official histories are not considered secondary sources. As for being old, historians do not determine the best sources by how recently they were published. In fact, accounts published closer to the event are usually more rather than less reliable. Mr. Palmer has a right to his opinion that the British CRUSADER operation caused Rommel to withdraw from El Agheila, but Rommel does not agree. He said it was because he was out of supplies. I did not mention ULTRA hecause it would have required too lengthy elaboration for a short article and did not seem to affect my main point about logistics and the Nortb African war. In his zeal to explain why the article is worthless, Palmer seems to have overlooked its main contribution, which is to show that shipping across the Mediterranean from 1940 to 1942 had less effect on military control of North Africa than had been previonsly supposed.

Rowena Reed
Associate Professor of History
Dartmouth College

Naval Warfare Principle Research Grants

Sir,

The short discussion of the inside-back cover of the May-June '84 issue ("Naval War College—Naval Warfare History Research Grants") illustrates what I think to be a problem with present-day military-academic research effort. That problem is exemplified by the sentence beginning. "While the idea of principles was subsequently viewed as highly questionable . . . . "

I think it highly unlikely that there are no "immutable principles" of strategy and tactics. Within the subject of tactics, for example, we have the "principle of principle" illustrated by Frederick William Lanchester's famous "in-square law" of concentration in tactics. Although it was derived for very simple and idealized conditions, it is clearly a valid and rather general idea—an "immutable principle," if you will. Clearly, tactical concentration, in a rational world, is but a special case of the more general principle of tactical surprise. The latter, in turn, is subject to the logical principles of perception. Principles are everywhere, and are surely not absent from the strategy and tactics of naval warfare. I am fond of the statement attributed to a fellow engineer that "everything that can possibly happen in the real world is no more than a special case of a good, general theory."

The study of naval warfare history, while essential preparation, is no more than just that. Human progress is not made by students of history. It is made by those who, being familiar with the past, can nevertheless invent the future. To do that with success, in the long-term, would seem to require more reliance on principle than we have used in the past. If we are to use principle, we must discover it and understand it. Doing such things is often more difficult than studying and interpreting history, and is seemingly done by fewer people.

I think it is a pity that the grander goal of Stephen B. Luce and Alfred Thayer Mahan has been discarded. The much easier one of studying history, while clearly worthwhile, is too timid and slurs over the crux of military power and its place in the human scheme of things. It is too bad that there are no such things as "Naval War College—Naval Warfare Principle Research Grants."

Theodore C. Taylor
Pacific Palisades, California

Nuclear Weapons—Self Defense

Sir,

While stretching the definition of "law," George Bunn's recent article, "US Law of Nuclear Weapons," (July-August 1984) provides an excellent description of the various constraints on nuclear weapons.

However, I take exception to his assertion (p. 55) that "the UN Charter itself prohibits the *first use* of any armed force (including nuclear force) by a nation-state except as authorized by the UN" (emphasis mine).

I assume that Professor Bunn, as a respected international lawyer, *would agree* that the inherent right of self-defense, as enshrined in article 51 of the UN Charter, permits the use of proportional force in self-defense against a demonstration of hostile intent amounting to a threat of imminent attack. Article 0915, U.S. Navy Regulations 1973, and our peacetime rules of engagement, permit anticipatory self-defense ("Rules of Engagement," *NWC Review*, January-February 1983, p. 46, at 49-50).

No one can reasonably expect our warships to stand idly by in the face of a coordinated preemptive attack. Although all commanders recognize the tremendous responsibility associated with shooting first, none should be constrained from doing so when necessary by a mistaken belief that the first use of armed force in self-defense is unlawful. It is not.

J. Ashley Roach
Captain, JAGC, US Navy

Bunn rejoinder:

I agree with Captain Roach's comment concerning self-defense and Article 51 of the UN Charter. Article 51 preserves "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs . . . . " The language of my article which he quotes was meant to encompass this exception though it did not do so as explicitly as does his letter.

The problem has always been to determine when an *armed attack* is so *imminent* that "anticipatory" self-defense is justified. In the Gulf of Sidra incident, for example, hostile aircraft shot missiles at our planes. Though they missed, this was clearly an armed attack and justified shooting down the hostile aircraft in self-defense. (Contrast that with the Soviet destruction of Korean Airlines Flight 007 which was trespassing, but not threatening an armed attack.) In the nuclear context, if our early warning systems revealed an approaching Soviet ICBM attack against the United States, international law would not stand in the way of a nuclear counterattack in self-defense.

George Bunn
Naval War College

PROFESSIONAL READING

Heretofore it has been virtually impossible for most "students" of intelligence to evaluate intelligence related literature accurately. Now with *Intelligence and Espionage* and a *Scholar's Guide to Intelligence Literature*, the military officer and scholar—*inter alias*—will have some reliable guides with which to dig into this ambiguous and murky world.

Lieutenant Commander George Kraus, US Navy

Constantinides, George C. *Intelligence and Espionage: An Analytical Bibliography*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. 559pp. $60

Cline, Marjorie W., Christiansen, Carla E., and Fontaine, Judith M., eds. *Scholar's Guide to Intelligence Literature: Bibliography of the Russell J. Bowen Collection*. Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1983. 236pp. $40

It has previously been impossible for most individuals to accurately evaluate intelligence-related literature. With the exception of practitioners or others with routine access to classified intelligence material, such assessment of unclassified books and articles was impractical. This problem has been compounded, as one recent author has noted (David Martin, *Wilderness of Mirrors*), by "the amount of misinformation that has appeared in print and then [been] elevated to history through constant repetition." At the same time, the increasing stream of books on intelligence subjects, the ULTRA revelations, and the increasing attention to the study of intelligence by academia have focused attention on intelligence and its role in history and

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Recently staff intelligence officer for the Naval War College, Lt. Comdr. Kraus is now assigned to the net assessment office of the Secretary of Defense.

national security. The publication of Constantinides' outstanding bibliography has gone a long way towards providing a reliable guide into the murky world of intelligence literature for the careful scholar and the concerned citizen, or the interested naval officer.

Constantinides has included over 500 nonfiction books in this bibliography all save one of which are printed in English. They cover the period from the American Revolution to the present, and focus on all aspects of the intelligence business: collection, analysis, use, counterespionage, unconventional warfare, evasion and escape, and the use of deception and disinformation—over fifty categories are listed in the "Intelligence Category" listing. The organization of the work is excellent and that makes it even more useful. It has a subject category listing, an annotated list of entries in alphabetical order by author, a title index and a subject and author index. The various indexes are cross-referenced and the result is an extremely flexible research reference.

While organization and coverage are important to this book's usefulness, they are but thoughtful adjuncts to the cogent analytic entries. These analyses address the accuracy and reliability of each book cited, the importance of the subject discussed, and the success of each author in covering it. Constantinides compares and contrasts the books where appropriate, discusses material that highlights errors or omissions, and points to areas of larger significance or to events and subjects where further research is required. The careful delineation of the backgrounds and biases of authors provides additional insight into the worth of individual entries. Constantinides includes coverage of the major available bibliographies on the subject in English, an extremely useful feature for the scholar and general reader alike, as the literature on intelligence has become so expansive. The author also supplements his comments, where appropriate, with observations from other analysts, and he is scrupulous in highlighting significant disagreements or uncertainties that exist.

One example that illustrates how useful this work can be (among hundreds that might be chosen) is the entry discussing William Stevenson's *A Man Called Intrepid*, a US best-seller. Constantinides discusses reviews by Ronald Lewin and Hugh Trevor-Roper and refers the reader to four other books that are related, discuss the same subject, or have information relevant to a determination of the accuracy and reliability of the Stevenson book. He cites H. Montgomery Hyde's book, *Room 3603* (published in the United States in 1963 with little notice) as a "much more reliable work." Consulting the entry on *Room 3603*, the balance and judgment of Constantinides' analysis is manifest, as he lists no less than seven additional works which should be consulted for further details and corrections. He points to the fact that Hyde's book was an official "partial leak" regarding the British WWII intelligence organization for the Western Hemisphere, and to the "special" covert

propaganda activities of that organization aimed at encouraging US entry into the war. British cryptological successes against the Germans are described as well, long before the ULTRA revelations. The value of such complete and careful analysis should be obvious, and the author provides a rich context and perspective so often missing or unavailable to the uninitiated.

Constantinides has had a long US Government career in national security and intelligence related assignments. He has supplemented his own knowledge and experience by consulting other knowledgeable individuals, Dr. Walter Pforzheimer for example, and by consulting collections of intelligence related material, both private and official. The resulting book is simply the best bibliography currently available in English on the subject. It is not complete, as Mr. Constantinides explains in his introduction; it assumes some familiarity with intelligence terminology (though it does include one, the glossary is primarily of organizational titles); it does not include Congressional Committee reports or Royal Commission studies or periodical articles; these are merely referenced where appropriate. Nonetheless, the interested naval officer will find no more reliable and thorough guide through the plethora of nonfiction relating to intelligence.

The Russell J. Bowen Collection is, as Colonel Bowen notes in his introduction, a "somewhat eclectic" assortment of loosely related publications. The colonel, in his alternative careers as an army reserve officer and as an engineering consultant has had a "somewhat eclectic" life. Over the past forty years he has been involved, by his own admission, in the areas of chemical and psychological warfare, information control, special weapons development, arms control inspection, strategic area analysis, foreign technology assessment and technology transfer. He began collecting books related to military intelligence and state security, and then expanded the already large collection with a view toward creating a data base to support writing on intelligence and related subjects in his retirement. The result is one of the largest and most complete collections of published material on intelligence. In order that it would be available to support the many teaching and research activities of Georgetown in the fields of foreign affairs and national security, the entire collection has been made available to the Joseph Mark Lauinger Memorial Library at Georgetown University. This bibliography was promoted and prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Study Center. Unlike the Constantinides analytic bibliography, the "Scholar's Guide" to the Bowen collection is not annotated, though it is, of course, an exhaustive listing of the more than 5,000 titles that comprise the collection.

The bibliography is divided into four sections: a subject categorization listing, an index of authors or editors or compilers, a title listing, and a source

listing. The meat of the text is in the first section, itself divided into two parts, the first part containing titles organized into categories under the general rubric of "Intelligence Organizations and Activities," the second containing titles on "Intelligence Related Topics." The author, editor, compiler index is just that, and is made more useful by the inclusion of pseudonyms where applicable. The title listing is not complete, but is a sampling of works in all the major subject areas, thus providing quick access to primary works in a given area, and thereby to other related titles that will be found in the same sections. The final "sources" section is the shortest element in the bibliography, and it lists the sources (other than book publishers) from which many of the documents come. Examples include, *inter alia*, *American Heritage*, the US Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), and *Wall Street Journal*, as well as a number of US Government organizations. The reader is referred to appropriate pages in the bibliography where material from these sources is found thus facilitating cross-referencing within the collection by document source, e.g., all the JPRS translations, or all the articles from *American Heritage*.

Organization, of course, is quite important in any bibliography, and there is little to be criticized here. I would have cross-referenced Sun Tzu (*The Art of War*) under many categories (e.g., Foreign Relations: General, Psychological Warfare: General, Warfare: Military Strategy: General, etc.), and probably would *not* have included it in the "National Intelligence Establishment" category. I would have preferred that the editors designate their "Consolidation of Political and Military Power" section as "Prelude to World War II" or "Interwar Years," to make the description more useful to the researcher.

This bibliography is important for several reasons. First, most of the literature that, as David Kahn has noted, the "experts consider vital" is here. Second, this is a balanced collection in the sense that the views of all sides are represented. Third, the very eclectic nature of the selections assures that virtually all aspects, features or effects and uses of intelligence are included. Thus the scholar with this bibliography will be more likely to expand the "net" of his inquiry to cover all dimensions of his intelligence topic. In addition, this compendium provides the layman with insight into the wide range of areas touched by intelligence. Finally, the Bowen collection is certainly one of the greatest collections of works on intelligence. This bibliography makes it accessible and usable. As useful as it is, the Bowen collection bibliography is a categorization with no annotation. The careful reader should have *both* this and the Constantinides bibliographies. They complement one another nicely, and Constantinides had access to Colonel Bowen's collection in preparing his annotated work. The publication of these two works provides the public with a comprehensive checklist of the literature of intelligence and a detailed description of its strengths and weaknesses.

Haig, Alexander M., Jr. *Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy.* New York: Macmillan, 1984. 367pp. $17.95

A reviewer must take the author's point of departure. Mr. Alexander Haig has written "a personal memoir . . . from the point of view of a participant" of his 18 months as Secretary of State. Here is no richly complex review of American foreign policy such as Mr. Henry Kissinger and his acolytes have given us, all the more valuable for being in not insignificant parts true. Nor is it a Chinese dynastic history (all passion, all thought removed) such as Mr. Cyrus Vance has given of his stewardship. A reviewer of the present book can fault the author's facts, point out discrepancies with other records, or carp at the author's performance. Several reviewers have done these and done them well (see Stanley Hoffman, "The Vicar's Revenge" in the *New York Review of Books*, 31 May 1984). Mr. Haig would disarm more serious comment by saying that what it was all about "belongs to future books."

We have here an operator. The word has a pejorative connotation, not always deserved. Like mercenaries, the operator too may "save the sum of things for pay." But, as with the soldier, there is a need to question the basis on which the operator acts. Here, Mr. Haig's book raises real questions.

His account of his defense before the Senate of his actions in the Watergate crisis (Watergate does not appear in the index) omits the fateful line to Elliot Richardson about "your commander-in-chief orders you," and in the end reads like a German general officer's post-1945 defense: "I had not been there when the misdeeds took place."

When faced with the need to tell a new and supremely ignorant administration about the realities of East Asian policy, Mr. Haig missed the point. He saw China as a strategic partner able to balance the West's deficit with the Soviet Union. This never has been so. The rapprochement with China relieved the United States of a tremendous strategic burden but it added little to the West's scales. But Mr. Haig doesn't seem to see the larger question, to call in one totalitarian state to balance another totalitarian state is for democracies a very expensive business—witness the bill the USSR presented for the defeat of Hitler.

Mr. Haig's actions (and his account of them) on Nato problems does him credit and does little to give confidence in the judgment of his political masters. On Lebanon, Mr. Haig's instincts were good and certainly better than those of his superiors. But as usual, the emphasis was on dexterous operations, not a sound policy.

On the Falklands issue, Mr. Haig's account has been subjected to Pharisee-like examinations by the British. (*The Times Literary Supplement* has had a two months perils-of-Pauline review of Mr. Haig's role in the Peruvian initiative and the sinking of the *General Belgrano*.) The whole story belongs probably to one of those "future books," but Mr.

Haig's account seems fair, although he fudges somewhat on the actions of Americans at Buenos Aires, the United Nations and Washington. It might be noted that the publisher found it necessary to distribute errata sheets on the Falklands chapter, among others.

Mr. Haig's brief authority as "vicar" (he blames the word on Mr. Paul Nitze) was not a happy time and he gives us a disturbing view of how our foreign policy is made. His criticisms of the present administration's preoccupation with domestic affairs and public relations have been well publicized. Great powers cannot act that way for too long without paying a high price. One Washington luminary (the literate one) when reminded of a treaty commitment, replied, with lines from a 17th century play, "That was long ago and in a distant land. Besides, the wench is dead." Mr. Haig saw clearly what this attitude might mean at the end of the day.

It would be easy to dismiss Mr. Haig as tinkling brass (or, given his civilian status, as the clink of his gold wrist bracelet). To do so would not take account of the problem he faced in an administration that didn't like "furriners." But the baggage Mr. Haig brought to his task was equally heavy. Did he understand all that much about his own country? Consider his almost Marxian view of the American roles in the Korean and Vietnam Wars: he professes to believe that if the middle and upper classes of our society had been involved directly on the battlefields, the United States would have followed different strategies or would "have pursued policies that would have preserved the American position without recourse to arms in the first place." This is sheer mindlessness. If Mr. Haig believes that Mr. Harry Truman or his successors embarked on wars in East Asia with a class view, then he has defined starkly for us the limits of an operator. Messrs. Baker, Deaver and Meese indeed may be "essentially public relations men" but good PR men (Mr. Haig described them as "wizards") know their product and its audience. Caveat may well be the word, and thus warned, we should look behind this tale, "neither autobiography nor formal history."

J.K. HOLLOWAY
Naval War College

Komer, Robert W. *Maritime Strategy Or Coalition Defense?* Cambridge, Mass.: Abt Books, 1984. 116pp. $19

This is a spirited and thought-provoking defense of the Carter administration's "NATO-first" policy (which established the adequacy of US forces for the defense of Western Europe as the *sine qua non* for US military preparedness elsewhere), and a critique of the next Administration's "maritime strategy" that was very much a reaction to the perceived overemphasis of Western European defense at the expense of other areas. Komer, who was Defense Secretary Brown's under secretary for policy, deliberately avoids the historical contrast

between "continental" and "maritime" schools of strategy, and instead stresses the need for closer integration of US and (Western European) allied defenses at the "coalition" level. By this he means greater burden sharing, co-production and standardization of weaponry, and a greater geographical and functional division of intra-coalition defense tasks.

A coalition straregy does not necessarily rule out an emphasis on naval and maritime resources and strategies, of course; indeed, Komer stresses the point that the United States and its allies must maintain powerful naval forces to ensure the credibility of a coalition strategy. Komer's objections center on what he asserts as some of the particular "flaws" of the Reagan administration's maritime emphasis. For one, he believes that the present investment in a 600-ship navy is an unwise diversion of funds from much needed improvements in conventional land and air forces. Twelve aircraft carriers, he claims, are sufficient for the Navy's "proper" role in a coalition war, *sea control*. For another, he holds that talk about horizontal escalation—the expansion of a Soviet-initiated war to areas of Soviet military weakness—is fraught with danger, will, in most cases, be unprofitable, and is unlikely to compel the Soviet aggressors to change their collective mind at the initial point of contact. Frankly, Komer is probably chasing shadows when he castigates the horizontal strategists. Indications are that the concept never progressed beyond exactly that; it is doubtful that it ever carried much conviction with the uniformed Navy, unlike some of the civilian military planners that entered the Department of Defense in 1980. If war does break our with the Soviet Union, the United States should consider and should have the wherewithal to take advantage of Soviet vulnerabilities elsewhere. But the choice of peripheral initiatives should be guided by tactical exigencies and opportunities, not the expectation of deciding the main confrontation in the central theater.

It is also obvious from Komer's argument that the author's real advocacy is a mixed strategy. The coalition portion of this strategy is essentially limited to Western Europe. Closer cooperation with Japan and South Korea is recommended (although the specifics thereof are not nearly made as clear as is the case for Europe), but the defense of the Persian Gulf, the author concedes, will have to be a unilateral US affair. One can quibble whether US support for its Pacific allies, the defense of the Middle East oil region and, of course, the protection of the north Atlantic shipping lanes, requires 12 or 15 aircraft carriers; the unavoidable fact is that some sort of US maritime strategy is needed to underwrite both US unilateralism and coalition warfare.

This is a well-written, thought-provoking book. Komer brings to bear many years of practical experience in the making and implementing of US security policy, and his advice warrants critical evalua-

tion. Komer's real world contrast between coalition defense and his maritime strategy is probably somewhat overstated. But, then, advocates must sometimes make their case larger than life.

JAN S. BREEMER
Reston, Virginia

Mayer, Martin. *The Diplomats*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. 1983. 417pp. $17.95

Martin Mayer has written an entertaining and informative book about the people who make up the diplomatic services of the world in the latter part of the twentieth century. The author, who has previously performed the same function for the denizens of Wall Street and Madison Avenue, as well as for lawyers and bankers, is not only a writer with an easy prose style, but a thorough researcher and an indefatigable interviewer as well. The publisher's claim that Mr. Mayer spent five years traveling to foreign ministries, embassies, consulates and agencies in twenty countries to compile this study is entirely credible. Along the way, the author met and eventually married a young lady who was then serving as a State Department official, a circumstance that can only have enhanced his understanding of how the American brand of diplomacy actually operates.

In *The Diplomats*, Mr. Mayer devotes special attention to the problems of training the young professionals. His coverage of two of the very few diplomatic academies which endeavor to do this for foreigners, as well as their own nationals (Austria and Cameroon), is particularly interesting. There are, of course, many academic institutions in the United States and in Europe which offer a broad education to prospective diplomats, but Mr. Mayer focuses instead on technical training schools, which are designed to assist their students to apply their academic knowledge to dealing with the mechanisms and practices of modern diplomacy. In so doing, he demonstrates a high degree of empathy with the young people involved, particularly those from less developed nations. As a kind of by-product of his worldwide investigation of diplomacy, the author also provides two special case studies, one on the Foreign Agricultural Service of the United States and the other on the Israeli Foreign Ministry. Both are worthy of the attention given them and benefit from the sympathetic approach Mr. Mayer takes to their particular problems. The sections on multilateral diplomacy, as seen at the United Nations and in the Brussels headquarters of the European Community are also well worth reading.

Not surprisingly in a book of over 400 pages, there are a few items of unintentional misinformation as well as information. On organizational matters, these are with one exception all very minor. In that instance, however, Mr. Mayer comments on more than one occasion on what he considers to be the close relationship between Labor Attaches in American Embassies and the Central Intelligence Agency, via the AFL/CIO.

This is not only incorrect, but unfair and harmful to the Attaches. The AFL/CIO, to which the Attaches must be fully acceptable, is well aware of the damage that could be done to their effectiveness by any identification with intelligence activities. Accordingly, although as Mr. Mayer relates, the AFL/CIO is militantly anti-Communist, it is also militantly opposed to countenancing any association of "its Attaches" with an intelligence agency. One hopes that any future edition of this otherwise well conceived and well executed treatment of the diplomatic profession will correct this unfortunate misunderstanding.

Finally, from time to time Mr. Mayer feels called upon to pronounce on a number of current political and diplomatic controversies in ways that will not be applauded by all of his readers. At times his eagerness to let a breath of fresh air into stale arguments reveals perceptive insights into current realities. At other times, however, even a very felicitous style cannot conceal a less than complete understanding of the nature of the world's problems and the difficulties facing any serious efforts to resolve them.

Mr. Mayer's essays into more complicated policy dilemmas are no less open to critical analysis. The book remains, therefore, a curious mixture of perceptive insights and somewhat unrealistic suggestions for improvement. This is regrettable because his obvious lapses on some points tend to undermine his credibility on other, more limited matters, where his off-beat advice is often well founded. The lively style in which the book is written contributes to this result, moreover, because Mr. Mayer—in his understandable desire to be readable—occasionally slides over from an engaging irreverence into the kind of snide remark that could make the serious reader take his views less seriously than they should be.

EDWARD L. KILLHAM
Naval War College

Barnet, Richard J. *The Alliance: America-Europe-Japan, Makers of the Postwar World.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983. 511pp. $19.95

A brilliant analysis of global international relationships from the mid-1940s to the early 1980s, *The Alliance* is narrative political-economic history at its best, showing how the victorious United States shaped the postwar world by making defeated Germany and Japan into "protectorates" and exhausted Britain and France into virtual dependencies through the Nato system. Though the author is a master at weaving together the multifaceted story of this "alliance," he cannot decide whether it was preconceived, "surely one of the most ingenious political inventions of our century," or merely opportunistic, "a compromise between the liberal vision of a world economic order and . . . 'the gospel of national security.' "

His narrative tends to support the latter conclusion that, indeed, compromise became the (reluctant) *modus operandi* of the succession of US

presidents from Truman to Reagan, with each compromise further diluting the actual inventions. Barnet offers no historian's judgment of how the United States might have done better over these four decades nor how it might have shaped the future of its allies from the late 1940s. He shows America's intentions at several stages, how and why things went wrong, and how particular problems might have been handled differently.

"Creation," one of three divisions in the book, reveals how the revolutionary attempt in the late 1940s to deindustrialize Germany and Japan gave way to the reconcentration of economic wealth in both countries. This provided stable buffers against the Soviet Union, a process greatly stimulated by the Korean War.

"A Time of Wrenching" of the Alliance followed, due in no small part to the policies of Dwight Eisenhower's secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, described as "a rumpled bear of a man with a drooping look, serious, suspicious, and self-righteous, the perfect foil for the popular general who hated war." With new emphasis on massive retaliation, Dulles tried to invent a Communist threat in the Middle East and weaken Britain's traditional role there, which prompted the Suez war of 1956 and did great harm to the Nato partnership. And when the French suspected Dulles of trying to create an American security system in the Far East, they pulled out of the European Defense Community. This led to West German rearmament. Nato had no credible military strategy in the 1950s as the generals were looking to refight World War II using nuclear weapons, an impossibility demonstrated by the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The Kennedy-Johnson years only accelerated the decline of American prestige within the alliance, with the strong European economy undercutting the American challenge of US based multinational corporations, the Japanese keeping out US companies altogether.

The "unraveling" of the Alliance accompanied the Russo-American *detente*, which Dean Acheson had foreseen as imperiling the unity of the West and diluting US influence in Europe, based as it was on its anti-Soviet military presence. But Henry Kissinger of the Nixon administration wanted *detente* in order to achieve stability and order inside America and throughout the world. Domination of the world market was shifting to Europe and Japan by 1971, requiring aggressive US economic policies such as promoting relations with China to offset the spectacular Japanese gains. The October 1973 war, the oil embargo and the 1974 crisis in Cyprus all further undermined American influence, which reeled even more so under the undisciplined foreign policy of the Carter regime—battered in general by the energy crisis and in particular by the 1979-80 upheavals in Iran and Afghanistan. Into the breech has stepped Ronald Reagan, whose tough words and exaggerated fears of the Russian threat have only served to frighten

Europe further, bury *detente* and lead to a new round of peace movements.

Whither The Alliance? Barnet does uot guess at this. He has merely told the tale as *he sees* it. At the very least, his account should help to educate American leaders to past US folly and make them more sensitive to global realities. As a historian, Barnet is neither a traditionalist (the United States is never wrong) nor a revisionist (the United States is never right). What he really seems to be saying is that in fact the postwar era has come to an end and, thus, also should any policy assumptions based on the initial postwar political arrangements. A new American world view is badly needed, perhaps to restore the Alliance with a fresh set of assumptions. First, however, we must brush away the cobwebs of rhetoric and bad history. Mr. Barnet has contributed materially to this end in his meaty book.

CLARK G. REYNOLDS
Charleston, S.C.

Beckwith, Charlie A., and Knox, Donald. *Delta Force*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983. 300pp. $14.95

Big dumb grunt.

Open-faced honesty, simplicity. What you see is what you get. One of the modern day adventurers who show up in long-range reconnaissance units or special forces outfits—long on guts and bravado. A man with the single-mindedness of St. Bernard, the rescuing cleric.

Only Beckwith's cloth is camouflage, his missionary endeavor: to design, build and train a unique Army unit for saving hostage souls. A chivalrous knight of nobility, sophistication and Machiavellian plots he is not. More like an NFL fullback of the fifties with a pair of brass knucks and alum on his jersey sleeves, alternatively cussing and spitting at the opposing line, the officials, the coaches, his own teammates as he plows his body into the stack on the next play. No O.J. Simpson here, no gliding to the outside or cutting back across the grain when the hole crashes shut or never appears.

Beckwith's forté is blood, sweat, tears, cheers, and a lot of wishful thinking. He exhibits a child-like fascination for the British SAS, a special operations unit he served with early in his Army career. Beckwith then spends more than the next decade of straight-ahead hammering on the Army for the need of a unique Army unit, fashioned in the British mold—at times he sounds like a teenager in his emulation—to be used in terrorist hostage situations.

There is good news: Beckwith succeeds, Delta Force will be formed. Immediately, however, there are internal Army squabblings, jealousies, plots and counter-plots to thwart Delta Force, or to have other Army units take on the new mission assigned to Delta Force. There is yet more good news: Beckwith succeeds again, Delta Force is intact, potent, and has access to the requisite-caliber soldiers to man and train the elite hostage rescue unit.

The timing is well-nigh providential as Beckwith is finishing almost 2 years of training Delta Force, when

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Khomeini seizes 53 hostages in the American Embassy in Tehran in November 1979. After weeks of study, confusion, and indecision in Washington, Beckwith sees the fulfillment of nearly 20 years of effort—Delta Force is given the Tehran hostage rescue mission.

Now comes the bad news, the salami sandwich part. The array of forces includes the Navy aircraft carrier *Kitty Hawk*; a squadron of 8 Navy RH-53D helicopters; a Marine squadron of pilots and crewmen to man and fly the Navy helicopters; a flight of USAF MC-130s to carry Delta Force to Desert One; Delta Force (93 men) to rescue 50 hostages held in the chancellery; a separate force of 13 men put together and trained in Germany to rescue 3 hostages held in the Foreign Ministry Building near the chancellery; a USAF flight of EC-130s to refuel the RH-53Ds at Desert One; a 12-man Army roadwatch team to secure Desert One for the 130s and the choppers; a 12-man Army team of drivers to drive the trucks transporting Delta Force from their final hide site into Tehran and the American Embassy compound; and the overall commander of the rescue mission positioned at Masirah Island off Oman. Strike One.

The above mélange is to arrive at Desert One, the choppers arriving last after a 700-mile night low-level leg over hazardous terrain; refuel the choppers; transfer Delta Force to the choppers for a 200-mile pre-dawn leg to a hide site. There is a 30-minute timing window. Strike Two.

At Desert One an Air Force colonel is designated Desert One Commander (whatever that means); Beckwith has command of Delta Force and all other Army personnel proceeding on to Tehran; and a Marine colonel has command of the 8 RH-53Ds flying in from the *Kitty Hawk*, which command is passed to the Marine lieutenant colonel when the colonel's RH-53D develops instrument problems and returns to *Kitty Hawk*. Strike Three.

Desert One, knowingly, has been sited astraddle a highway. The 130s land, and immediately a Mercedes bus appears, followed by a gasoline truck which is promptly dispatched by an antitank weapon, a third Iranian vehicle appears and escapes. Beckwith is cussing and spitting. And anxious. The sandstorm delays the 6 choppers that finally make it an hour and a half late, and then there are 5 as the crew of one RH-53D say they have a hydraulic problem. The ball game is over. Beckwith packs it in. The subsequent crash and tragic loss are anticlimatic.

And now comes confession time—the book. It is impossible not to love Beckwith, to ache with him, to empathize. His reach exceeded his grasp, and that is to be admired and cheered. The tragedy—and very deeply disturbing factor—is that not one leader up the chain of command knew it. Where are the combat veterans who understand how to plan and execute a combat raid over 900 miles into hostile territory? Where are the tough, military minds who understand men and machines, how

many are required, and how to drive them to mission accomplishment?

The lessons learned from Desert One are legion. Not one is new:

- Perhaps most importantly of all, the mission statement must be clear. Was the mission to rescue 53 hostages, 50? Or to rescue as many as possible? Beckwith aborts when he learns one RH-53D has hydraulic problems, leaving 5, and "the mission" requires 6. Five RH-53Ds could have carried the full complement required to rescue the 50 hostages in the chancellery. Or one RH-53D could have been recycled to pick up the remaining 13 man team trained to rescue the remaining 3 hostages in the Foreign Ministry Building. Or 13 men could have been distributed over 5 choppers (the things that were done by choppers in Vietnam that were "impossible"!). Or . . . Or . . . Or . . . .

- A raid, which is a combat operation, must have a single commander, on scene, to influence the action.

- A combat operation involving all 4 Services operating aircraft and helicopters at night over 700 miles of unfamiliar and hazardous terrain cannot be held to a precision time schedule. There must be backup helicopters and alternate plans for most reasonable eventualities.

Long on guts. Short on smarts. Read Delta Force for how *not* to do it if—God forbid—the need arises again.

MYRL ALLINDER
Colonel, US Marine Corps

Knox, MacGregor. *Mussolini Unleashed, 1939-1941; Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy's Last War.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982. 385pp. $29.50

Over the years, Mussolini has acquired a reputation as a swaggering, almost well-intentioned buffoon, a comic-opera dictator quite incapable of the thoughts and deeds of a Hitler, the personification of 20th-century evil.

A reputation thoroughly undeserved, says MacGregor Knox in his important reassessment of the apogee of *Il Duce*'s career. Mussolini lacked the means that the German state and economy put at Hitler's disposal; he may not have shared Hitler's racialist obsessions. Nevertheless, previous interpretations of Mussolini's regime "have tended to underestimate its brutality, the vigor and extent of its expansionist ambition, and the degree of domestic support its aims enjoyed until their price became fully apparent."

In building his own case, Knox takes issue: with the academic historians, whose propensity for underestimating the force of irrational motives and actions, he thinks, has led them to underestimate Mussolini's drive to achieve his grandoise ambitions; with such Italian liberals as the philosopher Benedetto Croce, who saw *Il Duce*'s regime as a historical aberration, odious but ephemeral; with Mussolini's leading biographer, Renzo de Felice, who for all his penetrating insights into his subject, is inclined to see what is most unadmirable about the dictator

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as most un-Italian; with some British students of fascist Italy, for whom wit and sarcasm pass for scholarly inquiry; with those political scientists whose passion for such abstractions as "totalitarianism" has caused them to stuff Mussolini into ill-fitting analytical pigeonholes; and finally, with Italian Marxists, who peer at Mussolini through Leninist lenses and see the errand boy of faceless, capitalist big shots.

In 1939 and 1940, Knox contends, in North Africa and in the attack on Greece, Mussolini demonstrated that his goals were not so different from those of his brutal and convenient friend to the north. Piggybacking on the successes of a resurgent Germany, Mussolini in 1940, launched his long-pondered assault on the Mediterranean position of the Western imperial powers. *Il Duce*'s expansionist urge, Knox argues, was no less dynamic than Hitler's quest for *lebensraum*; and like the German dictator's attack on Poland in 1939, Mussolini's decision for war in 1940 derived from his own vision, not from domestic social or political pressures: he wasn't pushed, he jumped.

Thus Knox convincingly differs with the fashionable "social imperialism" thesis, which argues that modern states as disparate as Great Britain, the United States and Argentina go to war principally as a means of allaying domestic unrest. If Mussolini's ambitions for Italy and himself ended in disaster, it was not for want of trying. For instance, the Italian Navy entered the war with 113 submarines, the largest such force in the world, save the Soviet Union's.

Knox doesn't attempt to make Mussolini's regime an Italian version of Nazi Germany. The vital distinction between them was that Hitler sought world mastery; Mussolini was content with an Italian nationalist utopia.

This is not only an important book. Written with verve and wit, it is also delightful to read. "Hitler's foreign policy and military subordinates," Knox says, "rushed about like eager spaniels, each bearing the Führer a bone." A rather startling characterization for the likes of Ribbentrop and Jodl, but very apt indeed.

J.E. TALBOTT
University of California, Santa Barbara

Geraghty, Tony. *Who Dares Wins the Special Air Service, 1950 to the Falklands*. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1983. 320pp. £11.95

Ladd, James D. *SBS: The Invisible Raiders*. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1982. 283pp. £10.95

The origins and accomplishments of the Special Air Service and Special Boat Service are obscure and often the subject of violent polemics by both supporters and detractors. Supporters feel that these two organizations are useful silent servants of the state. Detractors assert that they are rogue elephants and a collection of neofascist thugs. Supporters argue that the SAS and SBS are vitally necessary to undertake missions unsuited to the capabilities of regular

forces while opponents believe that these elite formations in fact accomplish little and are more trouble than they are worth.

Tony Geraghty's history of the SAS and James D. Ladd's study of the SBS are popular histories. Both authors admire their subjects and do not seriously question the *raison d'etre* of these special formations. Moreover, there are numerous gaps in the narrative. For example neither author provides much coherent data concerning special operations in Northern Ireland, and Ladd's work is especially difficult to read because of its poor writing style and overly episodic treatment of the subject matter.

Both books on the other hand are useful. They do provide information on the origins of the SAS and SBS. They offer concise descriptions of many SAS and SBS operations and describe in some detail current methods of recruitment and training. They do not, of course, answer the broader questions concerning the proper roles and ultimate value of such forces but they do at least provide some hard evidence for an informed judgment.

STEVEN ROSS
Naval War College

Rings, Werner. *Life with the Enemy: Collaboration and Resistance in Hitler's Europe 1939-1945*. New York: Doubleday, 1982. 351pp. $17.95

Why a book on collaboration? Because even if collaboration is an issue often skirted, it happened. It is easy to write on the romance of resistance, but collaboration with the enemy normally is buried because of memories of betrayal and shame brought about by fellow countrymen. Werner Rings tries to explain what happened after the Germans conquered Europe in World War II.

The German occupation of Europe brought out the best and the worst of each nation's population. The question, "do I collaborate or resist?" was easily answered by a lot of people, as can be seen by the decisions to collaborate made by many in Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, France, Poland, and the other countries. Indeed, at first there was a general readiness to collaborate.

Rings paints superb pictures of opportunists, such as Quisling, the Norwegian; Mussert, the Dutchman; Degrelle, the Belgian; and others who attempted vainly to convince the Germans that they indeed embraced the goals of Nazism and the ideals embodied by the Party.

According to Rings, there were four types of collaboration. The first, the neutral or "I conform" type, arose from an acceptance by the individual that because of circumstances he could not change things. In the second type, or "unconditional collaboration," the individual totally accepted the enemy's principles and ideals. The third type, "conditioned collaboration," occurred when the individual only endorsed *some* Nazi principles and cooperated accordingly. The fourth type of collaboration was "tactical." Here an individual collaborated despite his hatred

of National Socialism because it prevented the murder of fellow countrymen or it fulfilled a political idea in opposition to Nazism. This type of collaboration was really resistance in disguise and was a part of the fight to rid the country of the enemy.

Rings also discussed the role Resistance played in removing the enemy. Once again, the author describes four types. The first was the "symbolic" resistor. The work of such people he sees typified by the French Navy when it scuttled the fleet at Toulon in 1942. A second type of opponent, a "polemic" resistor, opposed the enemy through protest or through organizing protests. Such a person of course had to possess legally acquired power. "Defense" resistance was the third type. Here individuals sided with those in danger, or rallied to those who strove to protect those persons. Solidarity was the key to this resistance. The fourth type of resistance was "offensive." Rings subtitles this section "I Fight to the Death." He tells of individuals taking the fight to the enemy, harassing him with guerrilla tactics, and suffering high casualties. This seems a world apart from the other types of resistance but yet it interlocked with them. But with this pursuit of freedom came a staggering cost in lives as a result of reprisals by the occupying power. Often in the search for a few the enemy would kill thousands.

Finally, Rings deals with the unconquered Allies. To them, he says, the resistance movement and its contribution to victory was simply a side issue. The author speculates that they held this view because professional soldiers had a low opinion of guerrilla warfare.

The book is a well researched, referenced, and documented testimony that collaboration existed alongside resistance. Read it for enlightenment because history has a tendency to repeat itself.

JAMES A. BOYLESS
Captain, USAF
USAF Academy

Webb, James. *A Country Such as This.* New York: Doubleday, 1983. 534pp. $17.95

While openly embraced by reviewers, James Webb's first two novels sent shock waves of protest through the well-filled ranks of his readership. An explanation for this is not hard to find: the novice's flexible command of language, his ability to recreate the speech of fighting men, and his evocation of the camaraderie that comes of hardship appealed to a literary community always on the prowl for new talent. The books were vehicles for an exploration of controversial, difficult questions about military life, and Webb's tenacious tackling of those questions on terms all his own—terms that bowed to neither the naval establishment nor its detractors—did him the double service of offending both.

Those who sympathized with the antiwar movement of the sixties did not swallow the "moral" of *Fields of Fire*, that theirs was not the right to oppose a war they could not under-

stand; and graduates of the US Naval Academy who read *A Sense of Honor* did not like its portrayal of certain midshipmen as dirty-talking, sadistic swaggerers. But if any of the condemnation filtered through to Webb he simply ignored it, for in his third novel, *A Country Such as This*, he shows no signs of accommodating his critics.

Here the scope of events is expanded beyond that of the first two books. The story, opening before the Korean War, traces the divergent paths three Annapolis graduates follow as the vicissitudes of American life carry them through the world-weary, post-Watergate era. Each man is highly gifted in his own way. Joe Dingenfelder, a bright, fastidious Jew, is sent by the Air Force to MIT to study aeronautical engineering, and at the height of his career is researching the Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile at Vandenberg Air Force Base. The Navy pilot Red Lesczynski, a Polish American at once gentle and fiercely patriotic, becomes a Blue Angel and eventually the exec of a squadron of F-4 Phantoms flying bombing missions over North Vietnam. The most complex character is the marine Judd Smith, a Virginia mountain boy of Scots and Indian blood, a foul-mouthed woman chaser whose blind courage as leader of a rifle platoon in Korea earns him the Medal of Honor. After a job with the FBI he dons the robes of a reborn preacher in his home town of Bear Mountain Gap.

Obviously to do justice to the book's broad sweep of time and space, the sort of questioning that has become Webb's stock-in-trade must cover more ground than his earlier writings did, and this leaves *A Country Such as This* vulnerable to the lack of focus that plagues such "epic" novels. If there is one concern that moves to the forefront, it is that of loyalty to one's country. What is it, what are its limitations, and does it take priority over family obligations? As the men and their wives awaken to the political realities of an America thrown from the cradle of the fifties into the whirlwind of social upheaval of the sixties, the answers become less clear-cut—it becomes necessary to define the parameter of the issue, and to this end Webb pits Judd against Joe's wife, Dorothy.

Dorothy is an Austrian Jew who fled the Nazi terror as a child and came to America. Filled with the bitterness of that experience, she sees the weapons race with the Soviets, black oppression, and the Vietnam War as different symptoms of the same disease: fascism. Ideologically and temperamentally estranged from Joe and his Academy friends—they are good-natured and conservative, she spiteful, argumentative, and radical—Dorothy leaves her husband and children without regrets and wins a seat in Congress as antiwar fever is spreading across the country.

Judd, hoping to do something about the growing disrespect shown the American flag, runs for Congress on the Republican ticket and wins. His fight against the liberals is to no avail—America pulls out of the war

and Nixon resigns his office under pressure. But despite a gnawing sense of helplessness, Judd holds his head high in the belief that, whatever one's opposition to the reigning political ethos, "loyalty to people and culture were the key to life."

Webb leaves not a minute's doubt which of these two characters is morally superior and to whose opinions he himself subscribes. Judd's political activities are an expression of loyalty to country; Dorothy's are a belated eruption of peut-up bile. Judd is handsome and manly; Dorothy ugly and unfeminine. He is faithful in his way to his family; she abandons hers.

Such blatant manipulation of the reader's sympathies can do no other than smother any attempt at nuance. Judd makes unexplained, passing remarks about people, events, and movements that go against his grain: the Vietnam Moratorium has "the undeniable media impact of a Hitlerian rally," McGovern is "the whiny South Dakota senator," and at the sight of bag ladies in Washington, DC, he mutters, "Women's lib hits the hoboes." These are, presumably, impressionistic strokes meant to create an image of the deterioration of American society in the sixties and seventies, but they are too general, sarcastic, and facile to do the trick.

What gets bypassed in the end is the heart of the tumultuous problems of that period. Red claims that if the Vietnam War was worth fighting it deserved an all-out effort—alright, but no one questions the if. The protestors are to Judd the spoiled spawn of the baby boom years who never experienced war, yet he ignores the fact that many of them were indeed veterans. Attributing America's waning belief in itself primarily to antiwar activism, Judd skirts the issue of Watergate's own contribution: he dismisses that piece of foul play as merely "symptomatic of political abuses that have gone on throughout eternity."

It is unfortunate that Webb did not turn his attention away from characters debating and spouting their homespun philosophies to concentrate more on the Korean and Vietnam War sections. His own experience as a marine infantry commander in Vietnam has left him well equipped to picture a youthful America's brave but naive sons set loose in the dark and ancient labyrinth of Asian war. And, after all, showing the reader is always better than telling—or, in this case, lecturing— him.

CONNIE BUCHANAN
US Naval Institute

Lombard-Hobson, Sam. *A Sailor's War.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. 175pp. $12.95

A Sailor's War is a personal account of the naval career of Sam Lombard-Hobson, starting with his days as a cadet at the Royal Naval College at Dartmouth and ending with his last wartime command as a lieutenant commander in 1944.

Those who love the sea, those who are interested in the differences between the Royal Navy and the American Navy, and those who just

like a stirring account of life in small British warships in World War II will all find this book interesting. Other readers, even without these special interests will also find it hard to put down.

Sam Lombard-Hobson was obviously a fine British naval officer. He seemed to have a knack for finding himself and his ships in interesting and dangerous situations and then extricating himself and his ships in equally interesting ways. His descriptions of these events are the heart of the book.

Lombard-Hobson had as one of his executive officers (first lieutenants in the Royal Navy) Nicholas Monsarrat, probably with Melville, one of the finest writers of the sea in the last two centuries. Monsarrat drew heavily on his experiences under Lombard-Hobson in writing his book *The Cruel Sea*. He was instrumental in persuading Lombard-Hobson to write of his experiences, and expected to write the foreword for this book. Monsarrat's early death deprived him of this opportunity, and his widow Ann ably completed this task.

Lombard-Hobson's account begins with an interesting description of life as a cadet at Dartmouth in the late 1920s. There were parallels with the American Naval Academy in that a certain amount of physical and mental hazing took place in these years, and physical development and athletics were stressed. It is easy to see where the British Navy developed one of its fundamental differences from the American Navy. At Dartmouth all cadets were encouraged to "mess about" in boats, to make mistakes, to run aground, to fall overboard, all with no questions asked. In contrast, such actions at the US Naval Academy would have brought demerits, disqualification for using boats, and many other penalties. These attitudes carried over into commissioned service in the two navies. As a young officer in the British Navy Lombard-Hobson describes escapades where he wrecked the captain's pinnace, many times left the ship without leave, and in general lived the life of a happy-go-lucky young naval officer. Further, the reader is left with the impression that his life style seemed to have been about average for young British naval officers. Again in contrast, an American naval officer caught in any one of Lombard-Hobson's escapades would have had his career ended quickly.

It is to the credit of the British Navy system that Lombard-Hobson survived his early career, including running a destroyer aground, for he became a splendid commanding officer of small ships. Nicholas Monsarrat, before his death, described Lombard-Hobson as: "tall, austere, highly efficient, totally self-disciplined, and devoted to his chosen career. He ran his ship, which was the best-kept, best-drilled, best-behaved corvette in Harwich Flotilla, with an unrelenting grip."

Lombard-Hobson's various assignments and commands enabled him to describe in fascinating detail the British Navy during peacetime, the

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battle of the Atlantic, the retreat from Europe, the naval war in the Mediterranean, and the spread of the conflict into the Aegean. His account ends with the virtual loss of his command, the destroyer *Rockwood*, and his subsequent assignment ashore. Later Lombard-Hobson continued his naval career for many years, but none of his subsequent assignments, even that of ADC to the Queen, could have been as fascinating as his sea commands of small ships.

The events he describes range across a broad spectrum and all are unique. In the Atlantic, his ship came upon a life raft in which several survivors were floating. All were taken aboard except for one who presented unique problems. The young, naked, oil-covered girl was too exhausted to climb up the ship's sea ladder. Several willing volunteers climbed down to the raft to help her, but were unable to get a satisfactory grip on her slippery figure. Finally she was hoisted aboard in a canvas bag, and when she emerged from it she leaned back against the forecastle bulkhead to regain her strength. The result was a perfect outline in oil of an attractive female body on the bulkhead. The crew refused to clean off the oil, and over a period of months it solidified. Even longer preservation was assured by the construction of a glass frame around it.

The description of evacuation of British troops from the ports of France is the British Navy and Lombard-Hobson at their best. The small ships of the British Navy were superb, and the author describes their feats in simple, understandable terms which make the tragic event come alive. This sequence alone "makes" the book.

One of the author's stories illustrates another difference between the two navies. When his ship entered the port of Algiers in which Admiral Cunningham, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, was located, the author decided to put on a good show for his senior. He manned the topside of his ship with all of his men in perfect uniforms except for shirts. He alone wore a shirt, Admiral Cunningham promptly sent for him, and castigated him for being out of uniform. Lombard-Hobson still had the presence of mind to observe Admiral Cunningham's manner and his office, and his resulting description of the encounter is priceless. The only item on the admiral's desk was a telescope; not a paper was in sight. Again, what a contrast with our Navy. No American admiral would have bothered to leave the business of the entire Mediterranean to observe the entry of a small ship in such great detail, and a mound of paper work would have been in evidence. There is a lesson somewhere here; people are important, not paper work.

Like Monsarrat's description of the author, this book seems a bit on the lean and austere side. What color and detail there is is excellent, but the reader might opt for more. Interesting to note is how Lombard-Hobson disagreed with his model,

Monsarrat. Where Monsarrat found the sea "cruel," Lombard-Hobson described it as "fascinating." The 175 pages of this book are all too few, and the reader will hope that Lombard-Hobson will try again. He is a superb story teller.

WILLIAM P. MACK
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Whitley, M.J. *Destroyer! German Destroyers in World War II.* London: Arms and Armour Press, 1983. 310pp. £12.95

This compact book should be in the library of anyone interested in destroyer design and operations. While there have been articles on German destroyers and torpedo boats, this is the first comprehensive English language accounting of those that participated in World War II (in German terminology, "torpedo boat" meant small destroyer).

The book is organized into three distinct sections. In the first 90 pages, Whitley covers design and construction. Here he provides ship plans and profiles as well as propulsion and armament diagrams, and he deals in detail with all critical design aspects. In the next 167 pages, he covers destroyer and torpedo boat operations from 1937 through the disposition of the few survivors in 1945. There are appropriate situation maps and numerous photographs of the ships. In this final part he provides technical data on each class of torpedo boat and destroyer, summary operational histories of all 40 destroyers and the like number of torpedo boats—including names of commanding officers—armament details, boiler comparisons, minelaying successes, ships sunk, and a relevant bibliography.

There is a bit of a mystery about the author, M.J. Whitley. There is no biography, not even a first name. One assumes Mr. Whitley is English. It is clear that he is technically oriented and obviously he had access to the German design and operational records. The book is a bit uneven since detailed descriptions of planned improvements are often followed by uncertainty as to which ships actually received them. It appears that the author made little effort to interview any of the surviving German design staff or those officers and men who actually participated in the operations he describes. Such additional effort might have moved this fine work into the category of truly great.

The big German destroyers, starting with the Type 34 of 1934, were conventionally arranged with five 127 mm single mounts and eight 21 inch torpedoes plus assorted 37 and 20 mm guns which steadily grew in number during the course of the war. At 3,100 tons and over, full load, these ships were far larger than their British contemporaries. They even exceeded the later US *Fletchers* which had similar armament. The Type 36A mounted the 5.9" (150 mm), the largest destroyer gun at that time anywhere in the world. But, it proved so unsuccessful as to force a return to the 127 mm in the later designs. Handling ammunition and accurate training

of the larger mounts proved difficult tasks which were not compensated for by the desired greater hitting power. The Germans also took the world lead in going to extremely high pressure steam propulsion—up to 1,600 psi. This reduced machinery weight but resulted in endless grief in terms of system reliability and maintenance.

The earliest of these destroyers were commissioned just before the war started in 1939 so the inexperienced German Navy had little operational experience with them before the fighting began. They were employed initially for minelaying in the shallow waters of the North Sea off the English east coast rather than with the German fleet. Ten destroyers were lost—almost the entire Type 36A class—at Narvik in the 1940 invasion of Norway during several desperate actions. The book covers the destroyers' and torpedo boats' actions against British destroyers and cruisers ranging from the coast of France to the frigid waters of the Norwegian Sea. Rough seas in the operating areas seem to have been a given condition. For this reason their efforts around the Norwegian North Cape to intercept Allied convoys moving in and out of Murmansk were unsuccessful. The author also covers the final efforts in the Baltic, where all available craft were employed to move large numbers of German troops and civilians out from under the rapidly advancing Russians.

The German destroyers did not live up to their designers' expectations and in many instances were frustratingly ineffective. In their defense, one must say that they operated in almost universally poor weather, that their fire control systems and radars were not the best and that they were up against an increasingly powerful enemy whose unending air raids made repair difficult. In action against surface ships, the German destroyers and torpedo boats relied heavily on torpedoes with almost no success (less than one percent of those fired, hit). One wonders what similar engagements would be like today with gun and ammunition handling automated and fire control systems.

Destroyers! covers a navy which, at destroyer level, never fought the US Navy, and yet the final German steam-driven designs, the Types 41/36C were generally comparable to the US *Gearings*. The Germans did, however, operate in areas where we intend to go. This book makes good reading both for the history it conveys and its lessons for the future.

R.F. CROSS III
Alexandria, Virginia

Dunlop, Richard. *Donovan, America's Master Spy*. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1982. 562pp. $19.95

Richard Dunlop is particularly qualified to write the Donovan biography. He not only worked for the OSS in the Burma and Greek theaters during World War II, but he also examined a multitude of recently declassified documents and interviewed many of Donovan's asso-

ciates. Dunlop's personal association with Donovan in the OSS coupled with the author's experience in the intelligence community has enabled him to portray accurately the men, history, and politics that shaped the Central Intelligence Agency. This book should be particularly interesting to intelligence buffs for four reasons.

Bill Donovan was a brilliant, dynamic anti-trust lawyer who, anticipating the United States involvement in World War II, launched an aggressive campaign to establish a United Stares "central intelligence agency." Facing intense opposition from the military intelligence chiefs, government departments, and agencies, Donovan persisted in his efforts by hounding his old law school classmate, President Roosevelt, through the White House back door. FDR weighed the political implications of establishing a new intelligence agency and finally bowed to Donovan's pressure by appointing him as the Coordinator of Information in July 1941. Donovan expanded this office into strategic services in 1942, and launched a new effort to retain the OSS after the war as a permanent intelligence service.

America's Master Spy illustrates the political arena that enabled Donovan to establish the OSS. President Roosevelt felt that Ambassador to Britain Joseph P. Kennedy sympathized with the cadre of English noblemen who preferred accommodation with Hitler rather than war. Roosevelt did not think this was Churchill's view so he dispatched Bill Donovan as a secret presidential emissary to determine Britain's survivability. Happy with reports from his "secret legs" that the British were "strong and determined," FDR became increasingly receptive to Donovan's views on national intelligence.

Dunlop outlines the contentious relationship between the OSS and the FBI and Donovan and Hoover, that is remembered by the intelligence community to this day. Donovan, head of the criminal division, tried to fire the "young upstart" acting FBI director for wire tapping. Hoover was retained as the FBI director when he notified Attorney General Stone that the FBI had enough damaging information in the files to sink the Republican candidates in the upcoming presidential election. In 1952 Hoover may have given Donovan the final blow in their longstanding personality clash. As William R. Corson suggests in *The Armies of Ignorance* (New York: Dial Press, 1977), Hoover leaked damaging personal information on Donovan to President Eisenhower as Donovan was being considered for the position of Director of Central Intelligence. Donovan was never appointed to the organization he developed.

The volume provides the reader an insight into the OSS organization and operations. He hired scholars and college professors on every subject. The OSS established a worldwide information network complete with field offices and agents. Research and development was charged with

creating everything from improved communications to special explosives. Every walk of life was considered at Donovan's desk to support covert operations. Not only was intelligence collection and analysis important but Donovan sensed a need to conduct guerrilla warfare in the face of the technologically advanced and trained militaries of Japan and Germany. He explained to FDR, " . . . the United States is still a bush league club. We must play a bush league game, stealing the ball and killing the umpire." Not only was the OSS an intelligence unit, but it was a premiere fighting force during World War II.

While the author covers the life of Bill Donovan more thoroughly than Ford's *Donovan of the OSS* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), Dunlop is somewhat sketchy in the OSS historical and organizational details. Furthermore, Dunlop treats Donovan as a hero throughout the biography without significant mention of faults. Donovan's womanizing may have contributed to his lifetime of largely unsuccessful political campaigns. Yet today's national intelligence structure can probably be attributed to FDR's successful harnessing of Donovan's ambitious and aggressive personality.

CHRISTOPHER MACMURRAY
Lieutenant Commander, US Navy
Defense Intelligence College

Hoffman, Fritz and Hoffman, Olga Mingo. *Sovereignty in Dispute, The Falklands/Malvinas 1493-1982.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984. 194pp. $20

This work is one of a series of Westview special studies on Latin America. The preface gives notice of an Argentine perspective both in source material and inclination of authors who are historians by profession.

The authors do a good job with the questions of national pride and deep-rooted precedents of international law which precipitated the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War. From the start they come down on the Argentine side, but bias does not ruin the book—other flaws nearly do. The book founders badly in dealing with the geopolitical and maritime significance of the islands. This flaw weakens the analysis of the present situation and clouds aspects of policy which would otherwise interest readers.

The authors do not adequately deal with the Falklands/Malvinas issue in terms of political geography. They acknowledge the historic utility of British south seas presence in the Falklands, as when it served as an English foot in the door to the Pacific, but virtually ignore the potential utility of the Malvinas Islands for Argentina. Accordingly, there is no discussion of how an Argentine presence in the islands might figure in British-Argentine competition and antagonisms over territorial claims just to the south, in the Antarctic Peninsula. Only one sentence is devoted to the nearby Argentine-Chilean dispute over the Beagle Channel. Nothing at all is said

of Argentine impulses to contain Chilean expansionism in the South Atlantic nor of the relevant Argentine-Chilean controversy over delimitation of Atlantic and Pacific waters in the southern reaches of the hemisphere. To put it more succinctly, the authors fail to see how Argentine sovereignty in the islands might relate to the wider range of contemporary regional issues which have to do with hegemony in the southern cone of South America.

A closer look at an atlas would have prevented other problems. Of major concern is the question of potential oil resources in the Falklands/Malvinas area. The authors too easily discard prospects for local petroleum in saying that the nearest oil discovered in the area has been along the Argentine continental shelf. The islands are, in fact, situated on the Argentine continental shelf and not far from the Magellanes Basin from which Argentina and Chile extract oil.

Despite these flaws, the book is of value to anyone researching political events prior to and during the war. It is worth reading if only for the new and interesting details about the failed mediation efforts of Alexander Haig and Javier Perez de Cuéllar.

MARSHALL VAN SANT HALL
Commander, US Navy

Recent Books

Selected Accessions of the Naval War College Library

Annotated by

George Scheck, Mary Ann Varoutsos and Jane Viti

Lehmann, Jean-Pierre. *The Roots of Modern Japan*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. 352pp. $25.00

Japan's recent commercial and industrial success has attracted much attention and indeed serious study by Western societies. In addition to an enviable degree of economic growth, Japan is also enjoying a high degree of social stability and national cohesion. In this historical analysis, the author explains how the foundations and characteristics of Japanese culture have positively contributed to the evolution of the modern Japanese nation. A distinction is made between those elements which are unique to Japan and those which can more readily be understood in a universal context. An excellent glossary of Japanese conceptual terms is included.

Lesher, Stephan. *Media Unbound: the Impact of Television on the Public*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982. 285pp. $15.95

For most people, television news has become the prime source of information. At the

same time, television journalism has come to influence the way other media present their material as well. According to Lesher, in television the line between journalism and show business may no longer exist, and weaknesses inherent in all forms of journalism are exaggerated. Using the program *60 Minutes* as one example in his argument, he questions the extent to which modern forms of journalism adhere to truth and fairness. Lesher concludes that despite their faults, journalistic presentations are more often distorted for more mundane reason than politics or ideology.

Levy, Jack S. *War in the Modern Great Power System, 1945-1975.* Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983. 215pp. $24.00

Intended to assist in the formulation of an empirically confirmed theory of the causes of war, this compilation of war data for the great power states covers the last five hundred years. Its objectives are threefold: to define and identify the great powers; to identify and measure their wars; and to analyze the characteristics, patterns and historic trends in their wars. The data collected disproves some popular notions about the nature of war. For example, it was shown that over the last five centuries great power wars have not become more frequent, although they have become more serious. The war weariness theory was not proved; nor were most war contagion theories found to be valid.

MacDonald, Philip. *Royal Dockyards.* Pomfret, Vt.: David & Charles, 1982. 216pp. $23.00

From Tudor England to the present day, the Royal Dockyards have played a vital role in England's naval history. Today, however, there are only a few of these government facilities still in operation in the British Isles. Of historic interest is the fact that some buildings in these yards still perform the tasks for which they were originally designed in the 18th century. Included are interesting anecdotes, such as the story of one James Aitken, an American spy, who fired the Portsmouth ropery in 1776. MacDonald traces the history of these dockyards that of necessity were virtually self-contained industrial centers.

Matusow, Barbara. *The Evening Stars: the Rise of the Network News Anchors.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983. 302pp. $14.95

This is a history of television news broadcasting in the United States and an analysis of the evolving influence and power of the nightly network news anchorperson. It is based upon interviews and in-depth research. Matusow takes an inside look at the personalities and careers of star newscasters such as Dan Rather, Tom Brokaw, Edward R. Murrow, Chet Huntley, David Brinkley, Walter Cronkite, Barbara Walters, Harry Reasoner, and others. She describes the roles they play and the extensive influence they wield—how they shape public policy and private attitudes. From its origins three decades ago, television news is seen to have evolved into a national institution of awesome resources and power.

Montgomery, Michael. *Who Sank the Sydney?* North Ryde, NSW: Cassell Australia, 1981; New York: Hippocrene Books, 1983. 242pp. $16.95

Nine months after her triumphant return from the Mediterranean, the cruiser HMAS *Sydney* was sunk off the coast of Western Australia leaving no survivors. Known as the

Royal Australian Navy's "glory boat," the *Sydney* had incurred little damage in numerous engagements with enemy ships. How, then, was she so completely destroyed by the German armed merchant raider *Kormoran*? Relying on extensive interviews and hitherto classified documents, Montgomery (son of the *Sydney*'s navigator) reconstructs the encounter between the *Kormoran* and the *Sydney*. He examines conflicting accounts of the incident and investigates a number of still unanswered questions. The result is a detailed exploration of this puzzling episode complete with photographs and maps.

Nafziger, E. Wayne. *The Economics of Political Instability: the Nigerian-Biafran War.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. 251pp. paper $16.95

Here we have an examination of the economic determinants and consequences of the 1967-1970 Nigerian-Biafran war. Nafziger argues that economic analysis is necessary ro understand the origin of political instability in the Third World. Two major questions are addressed: What were the economic factors that contributed to the Nigerian civil war? What were the economic impacts of that war? The author uses the political economy approach to examine rhe probability of civil war as partly a function of internal economic factors—class conflict, economic discontent, regional and communal economic rivalries, and domestic economic policy—all of which are partially influenced by transnational variables.

Parrott, Bruce. *Politics and Technology in the Soviet Union.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983. 428pp. $45.00

Understanding the interaction between Soviet politics and technology is considered a matter of fundamental intellectual and political significance for the West. To this end, five decades of policies and debates on research and development and technology transfer in the Soviet Union are traced here, using detailed analysis of the statements of both public and private officials. In tracking some long-term rrends over the whole period of Soviet industrialization, a distinction is made between the influence of "traditionalist" and "non-traditionalist" views. Arranged chronologically, the chapters are linked by three common themes: the evolurion of the USSR's technology strategy; the political and administrative struggle for power; and the place of technological progress within the official Soviet world view.

Patten, Thomas H., Jr. *A Manager's Guide to Performance Appraisal: Pride, Prejudice, and the Law of Equal Opportunity.* New York: Free Press, 1982. 188pp. $17.92

One of the more difficult tasks of the manager is appraising and measuring the performance of people at work. In this book the author offers suggestions and guidelines on how to appraise and measure performance effectively, legally, and fairly. He endorses a management by objectives performance appraisal system. It emphasizes simplicity and focuses upon planning and controlling the fulfillment of assigned work. The author also believes that an effective performance appraisal system can help managers develop the concepts and techniques to manage adequately.

Preston, Antony. *History of the Royal Navy.* New York: Greenwich House, 1983. 192pp. $12.95*

Lavishly illustrated with over 200 colored and black and white photographs,

paintings, maps, and diagrams, this survey highlights some of the major events in the last four hundred years of British naval history. Beginning with the defeat of the Spanish Armada, the narrative traces the rise and fall of the Royal Navy's fortunes, showing how a strong navy has helped Britain to prosper. The battles of Cape Passaro, Quiberon Bay, Cape Vincent, Trafalgar, Jutland, and Barents Sea are among those treated. The chronicle ends with a description of the Battle for the Falkland Islands in 1982. Preston, an experienced naval historian, writer, and editor, augments this history with information about the leaders, organization, ships, and equipment of the Royal Navy through the years.

*Distributed by Crown Publishers, Inc., One Park Avenue, New York, NY 10016.

Reginald, Robert and Elliot, Jeffrey M. *Tempest in a Teapot*. San Bernadino, Calif.: Borgo Press, 1983. 173pp. $12.95

There have been a number of recent books dealing with the military aspects of the Falklands/Malvinas War; however, this work views the conflict from a historical and political perspective. The authors interviewed both the Argentine and British missions to the United Nations to obtain their official positions on the dispute. They also include selected documents from the United Nations and the Organization of American States, military strengths and losses, and a chronological history of the islands. While military experience, professionalism, and efficient use of the press all contributed to the British victory, it is concluded that the basic issues and grievances still remain unresolved.

Roberts, Thomas C. *The Chinese People's Militia and the Doctrine of the People's War*. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1983. 146pp. paper $4.75*

The People's War doctrine, described as the principles which have guided China's defense planning since 1949, is viewed here as being closely linked to the Chinese People's Militia. Therefore, this study examines the militia to gain insight into the defense strategy of the People's Republic of China. The militia's organization is scrutinized in detail: its military and political command and control structure; its combat and peacetime role; and its relationship with the People's Liberation Army. Additional space is given to an analysis of the effects of recent developments in China on the militia and the current trends in the relationship between the militia and the regular forces. The study concludes that the militia is the keystone of Chinese ground defense policy at the present time.

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402.



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